back to indexE124: AutoGPT's massive potential and risk, AI regulation, Bob Lee/SF update
Chapters
0:0 Bestie intros!
1:49 Understanding AutoGPTs
23:57 Generative AI's rapid impact on art, images, video, and eventually Hollywood
37:38 How to regulate AI?
72:35 Bob Lee update, recent SF chaos
00:00:00.000 |
Welcome to Episode 124 of the all in podcast. My understanding 00:00:04.960 |
is there's going to be a bunch of global fan meetups for 00:00:08.680 |
Episode 125. If you go to Twitter and you search for all 00:00:12.880 |
in fan meetups, you might be able to find the link. 00:00:14.720 |
But just to be clear, we're not they're not official all in 00:00:17.240 |
this. They're fans. It's self organized, which is pretty 00:00:20.480 |
mind blowing. But we can't vouch for any particular 00:00:24.680 |
Nobody knows what's going to happen at these things. You can 00:00:27.080 |
get robbed. It could be a setup. I don't know. But I retweeted 00:00:31.120 |
it anyway, because there are 31 cities where you lunatics are 00:00:34.880 |
getting together to celebrate the world's number one business 00:00:40.440 |
It is pretty crazy. You know, what this reminds me of is in 00:00:43.360 |
the early 90s, when Rush Limbaugh became a phenomenon. 00:00:46.680 |
There used to be these things called rush rooms where like 00:00:50.120 |
restaurants and bars would literally broadcast rush over 00:00:54.320 |
their speakers during I don't know, like what for the morning 00:00:56.960 |
through lunch broadcast, and people would go to these rush 00:01:01.000 |
What was it like sex when you were about 1617 years old at the 00:01:05.680 |
It was a phenomenon. But I mean, it's kind of crazy. We've got 00:01:08.360 |
like a phenomenon going here where people are organizing. 00:01:11.800 |
You've said phenomenon three times instead of phenomenon. He 00:01:15.840 |
said phenomenon. phenomenal. Why sacks in a good mood? What's 00:01:19.760 |
going on? There's a specific secret toe tap that you do under 00:01:22.760 |
the bathroom stalls when you go to a rush room. 00:01:24.560 |
I think you're getting confused about a different event you 00:01:49.600 |
There's a lot of actual news in the world and generative AI is 00:01:54.560 |
taking over the dialogue and it's moving at a pace that none 00:01:59.560 |
of us have ever seen in the technology industry. I think 00:02:01.720 |
we'd all agree the number of companies releasing product and 00:02:06.920 |
the compounding effect of this technology is phenomenal. I 00:02:10.760 |
think we would all agree a product came out this week 00:02:14.880 |
called auto GPT. And people are losing their mind over it. 00:02:20.360 |
Basically, what this does is it lets different GPT is talk to 00:02:26.560 |
each other. And so you can have agents working in the background 00:02:30.360 |
and we've talked about this on previous podcasts. But they could 00:02:33.640 |
be talking to each other essentially, and then completing 00:02:37.760 |
tasks without much intervention. So if let's say you had a sales 00:02:42.040 |
team and you said to the sales team, hey, look for leads that 00:02:47.480 |
have these characteristics for our sales software, put them 00:02:50.480 |
into our database, find out if they're already in the database, 00:02:53.840 |
alert a salesperson to it, compose a message based on that 00:02:56.640 |
person's profile on LinkedIn or Twitter or wherever. And then 00:02:59.960 |
compose an email, send it to them if they reply, offer them 00:03:03.200 |
to do a demo and then put that demo on the calendar of the 00:03:05.640 |
salesperson, thus eliminating a bunch of jobs and you could run 00:03:08.440 |
these, what would essentially be cron jobs in the background 00:03:12.200 |
forever, and they can interact with other LLM in real time 00:03:16.720 |
sacks. I've just gave but one example here. But when you see 00:03:19.480 |
this happening, give us your perspective on what this tipping 00:03:24.040 |
Let me take a shot at explaining it in a slightly different way. 00:03:27.280 |
Sure. Not that your explanation was wrong. But I just think that 00:03:30.280 |
maybe explain it in terms of something more tangible. So I 00:03:34.600 |
had a friend who's a developer who's been playing with auto 00:03:38.200 |
GPT. By the way, so you can see it's on GitHub. It's kind of an 00:03:41.360 |
open source project. It was sort of a hobby project. It looks 00:03:43.800 |
like that somebody put up there. It's been out for about two 00:03:46.640 |
weeks. It's already got 45,000 stars on GitHub, which is a huge 00:03:53.200 |
It's just a code repository. And you can create, you know, 00:03:56.000 |
repos of code for open source projects. That's where all the 00:03:58.360 |
developers check in their code. So you know, for open source 00:04:01.520 |
projects like this, anyone can go see it and play with it. 00:04:07.000 |
It would be more like amateur Pornhub because you're 00:04:09.320 |
contributing your scenes as it were your code. Yes, continue. 00:04:12.840 |
But this thing has a ton of stars. And apparently just last 00:04:17.560 |
night, I got another 10,000 stars overnight. This thing is 00:04:19.840 |
like, exploding in terms of popularity. But in any event, 00:04:23.080 |
what you do is you give it an assignment. And what auto GPT 00:04:27.560 |
can do that's different is it can string together prompts. So 00:04:31.560 |
if you go to chat GPT, you prompt it one at a time. And 00:04:34.640 |
what the human does is you get your answer. And then you think 00:04:36.600 |
of your next prompt, and then you kind of go from there and 00:04:38.840 |
you end up in a long conversation that gets you to 00:04:41.240 |
where you want to go. So the question is, what if the AI 00:04:45.000 |
could basically prompt itself, then you've got the basis for 00:04:49.240 |
autonomy. And that's what this project is designed to do. So 00:04:52.720 |
what you'll do is when my friend did it, he said, Okay, you're an 00:04:55.920 |
event planner, AI. And what I would like you to do is plan a 00:05:01.320 |
trip for me for a wine tasting in Healdsburg this weekend. And 00:05:07.240 |
I want you to find like the best place I should go and it's got 00:05:09.800 |
to be kid friendly, not everyone's going to drink, we're 00:05:11.680 |
gonna have kids there. And I'd like to be able to have other 00:05:13.800 |
people there. And so I'd like you to plan this for me. And so 00:05:17.680 |
what auto GPT did is it broke that down into a task list. And 00:05:22.880 |
every time I completed a task, it would add a new task to the 00:05:26.480 |
bottom of that list. And so the output of this is that it 00:05:30.680 |
searched a bunch of different wine tasting venues, it found a 00:05:34.080 |
venue that had a bocce ball and lawn area for kids, it came up 00:05:38.120 |
with a schedule, it created a budget, it created a checklist 00:05:42.600 |
for an event planner. It did all these things. And my friend says 00:05:45.960 |
he's actually in a book the venue this weekend and use it. 00:05:48.080 |
So we're going beyond the ability just for a human to just 00:05:52.680 |
prompt the AI we're now the AI can take on complicated tasks. 00:05:58.120 |
And again, it can recursively update its task list based on 00:06:01.240 |
what it learns from its own previous prompt. So what you're 00:06:04.800 |
seeing now is the basis for a personal digital assistant. This 00:06:08.720 |
is really where it's all headed is that you can just tell the AI 00:06:11.880 |
to do something for you pretty complicated. And it will be able 00:06:15.160 |
to do it, it will be able to create its own task list and get 00:06:17.800 |
the job done in quite complicated jobs. So that's why 00:06:23.600 |
free burger thoughts on automating these tasks and 00:06:27.160 |
having them run and add tasks to the list. This does seem like a 00:06:32.520 |
sort of seminal moment in time that this is actually working. 00:06:36.120 |
I think we've been seeing seminal moments over the last 00:06:41.640 |
couple of weeks and months, kind of continuously, every time we 00:06:46.320 |
chat about stuff, or every day, there's new releases that are 00:06:50.120 |
paradigm shifting, and kind of reveal new applications and 00:06:55.000 |
perhaps concepts structurally that we didn't really have a 00:06:59.600 |
good grasp of before some demonstration came across chat 00:07:02.400 |
GPT was kind of the seed of that. And then all of this 00:07:05.560 |
evolution since has really, I think, changed the landscape for 00:07:09.720 |
really how we think about our interaction with the digital 00:07:12.520 |
world and where the digital world can go and how it can 00:07:15.800 |
interact with the physical world. It's just really 00:07:17.800 |
profound. One of the interesting aspects that I think I saw with 00:07:22.480 |
some of the applications of auto GPT, where these almost like 00:07:26.440 |
autonomous characters in, in like a game simulation that 00:07:32.360 |
could interact with each other or these autonomous characters 00:07:34.560 |
that would speak back and forth to one another, where each 00:07:38.040 |
instance has its own kind of predefined role. And then it 00:07:42.560 |
explores some set of discovery or application or prompt back 00:07:46.440 |
and forth with the other agent, and that the kind of recursive 00:07:50.280 |
outcomes with this agent to agent interaction model, and 00:07:53.160 |
perhaps multi agent interaction model, again, reveals an 00:07:57.320 |
entirely new paradigm for, you know, how things can be done 00:07:59.960 |
simulation wise, you know, discovery wise engagement wise, 00:08:04.160 |
where one agent, you know, each agent can be a different 00:08:07.040 |
character in a room. And you can almost see how a team might 00:08:10.200 |
resolve to create a new product collaboratively by telling each 00:08:14.280 |
of those agents to have a different character background 00:08:16.480 |
or different set of data or a different set of experiences or 00:08:19.440 |
different set of personality traits. And the evolution of 00:08:22.200 |
those that multi agent system outputs, you know, something 00:08:25.560 |
that's very novel, that perhaps any of the agents operating 00:08:28.320 |
independently, we're not able to kind of reveal themselves. So 00:08:30.880 |
again, like another kind of dimension of interaction with 00:08:34.760 |
these with these models. And it again, like every week, it's a 00:08:38.640 |
whole nother layer to the onion. It's super exciting and 00:08:42.400 |
compelling. And the rate of change and the pace of kind of, 00:08:46.040 |
you know, new paths being being defined here, really, I think 00:08:50.680 |
makes it difficult to catch up. And particularly, it highlights 00:08:54.760 |
why it's gonna be so difficult, I think, for regulators to come 00:08:58.000 |
in and try and set a set of standards and a set of rules at 00:09:02.520 |
this stage, because we don't even know what we have here 00:09:04.160 |
yet. And it's going to be very hard to kind of put the genie 00:09:07.520 |
Yeah. And you're also referring, I think, to the Stanford and 00:09:12.440 |
Google paper that was published this week, they did a research 00:09:15.520 |
paper where they created essentially the Sims, if you 00:09:17.960 |
remember that video game, put a bunch of what you might consider 00:09:21.760 |
NPCs non playable characters, you know, the merchant or the 00:09:25.320 |
whoever in a in a video game, and they said, each of these 00:09:30.840 |
agents should talk to each other, put them in a simulation, 00:09:33.400 |
one of them decided to have a birthday party, they decided to 00:09:35.440 |
invite other people, and then they have memories. And so then 00:09:38.400 |
over time, they would generate responses like I can't go to 00:09:42.080 |
your birthday party, but happy birthday, and then they would 00:09:45.400 |
follow up with each player and seemingly emergent behaviors 00:09:49.760 |
came out of this sort of simulation, which of course, now 00:09:53.560 |
has everybody thinking, well, of course, we as humans, and this is 00:09:56.560 |
simulation theory are living in a simulation, we've all just been 00:09:59.160 |
put into this trauma is what we're experiencing right now. 00:10:02.960 |
How impressive this technology is, or is it? Oh, wow, human 00:10:09.680 |
cognition, maybe we thought was incredibly special, but we can 00:10:13.520 |
actually simulate a significant portion of what we do as humans. 00:10:17.080 |
So we're kind of taking the shine off of consciousness. 00:10:20.480 |
I'm not sure it's that, but I would make two comments. I think 00:10:23.040 |
this is a really important week. Because it starts to show how 00:10:28.680 |
fast the recursion is with AI. So in other technologies, and in 00:10:35.160 |
other breakthroughs, the recursive iterations took years, 00:10:39.400 |
right? If you think about how long did we wait for from iPhone 00:10:42.720 |
one to iPhone two, it was a year, right? We waited two years 00:10:47.600 |
for the app store. Everything was measured in years, maybe 00:10:51.920 |
things when they were really, really aggressive, and really 00:10:55.240 |
disruptive were measured in months. Except now, these 00:10:59.200 |
incredibly innovative breakthroughs are being measured 00:11:01.920 |
in days and weeks. That's incredibly profound. And I think 00:11:07.360 |
it has some really important implications to like the three 00:11:11.160 |
big actors in this play, right? So it has, I think, huge 00:11:14.680 |
implications to these companies, it's not clear to me how you 00:11:18.320 |
start a company anymore. I don't understand why you would have a 00:11:24.600 |
40 or 50 person company to try to get to an MVP. I think you 00:11:29.960 |
can do that with three or four people. And that has huge 00:11:35.880 |
implications then to the second actor in this play, which are 00:11:39.160 |
the investors and venture capitalists that typically fund 00:11:41.600 |
this stuff, because all of our capital allocation models were 00:11:45.240 |
always around writing 10 and 15 and $20 million checks and $100 00:11:49.200 |
million checks, then $500 million checks into these 00:11:52.160 |
businesses that absorbs tons of money. But the reality is like, 00:11:56.760 |
you know, you're looking at things like mid journey and 00:11:59.560 |
others that can scale to enormous size with very little 00:12:03.560 |
capital, many of which can now be bootstrapped. So it takes 00:12:08.080 |
really, really small amounts of money. And so I think that's a 00:12:12.520 |
huge implication. So for me, personally, I am looking at 00:12:15.200 |
company formation being done in a totally different way. And our 00:12:20.280 |
capital allocation model is totally wrong size. Look, fun 00:12:23.040 |
for for me was $1 billion. Does that make sense? No, for the 00:12:28.000 |
next three or four years, no, the right number may actually be 00:12:30.640 |
$50 million invested over the next four years. I think the VC 00:12:34.640 |
job is changing. I think company startups are changing. I want to 00:12:37.560 |
remind you guys have one quick thing as a tangent. I had this 00:12:41.600 |
meeting with Andre carpety, I talked about this on the pod, 00:12:44.200 |
where I said I challenged him, I said, Listen, the real goal 00:12:47.520 |
should be to go and disrupt existing businesses using these 00:12:50.480 |
tools, cutting out all the sales and marketing, right, and just 00:12:54.560 |
delivering something and I use the example of stripe, 00:12:56.880 |
disrupting stripe by going to market with an equivalent 00:12:59.920 |
product with one 10th the number of employees at one 10th the 00:13:03.240 |
cost. What's incredible is that this auto GPT is the answer to 00:13:07.960 |
that exact problem. Why? Because now if you are a young 00:13:12.360 |
industrious entrepreneur, if you look at any bloated organization 00:13:17.040 |
that's building enterprise class software, you can string 00:13:20.760 |
together a bunch of agents that will auto construct everything 00:13:25.200 |
you need to build a much much cheaper product that then you 00:13:29.280 |
can deploy for other agents to consume. So you don't even need 00:13:32.920 |
a sales team anymore. This is what I mean by this crazy 00:13:35.720 |
recursion that's possible. Yeah. So I'm really curious to see how 00:13:39.880 |
this actually affects like all of this all of these, you know, 00:13:43.360 |
it's a singular company. I mean, it's a continuation chamath of 00:13:47.000 |
and then the last thing I just want to say is related to my 00:13:49.200 |
tweet. I think this is exactly the moment where we now have to 00:13:53.440 |
have a real conversation about regulation. And I think it has 00:13:56.080 |
to happen. Otherwise, it's going to be a shit show. 00:13:57.680 |
Let's put a pin in that for a second. But I want to get saxes 00:14:00.120 |
response to some of this. So, sax, we saw this before it used 00:14:04.040 |
to take two or $3 million to commercialize a web based 00:14:06.720 |
software product app, then it went down to 500k, then 250. I 00:14:11.200 |
don't know if you saw this story. But if you remember the 00:14:14.000 |
hit game on your iPhone, flappy birds, flappy birds, you know, 00:14:19.160 |
was a phenomenon. It you know, hundreds of millions of people 00:14:22.760 |
played this game over some period of time. Somebody made it 00:14:27.320 |
by talking to chat GPT for a mid journey in an hour. So the 00:14:32.040 |
perfect example and listen, it's a game. So it's something silly. 00:14:34.920 |
But I was talking to two developers this weekend. And one 00:14:38.280 |
of them was an okay developer. And the other one was an actual 00:14:41.400 |
10x developer who's built, you know, very significant 00:14:44.000 |
companies. And they were coding together last week. And because 00:14:47.880 |
of how fast chat GPT and other services were writing code for 00:14:51.640 |
them. He looked over at her and said, you know, you're basically 00:14:56.840 |
a 10x developer now, my superpower is gone. So where 00:15:01.640 |
does this lead you to believe company formation is going to 00:15:05.760 |
go? Is this going to be, you know, massively deflationary 00:15:09.640 |
companies like stripe are going to have 100 competitors in a 00:15:12.840 |
very short period of time? Or are we just going to go down the 00:15:15.080 |
long tail of ideas and solve everything with software? How's 00:15:20.120 |
this going to play out in the in the startup space? David Sacks? 00:15:24.680 |
Well, I think it's true that developers and especially junior 00:15:29.560 |
developers get a lot more leverage on their time. And so 00:15:33.520 |
it is going to be easier for small teams to get to an MVP, 00:15:36.760 |
which is something they always should have done anyway, with 00:15:39.520 |
their seed round, you shouldn't have needed, you know, 50 00:15:42.720 |
developers to build your v1, it should be, you know, this the 00:15:46.600 |
founders really. So that, that I think is already happening. And 00:15:52.160 |
that trend will continue. I think we're still a ways away 00:15:55.760 |
from startups being able to replace entire teams of people. 00:16:00.200 |
I just, you know, I think right now, we're at the final ways, 00:16:03.440 |
final ways, months, years, decades, or it's in the years, I 00:16:08.000 |
think, for sure. We don't know how many years. And the reason I 00:16:10.760 |
say that it's just very hard to replace, you know, 100% of what 00:16:16.600 |
any of these particular job functions do 100% of what a 00:16:20.080 |
sales rep does 100% of what a marketing rep does, or even what 00:16:23.760 |
a coder does. So right now, I think we're still at the phase 00:16:26.280 |
of this, where it's a tool that gives a human leverage. And I 00:16:32.000 |
think we're still a ways away from the, you know, human being 00:16:34.600 |
completely out of the loop. I think right now, I see it mostly 00:16:38.120 |
as a force for good, as opposed to something that's creating, 00:16:46.000 |
if we follow the trend line, you know, to make that video game 00:16:49.360 |
that you shared took probably a few hundred human years than a 00:16:52.800 |
few dozen human years, then, you know, with other toolkits 00:16:57.200 |
coming out, maybe a few human months, and now this person did 00:17:00.920 |
it in one human day, using this tooling. So if you think about 00:17:05.720 |
the implication for that, I mentioned this probably last 00:17:08.800 |
year, I really do believe that at some point, the whole concept 00:17:12.360 |
of publishers and publishing maybe goes away, where, you 00:17:15.920 |
know, much like we saw so much of the content on the internet 00:17:18.200 |
today being user generated, you know, most of the content is 00:17:20.840 |
made by individuals posted on YouTube or Twitter, that's most 00:17:23.920 |
of what we consume nowadays, or Instagram or Tick Tock, in terms 00:17:27.360 |
of video content. We could see the same in terms of software 00:17:32.840 |
itself, where you no longer need a software startup or a software 00:17:36.720 |
company to render or generate a set of tools for a particular 00:17:40.600 |
user, but that the user may be able to define to their agent, 00:17:45.120 |
their AI agent, the set of tools that they would individually 00:17:48.440 |
like to use or to create for them to do something interesting. 00:17:51.360 |
And so the idea of buying or subscribing to software, or even 00:17:55.760 |
buying or subscribing to a video game, or to a movie or to some 00:17:59.240 |
other form of content starts to diminish. As the leverage goes 00:18:04.520 |
up with these tools, the accessibility goes up, you no 00:18:06.920 |
longer need a computer engineering degree or computer 00:18:09.000 |
science degree, to be able to harness them or use them. And 00:18:12.280 |
individuals may be able to speak in simple and plain English, 00:18:15.120 |
that they would like a book or a movie that does that looks and 00:18:18.840 |
feels like the following or a video game that feels like the 00:18:21.600 |
following. And so when I open up my iPhone, maybe it's not a 00:18:24.960 |
screen with dozens of video games, but it's one interface. 00:18:27.760 |
And the interface says, What do you feel like playing today. And 00:18:30.360 |
then I can very clearly and succinctly state what I feel 00:18:32.440 |
like playing and it can render that game and render the code, 00:18:34.680 |
render the engine, render the graphics and everything on the 00:18:37.840 |
fly for me. And I can use that. And so you know, I kind of think 00:18:41.160 |
about this as being a bit of a leveling up that the idea that 00:18:44.440 |
all technology again, start central and move to kind of the 00:18:47.040 |
edge of the network over time. That may be what's going on with 00:18:50.680 |
computer programming itself now, where the toolkit to actually 00:18:54.560 |
use computers to generate stuff for us is no longer a toolkit 00:18:59.520 |
that's harnessed and controlled and utilized by a set of 00:19:02.400 |
centralized publishers, but it becomes distributed and used to 00:19:05.360 |
the edge of the network by users like anyone. And then the edge 00:19:09.160 |
of the network technology can render the software for you. And 00:19:12.520 |
it really creates a profound change in the entire business 00:19:15.440 |
landscape of software and the internet. And I think it's, you 00:19:20.000 |
know, it's, it's really like, we're just starting to kind of 00:19:22.520 |
see have our heads unravel around this notion. And we're 00:19:25.800 |
sort of trying to link it to the old paradigm, which is all 00:19:28.160 |
startups are gonna get cheaper, smaller teams. But it may be 00:19:30.560 |
that you don't even need startups for a lot of stuff 00:19:32.280 |
anymore. You don't even need teams. And you don't even need 00:19:34.280 |
companies to generate and render software to do stuff for you 00:19:37.320 |
anymore. Chama when we look at this, it's kind of a pattern of 00:19:42.320 |
augmentation, as we've been talking about here, we're 00:19:45.760 |
augmenting human intelligence, then replacing this replication 00:19:51.960 |
or this automation, I guess might be a nice way to say it 00:19:54.600 |
says augmentation, then automation. And then perhaps 00:19:59.040 |
deprecation, where do you sit on this? It seems like sacks feels 00:20:02.920 |
it's going to take years. And freeberg thinks, hey, maybe 00:20:05.800 |
startups and content are over? Where do you sit on this 00:20:08.640 |
augmentation, automation, deprecation journey we're on? 00:20:12.120 |
I think that humans have judgment. And I think it's going 00:20:14.640 |
to take decades for agents to replace good judgment. And I 00:20:18.160 |
think that's where we have some defensible ground. And I'm going 00:20:22.880 |
to say something controversial. I don't think developers anymore 00:20:26.240 |
have good judgment. developers get to the answer, or they don't 00:20:30.400 |
get to the answer. And that's what agents have done. Because 00:20:32.960 |
the 10x engineer had better judgment than the one x 00:20:36.320 |
engineer. But by making everybody a 10x engineer, you 00:20:39.920 |
taking judgment away, you're taking code paths that are now 00:20:44.120 |
obvious and making it available to everybody. It's effectively 00:20:47.360 |
like what you did in chess, and AI created a solver. So 00:20:50.920 |
everybody understood the most efficient path in every single 00:20:54.720 |
spot to do the most EV positive thing, the most expected value 00:20:58.800 |
positive thing. Coding is very similar that way you can reduce 00:21:02.000 |
it and view it very, very reductively. So there is no 00:21:05.800 |
differentiation in code. And so I think freeberg is right. So 00:21:08.920 |
for example, let's say you're going to start a company today. 00:21:11.600 |
Why do you even care what database you use? Why do you 00:21:17.040 |
even care? Which cloud you're built on? To freeberg's point, 00:21:22.160 |
why do any of these things matter? They don't matter. They 00:21:25.240 |
were decisions that used to matter when people had a job to 00:21:28.720 |
do. And you paid them for their judgment. Oh, well, we think 00:21:31.760 |
GCP is better for this specific workload. And we think that this 00:21:35.520 |
database architecture is better for that specific workload. And 00:21:38.160 |
we're going to run this on AWS, but that on Azure. And do you 00:21:42.400 |
think an agent cares? If you tell an agent, find me the 00:21:45.720 |
cheapest way to execute this thing. And if it ever gets not, 00:21:50.280 |
you know, cheaper to go someplace else, do that for me 00:21:52.240 |
as well. And, you know, ETL all the data and put it in the other 00:21:57.320 |
So you're saying it will, it will swap out stripe for ad yen 00:22:00.520 |
or it does node for Amazon Web Services, it's going to be 00:22:04.400 |
it's going to be ruthless. And I think that the point of that that 00:22:07.280 |
and that's the exact perfect word, Jason, AI is ruthless, 00:22:10.880 |
because it's emotionless. It was not taken to a steak dinner. It 00:22:15.200 |
was not brought to a basketball game. It was not sold into a CEO. 00:22:19.760 |
It's an agent that looked at a bunch of API endpoints figured 00:22:25.120 |
out how to write code to it to get done the job at hand that 00:22:28.400 |
was passed to it within a budget, right. The other thing 00:22:31.120 |
that's important is these agents execute within budgets. So 00:22:35.160 |
another good example was, and this is a much simpler one. But 00:22:39.840 |
a guy said, I would like seven days worth of meals. Here are my 00:22:46.120 |
constraints from a dietary perspective. Here are also my 00:22:49.640 |
budgetary constraints. And then what this agent did was figured 00:22:53.040 |
out how to go and use the Instacart plugin at the time and 00:22:56.400 |
then these other things and execute within the budget. How 00:23:00.120 |
is that different when you're a person that raises $500,000 and 00:23:03.800 |
says, I need a full stack solution that does x, y and z 00:23:06.720 |
for $200,000. It's the exact same problem. So I think it's 00:23:11.960 |
just a matter of time until we start to cannibalize these 00:23:15.280 |
extremely expensive, ossified large organizations that have 00:23:19.360 |
relied on a very complicated go to market and sales and 00:23:22.440 |
marketing motion. I don't think you need it anymore in a world 00:23:24.840 |
of agents and auto GPT. And I think that to me is quite 00:23:29.360 |
interesting, because a, it creates an obvious set of public 00:23:33.040 |
company shorts. And then be, you actually want to arm the rebels 00:23:38.840 |
and arming the rebels to use the Toby Lutke analogy here would 00:23:42.680 |
mean to seed hundreds of one person teams, hundreds and just 00:23:48.400 |
say go and build this entire stack all over again using a 00:23:51.040 |
bunch of agents. Yeah, recursively, you'll get to that 00:23:56.560 |
Interestingly, when you talk about the emotion of making 00:24:01.040 |
these decisions, if you look at Hollywood, I just interviewed on 00:24:04.280 |
my other podcast, the founder of you have another podcast. I do. 00:24:09.000 |
It's called startups. Thank you. So you've been on her four times 00:24:15.400 |
Listen, I'm not going to plug this week in startups available 00:24:18.480 |
on Spotify and iTunes and youtube.com slash this weekend. 00:24:21.320 |
runway is the name of this company I interviewed. And 00:24:24.160 |
what's fascinating about this is he told me on everything 00:24:27.880 |
everywhere all at once the award winning film, they had seven 00:24:32.480 |
visual effects people on it, and they were using his software. The 00:24:36.000 |
late night shows like Colbert and stuff like that are using it. 00:24:38.720 |
They are ruthless in terms of creating crazy visual effects 00:24:42.400 |
now, without and you can do text prompt to get video output. And 00:24:48.320 |
it is quite reasonable what's coming out of it. But you can 00:24:51.240 |
also train it on existing data sets. So they're going to be 00:24:54.120 |
able to take something sacks, like the Simpsons, or South 00:24:58.880 |
Park, or Star Wars, or Marvel, take the entire corpus of the 00:25:02.760 |
comic books and the movies and the TV shows, and then have 00:25:06.080 |
people type in have Iron Man do this have Luke Skywalker do 00:25:09.560 |
that. And it's going to output stuff. And I said, Hey, when 00:25:12.400 |
would this reach the level that the Mandalorian TV show is and 00:25:17.760 |
he said within two years now he's talking his own book, but 00:25:20.560 |
it's quite possible that that all these visual effects people 00:25:24.440 |
from industrial light magic on down are going to be replaced 00:25:28.600 |
with director sacks who are currently using this technology 00:25:32.200 |
to do what do they call the images like that go with the 00:25:35.360 |
script storyboards storyboards Thank you. They're doing 00:25:38.520 |
storyboards in this right now, right? The difference between 00:25:41.200 |
the storyboard sacks and the output is closing in the next 00:25:45.360 |
30 months, I would say, right? I mean, maybe you could speak to 00:25:48.800 |
a little bit about the pace here, because that is the 00:25:50.920 |
perfect ruthless example of ruthless AI. I mean, you could 00:25:53.360 |
have the entire team at industrial light magics or 00:26:00.400 |
Well, I mean, you see a bunch of the pieces already there. So 00:26:03.040 |
you have stable diffusion, you have the ability to type in the 00:26:05.800 |
image that you want, and it spits out, you know, a version 00:26:08.840 |
of it, or 10 different versions of it. And you can pick which 00:26:10.800 |
one you want to go with, you have the ability to create 00:26:13.200 |
characters, you have the ability to create voices, you 00:26:17.280 |
have the ability to replicate a celebrity voice, the only thing 00:26:20.800 |
that's not there yet, as far as I know, is the ability to take 00:26:24.360 |
static images and string them together into a motion picture. 00:26:27.280 |
But that seems like it's coming really soon. So yeah, in theory, 00:26:30.680 |
you should be able to train the model, where you just give it a 00:26:33.560 |
screenplay, and it outputs, essentially an animated movie. 00:26:37.680 |
And then you should be able to fine tune it by choosing the 00:26:40.240 |
voices that you want, and the characters that you want. And, 00:26:43.360 |
you know, and that kind of stuff. So yeah, I think we're 00:26:46.360 |
close to it. Now, I think that the question, though, is, you 00:26:50.040 |
know, every nine, let's call it a reliability is a big 00:26:54.360 |
advancement. So yeah, it might be easy to get to 90% within two 00:26:59.240 |
years, but it might take another two years to go from 90 to 99%. 00:27:02.200 |
And then it might take another two years to get to 99.9, and so 00:27:06.320 |
on. And so to actually get to the point where you're at this 00:27:09.280 |
stage where you can release a theatrical quality movie, I'm 00:27:12.840 |
sure it will take a lot longer than two years. 00:27:14.360 |
Well, but look at this, sex, I'm just gonna show you one image. 00:27:16.600 |
This is the input was aerial drone footage of a mountain 00:27:19.840 |
range. And this is what it came up with. Now, if you were 00:27:22.720 |
watching TV in the 80s, or 90s, on a non HDTV, this would look 00:27:26.960 |
indistinguishable from anything you've seen. And so this is at a 00:27:31.560 |
pace that's kind of crazy. There's also opportunity here, 00:27:34.040 |
right, Friedberg. I mean, if we were to look at something like 00:27:36.880 |
the Simpsons, which has gone on for 30 years, if young people 00:27:41.080 |
watching the Simpsons could create their own scenarios, or 00:27:44.960 |
with auto GPT, imagine you told the Simpsons, stable diffusion 00:27:51.200 |
instance, read what's happening in the news, have Bart Simpson 00:27:55.400 |
respond to it have the South Park characters parody, whatever 00:27:59.480 |
happened in the news today, you could have automated real time 00:28:02.800 |
episodes of South Park, just being published on to some 00:28:06.520 |
website. Before you move on, did you see the the wonder studio 00:28:10.000 |
demo, we can pull this one up. It's really cool. Yeah, please. 00:28:13.640 |
This is a startup that's using this type of technology. And the 00:28:17.800 |
way it works is you film a live action scene with a regular 00:28:23.680 |
actor, but then you can just drag and drop an animated 00:28:26.160 |
character onto it. And it then converts that scene into a movie 00:28:32.360 |
with that character, like Planet of the Apes or Lord of the 00:28:35.240 |
Rings, right? Yeah, yeah. Dacus, it was he the person who kept 00:28:38.280 |
winning all the Oscars. So there it goes after the robot has 00:28:40.880 |
replaced the human. Wow, you can imagine like every piece of this 00:28:44.960 |
just eventually gets swapped out with AI, right? Like you should 00:28:48.320 |
be able to tell the AI give me a picture of a human leaving a 00:28:56.440 |
building, like a Victorian era building in New York. And 00:29:01.440 |
certainly it can give you a static image of that. So it's 00:29:03.400 |
not that far to then give you a video of that, right. And so I 00:29:07.920 |
yeah, I think we're, we're pretty close for, let's call it 00:29:10.840 |
hobbyists or amateurs be able to create pretty nice looking 00:29:14.520 |
movies, using these types of tools. But again, I think 00:29:18.280 |
there's a jump to get to the point where you're just all 00:29:22.240 |
One of the things I'll say on this is we still keep trying to 00:29:26.000 |
relate it back to the way media narrative has been explored and 00:29:31.360 |
written by humans in the past, very kind of linear 00:29:35.160 |
storytelling, you know, it's a two hour movie, 30 minute TV 00:29:38.360 |
segment, eight minute YouTube clip, 30 second Instagram clip, 00:29:41.760 |
whatever. But one of the enabling capabilities with this 00:29:47.080 |
set of tools is that these stories, the way that they're 00:29:51.960 |
rendered, and the way that they're explored by individuals 00:29:54.840 |
can be fairly dynamic. You could watch a movie with the same 00:30:00.800 |
story, all four of us could watch a movie with the same 00:30:03.160 |
story, but from totally different vantage points. And 00:30:06.280 |
some of us could watch it in an 18 minute version or a two hour 00:30:09.360 |
version or a, you know, three season episode episodic version, 00:30:13.160 |
where the way that this opens up the potential for creators and 00:30:17.360 |
also, so now I'm kind of saying, before I was saying, hey, 00:30:20.560 |
individuals can make their own movies and videos, that's going 00:30:22.800 |
to be incredible. There's a separate, I think, creative 00:30:26.480 |
output here, which is the leveling up that happens with 00:30:31.000 |
creators, that maybe wasn't possible to them before. So 00:30:34.280 |
perhaps a creator writes a short book, a short story. And then 00:30:38.280 |
that short story gets rendered into a system that can allow 00:30:41.520 |
each one of us to explore it and enjoy it in different ways. And 00:30:44.960 |
I, as the creator can define those different vantage points, 00:30:48.280 |
I, as the creator can say, here's a little bit of this 00:30:50.520 |
fast personality, this character trait. And so what I can now do 00:30:54.360 |
as a creator is stuff that I never imagined I could do 00:30:56.960 |
before. Think about old school photographers doing black and 00:30:59.680 |
white photography with pinhole cameras, and then they come 00:31:02.640 |
across Adobe Photoshop, what they can do with Adobe Photoshop 00:31:05.680 |
with stuff that they could never conceptualize of in those old 00:31:09.000 |
days, I think what's going to happen for creators going 00:31:11.480 |
forward. And this is going back to that point that we had last 00:31:13.680 |
week or two weeks ago about the guy that was like, hey, I'm out 00:31:15.840 |
of a job. I actually think that the opportunity for creating new 00:31:19.320 |
stuff in new ways is so profoundly expanding, that 00:31:23.440 |
individuals can now write entire universes that can then be 00:31:27.120 |
enjoyed by millions of people from completely different lengths 00:31:30.480 |
and viewpoints and, and models, they can be interactive, they 00:31:33.920 |
can be static, they can be dynamic. And that the 00:31:36.640 |
personalised, personalised, but the tooling that you as a 00:31:39.760 |
creator now have, you could choose which characters you want 00:31:42.760 |
to define, you could choose which content you want to write, 00:31:46.720 |
you could choose which content you want the AI to fill in for 00:31:49.520 |
you and say, hey, create 50 other characters in the village. 00:31:52.800 |
And then when the viewer reads the book or watches the movie, 00:31:55.320 |
let them explore or have a different interaction with a set 00:31:58.120 |
of those villagers in that village. Or you could say, hey, 00:32:01.440 |
here's the one character everyone has to meet, here's 00:32:03.600 |
what I want them to say. And you can define the dialogue. And so 00:32:06.600 |
the way that creators can start to kind of harness their 00:32:09.200 |
creative chops, and create new kinds of modalities for content 00:32:13.880 |
and for exploration, I think is going to be so beautiful and 00:32:19.160 |
Yeah, you can choose the limits of how much you want the 00:32:22.440 |
individual to enjoy from your content, versus how narrowly you 00:32:25.800 |
want to define it. And my guess is that the creators that are 00:32:28.800 |
going to win are going to be the ones that are going to create 00:32:30.880 |
more dynamic range and meet creative output. And then 00:32:33.920 |
individuals are going to kind of be stuck, they're going to be 00:32:36.800 |
more into that than they will with the static, everyone 00:32:39.080 |
watches the same thing over and over. So there will be a whole 00:32:41.320 |
new world of creators that you know, maybe have a different set 00:32:47.440 |
to build on what you're saying, very, very, she thinks 00:32:49.240 |
incredibly insightful. Just think about the controversy 00:32:51.800 |
around two aspects of a franchise like James Bond. 00:32:55.080 |
Number one, who's your favorite bond? We grew up with Roger 00:32:57.840 |
Moore, we lean towards that, then we discover Sean Connery, 00:33:00.160 |
and then all of a sudden you see, you know, the latest one, 00:33:02.640 |
he's just extraordinary. And Daniel Craig, you're like, you 00:33:06.400 |
know what, that's the one that I love most. But what if you could 00:33:08.400 |
take any of the films, you'd say, let me get you know, give 00:33:10.440 |
me the spy who loved me, but put Daniel Craig in it, etc. And 00:33:13.720 |
that would be available to you. And then think about the next 00:33:15.360 |
controversy, which is Oh, my God, does Daniel, does James 00:33:18.120 |
Bond need to be a white guy from the UK? Of course not. You can 00:33:21.120 |
release it around the world and each region could get their own 00:33:24.360 |
celebrity, their number one celebrity to play the lead and 00:33:29.360 |
you know, the old story, the epic of Gilgamesh, right. So 00:33:32.120 |
like, that story was retold in dozens of different languages. 00:33:35.760 |
And it was told through the oral tradition. It was like, you 00:33:38.160 |
know, spoken by bards around a fire pit and whatnot. And all of 00:33:41.720 |
those stories were told with different characters and 00:33:43.880 |
different names and different experiences. Some of them were 00:33:47.000 |
10 minutes long, some of them were multi hour sagas explained 00:33:50.200 |
through the story. But ultimately, the morality of the 00:33:53.360 |
story, the storyline, the intentionality of the original 00:33:56.240 |
creator of that story, yes, through the Bible is another 00:33:59.040 |
good example of this, where much of the underlying morality and 00:34:01.760 |
ethics in the Bible comes through in different stories 00:34:04.080 |
read by different people in different languages. That may 00:34:07.120 |
be where we go like, my kids want to have a 10 minute bedtime 00:34:09.800 |
story. Well, let me give them Peter Pan at 10 minutes, I want 00:34:12.560 |
to do you know, a chapter a night for my older daughter for 00:34:15.640 |
a week long of Peter Pan. Now I can do that. And so the way that 00:34:19.480 |
I can kind of consume content becomes different. So I guess 00:34:22.800 |
what I'm saying is there's two aspects to the way that I think 00:34:25.760 |
the entire content, the realm of content can be rewritten through 00:34:29.720 |
AI. The first is like individual personalized creation of 00:34:32.720 |
content, where I as a user can render content that was of my 00:34:36.520 |
liking and my interest. The second is that I can engage with 00:34:39.880 |
content that is being created that is so much more 00:34:42.120 |
multidimensional than anything we conceive of today, where 00:34:45.000 |
current centralized content creators now have a whole set of 00:34:47.320 |
tools. Now from a business model perspective, I don't think that 00:34:50.240 |
plot publishers are really the play anymore. But I do think 00:34:52.880 |
that platforms are going to be the play. And the platform 00:34:55.160 |
tooling that enables the individuals to do this stuff and 00:34:57.600 |
the platform tooling that enables the content creators to 00:35:00.200 |
do this stuff are definitely entirely new industries and 00:35:03.320 |
models that can create multi hundred billion dollar outcomes. 00:35:06.360 |
Let me hand this off to sacks because there has been the dream 00:35:09.640 |
for everybody, especially in the Bay Area of a hero coming and 00:35:15.040 |
saving Gotham City. And this has finally been realized David 00:35:20.000 |
sacks, I did my own little Twitter AI hashtag and I said to 00:35:26.160 |
Twitter AI, if only please generate a picture of David 00:35:29.720 |
sacks is Batman crouched down on the peak thing a bridge, the 00:35:33.600 |
amount of creativity sacks that came from this and this is 00:35:37.640 |
something that you know, if we were talking about just five 00:35:41.160 |
years ago, this would be like a $10,000 image you could create 00:35:44.240 |
by the way, it's a birthday. These were not professional 00:35:46.880 |
quote unquote artists, these individuals, individuals that 00:35:50.480 |
were able to harness a set of platform tools to generate this 00:35:53.640 |
incredible new content. And I think it speaks to the 00:35:56.000 |
opportunity ahead. And by the way, we're in inning one, right? 00:35:58.640 |
sacks, when you see yourself as Batman, do you ever think you 00:36:02.160 |
should take your enormous wealth and resources and put it towards 00:36:05.320 |
building a cave under your mansion that lets you out 00:36:09.080 |
underneath the Golden Gate Bridge and you could go fight 00:36:10.880 |
crime? So good. So good. Do you want to go fight this crime in 00:36:15.240 |
I think San Francisco has a lot of Gotham like qualities. I 00:36:19.240 |
think the villains are more real than the heroes. Unfortunately, 00:36:25.040 |
jokers. Yeah, that's a whole separate topic. I'm sure 00:36:29.120 |
we'll separate topic we'll get to at some point today. You guys 00:36:31.920 |
are talking about all this stupid bullshit. Like there 00:36:34.600 |
are trillions of dollars of software companies that could 00:36:36.440 |
get disrupted. And you're talking about making fucking 00:36:38.160 |
children's books and fat pictures of sacks. It's so dumb. 00:36:42.320 |
Great job. No, it nobody cares about entertainment anymore, 00:36:47.320 |
because it's totally okay. So why don't you talk about 00:36:49.520 |
industries? Where the money is? Why don't you teach people where 00:36:53.040 |
there's going to be actual economic destruction? This is 00:36:55.280 |
going to be amazing economic destruction and opportunity. 00:36:57.960 |
You spend all this time on the most stupidest fucking topics. 00:37:01.520 |
Listen, it's an illustrative example. No, it's an elitist 00:37:07.400 |
It's Batman's not nobody. Nobody cares. Let's bring nobody 00:37:13.200 |
I mean, I think I think us box office is like 20. Here I 00:37:17.080 |
remember when like, like 100 billion a year payment volume, 00:37:22.320 |
add in and Stripe are going to process $2 trillion almost once 00:37:25.720 |
you talk about that disruption, you nanny market size of US 00:37:28.760 |
media and entertainment industry 717 billion. Okay, it's not 00:37:33.000 |
Video games are nearly half a trillion a year. 00:37:35.720 |
Yeah, I mean, this is not insignificant. But let's pull up 00:37:38.920 |
Chamath tweet. Of course, the dictator wants to dictate here 00:37:42.200 |
all this incredible innovation is being made. And a new hero 00:37:46.880 |
has been born Chamath Palihapitiya, a tweet that went 00:37:50.440 |
viral over 1.2 million views already. I'll read your tweet 00:37:54.280 |
for the audience. If you invent a novel drug, you need the 00:37:57.520 |
government to vet and approve it FDA before you can 00:37:59.920 |
commercialize it. If you invent a new mode of air travel, you 00:38:02.720 |
need the government to vet and approve it. FAA. I'm just going 00:38:05.800 |
to edit this down a little bit. If you create new security, you 00:38:08.000 |
need the government to vet it and approve it sec more 00:38:10.080 |
generally, when you create things with broad societal 00:38:12.720 |
impact, positive and negative, the government creates a layer 00:38:15.160 |
to review and approve it. AI will need such an oversight 00:38:18.200 |
body. The FDA approval process seems the most credible and 00:38:21.480 |
adaptable into a framework to understand how a model behaves 00:38:26.520 |
and it's counter factual. Our political leaders need to get in 00:38:30.840 |
front of this sooner rather than later and create some oversight 00:38:33.920 |
before the eventual big avoidable mistakes happen. And 00:38:37.120 |
genies are let out of the bottle. Chamath, you really want 00:38:39.560 |
the government to come in. And then when people build these 00:38:43.560 |
tools, they have to submit them to the government to approve 00:38:46.240 |
them. That's what you're saying here. And you want that to 00:38:48.840 |
Here's the alternative. The alternative is going to be the 00:38:52.240 |
debacle that we know as Section 230. So if you try to write a 00:38:57.640 |
brittle piece of legislation or try to use old legislation to 00:39:02.960 |
deal with something new, it's not going to do a good job 00:39:06.720 |
because technology advances way too quickly. And so if you look 00:39:11.240 |
at the Section 230 example, where have we left ourselves, 00:39:14.120 |
the politicians have a complete inability to pass a new 00:39:17.720 |
framework to deal with social media to deal with 00:39:20.080 |
misinformation. And so now we're all kind of guessing what a 00:39:25.120 |
bunch of eight 70 and 80 year old Supreme Court justices will 00:39:29.160 |
do in trying to rewrite technology law when they have to 00:39:33.080 |
apply it on Section 230. So the point of that tweet was to lay 00:39:37.320 |
the alternatives. There is no world in which this will be 00:39:41.720 |
unregulated. And so I think the question to ask ourselves is do 00:39:46.280 |
we want a chance for a new body? So the FDA is a perfect example 00:39:51.600 |
why, even though the FDA commissioner is appointed by the 00:39:54.600 |
President, this is a quasi organization, it's still arms 00:39:58.560 |
length away. It has subject matter experts that they hire, 00:40:02.960 |
and they have many pathways to approval. Some pathways take 00:40:08.480 |
days, some pathways are months and years, some pathways are for 00:40:12.400 |
breakthrough innovation, some pathways are for devices. So 00:40:15.640 |
they have a broad spectrum of ways of of arbitrating what can 00:40:20.240 |
be commercialized and what cannot. Otherwise, my 00:40:23.400 |
prediction is we will have a very brittle law that will not 00:40:27.400 |
work. It'll be like the Commerce Department and the FTC trying to 00:40:31.920 |
gerrymander some old piece of legislation. And then what will 00:40:35.840 |
happen is it'll get escalated to the Supreme Court. And I think 00:40:38.840 |
they are the last group of people who should be deciding on 00:40:43.720 |
this incredibly important topic for society. So what I have been 00:40:48.760 |
advocating our leaders and I will continue to do so is don't try 00:40:53.280 |
to ram this into an existing body. It is so important, it is 00:40:56.840 |
worth creating a new organization like the FDA and 00:41:01.560 |
having a framework that allows you to look at a model and look 00:41:05.320 |
at the counterfactual judge how good how important how 00:41:10.040 |
disruptive it is, and then release it in the wild 00:41:13.080 |
appropriately. Otherwise, I think you'll have these chaos 00:41:15.480 |
GPT things scale infinitely. Because again, as Friedberg said 00:41:20.320 |
in a sex that you're talking about one person that can create 00:41:22.720 |
this chaos, multiply that by every person that is an 00:41:26.520 |
anarchist or every person that just wants to sow seeds of chaos 00:41:31.920 |
I think regulating what software people can write is a near 00:41:35.320 |
impossible task. Number one, I think you can probably put rules 00:41:39.040 |
and restrictions around commerce, right? That's 00:41:41.240 |
certainly feasible in terms of how people can monetize but in 00:41:45.120 |
terms of writing and utilizing software, it's going to be as 00:41:48.920 |
challenged as trying to monitor and demand oversight and 00:41:54.640 |
regulation around how people write and use tools for for 00:41:59.240 |
genome and biology exploration. Certainly, if you want to take a 00:42:02.800 |
product to market and sell a drug to people that can 00:42:04.920 |
influence their body, you have to go get that approved. But in 00:42:08.360 |
terms of you know, doing your work in a lab, it's very 00:42:11.880 |
difficult. I think the other challenge here is software can 00:42:16.080 |
be written anywhere. It can be executed anywhere. And so if the 00:42:20.920 |
US does try to regulate, or does try to put the brakes on the 00:42:26.640 |
development of tools where the US can have kind of a great 00:42:30.160 |
economic benefit and a great economic interest, there will be 00:42:33.760 |
advances made elsewhere, without a doubt. And those markets and 00:42:37.720 |
those those places will benefit in an extraordinarily out of 00:42:43.640 |
pace way. As we just mentioned, there's such extraordinary kind 00:42:47.320 |
of economic gain to be realized here, that if we're not, if the 00:42:51.960 |
United States is not leading the world, we are going to be 00:42:55.720 |
following and we are going to get disrupted, we are going to 00:42:57.560 |
lose an incredible amount of value and talent. And so any 00:43:00.880 |
attempt at regulation, or slowing down or telling people 00:43:04.400 |
that they cannot do things when they can easily hop on a plane 00:43:07.360 |
and go do it elsewhere, I think is is fraught with peril. 00:43:10.600 |
So you don't agree with regulation, sacks? Are you on 00:43:13.680 |
board with the Chamath plan? Are you on board with the free 00:43:15.600 |
bird? I'll say I think I think just like with computer hacking, 00:43:18.240 |
it's illegal to break into someone else's computer. It is 00:43:20.800 |
illegal to steal someone's personal information. There are 00:43:23.280 |
laws that are absolutely simple and obvious and you know, no 00:43:30.600 |
are legal to get rid of 100,000 jobs by making a piece of 00:43:34.400 |
That's right. And so I think trying to intentionalize how we 00:43:38.840 |
do things versus intentionalizing the things that 00:43:42.400 |
we want to prohibit happening as an outcome, we can certainly try 00:43:45.360 |
and prohibit the things that we want to happen up as an outcome 00:43:47.240 |
and pass laws and institute governing bodies with authority 00:43:51.480 |
to oversee those laws. With respect to things like stealing 00:43:55.840 |
but you can jump on a plane and go do it in Mexico, Canada, or 00:43:58.840 |
whatever region you get to sacks. Where do you stand on 00:44:01.280 |
Yeah, I'm saying like, there are ways to protect people, 00:44:03.920 |
there's ways to protect society about passing laws that make it 00:44:06.920 |
illegal to do things as the output of the outcome. 00:44:13.120 |
Yeah. Do you want to talk about it real quick? 00:44:14.880 |
It's a recursive agent that basically is trying to destroy 00:44:20.880 |
Yeah. But I guess by first becoming all powerful and 00:44:23.520 |
destroying humanity and then destroying itself. 00:44:28.800 |
But it's not it's not it's not a tongue in cheek. Auto GPT. 00:44:32.680 |
The guy, the guy that created it, you know, put it out there 00:44:35.000 |
and said, like, he's trying to show everyone to your point, 00:44:37.560 |
what intentionality could arise here, which is negative 00:44:40.840 |
I think it's very naive for anybody to think that this is 00:44:46.160 |
not equivalent to something that could cause harm to you. So for 00:44:50.120 |
example, if the prompt is, hey, here is a security leak that we 00:44:54.240 |
figured out in Windows. And so why don't you exploit it? So 00:44:57.880 |
look, a hacker now has to be very technical. Today with with 00:45:02.000 |
these auto GPT is a hacker does not need to be technical, 00:45:04.600 |
exploit the zero day. exploit in Windows, hack into this plane 00:45:09.400 |
and bring it down. Okay, the GPT will do it. So who's going to 00:45:13.560 |
tell you that those things are not allowed, who's going to 00:45:15.680 |
actually vet that that wasn't allowed to be released in the 00:45:18.680 |
wild. So for example, if you work with Amazon and Google and 00:45:22.480 |
Microsoft and said, you're going to have to run these things in a 00:45:25.400 |
sandbox, and we're going to have to observe the output before we 00:45:28.240 |
allow it to run on actual bare metal in the wild. Again, that 00:45:33.200 |
seems like a reasonable thing. And it's super naive for people 00:45:36.360 |
to think it's a free market. So we should just be able to do 00:45:38.400 |
what we want. This will end badly quickly. And when the 00:45:42.240 |
first plane goes down, and when the first fucking thing gets 00:45:44.800 |
blown up, all of you guys will be like, Oh, sorry, 00:45:47.280 |
facts. Pretty compelling example here by Chamath. Somebody puts 00:45:50.880 |
out into the wild chaos GPT, you can go do a Google search for it 00:45:53.600 |
and says, Hey, what are the vulnerabilities to the 00:45:56.600 |
electrical grid, compile those and automate a series of attacks 00:46:01.760 |
and write some code to probe those until we and success in 00:46:06.040 |
this mission, you get 100 points and stars every time you Jason do 00:46:09.800 |
this such a such a beautiful example, but it's even more 00:46:12.520 |
nefarious. It is. Hey, this is an enemy that's trying to hack 00:46:17.920 |
our system. So you need to hack theirs and bring it down. You 00:46:20.760 |
know, like you can easily trick these GPT. Right? Yes, they have 00:46:24.320 |
no judgment. They have no judgment. And as you said, 00:46:27.360 |
they're ruthless in getting to the outcome. Right? So why do we 00:46:32.280 |
think all of a sudden, this is not going to happen? 00:46:34.200 |
I mean, it's literally the science fiction example, you say, 00:46:36.360 |
Hey, listen, make sure no humans get cancer and like, okay, well, 00:46:39.200 |
the logical way to make sure no humans get cancer is to kill all 00:46:42.080 |
But can you just address the point? So what do you think 00:46:44.600 |
you're regulating? Are you regulating the code that here's 00:46:48.240 |
If you look at the FDA, no, you're allowed to make any 00:46:51.000 |
chemical drug you want. But if you want to commercialize it, 00:46:53.800 |
you need to run a series of trials with highly qualified 00:46:58.360 |
measurable data, and you submit it to like minded experts that 00:47:01.800 |
are trained as you are to evaluate the viability of that. 00:47:05.880 |
And but no, it's how long there are pathways that allow you to 00:47:08.760 |
get that done in days under emergency use. And then there 00:47:12.120 |
are pathways that can take years depending on how gargantuan the 00:47:15.680 |
task is at hand. And all I'm suggesting is having some amount 00:47:20.200 |
of oversight is not bad in this specific example. 00:47:24.600 |
I get what you're saying. But I'm asking tactically how what 00:47:27.480 |
are you overseeing? You're overseeing chat GPT, you're 00:47:30.640 |
overseeing the model you're doing exactly what chips. 00:47:34.080 |
Okay, look, I used to run the Facebook platform, we used to 00:47:36.920 |
create sandboxes, if you submit code to us, you would we would 00:47:40.960 |
run it in the sandbox, we would observe it, we would figure out 00:47:43.560 |
what it was trying to do. And we would tell you this is allowed 00:47:46.120 |
to run in the wild. There's a version of that that Apple does 00:47:49.040 |
when you submit an app for review and approval. Google does 00:47:52.720 |
it as well. In this case, all the bare metal providers, all the 00:47:56.560 |
people that provide GPUs will be forced by the government, in my 00:48:00.320 |
opinion, to implement something. And all I'm suggesting is that 00:48:05.200 |
it should be a new kind of body that essentially observes that 00:48:09.560 |
has PhDs that has people who are trained in this stuff, to 00:48:13.120 |
develop the kind of testing and the output that you need to 00:48:17.160 |
figure out whether it should even be allowed to run in the 00:48:20.280 |
Sorry, but you're saying that the mod the model, sorry, I'm 00:48:22.680 |
just trying to understand too much points, you're saying that 00:48:24.120 |
the models need to be reviewed by this body. And those models, 00:48:28.080 |
if they're run on a third party set of servers, if they're run 00:48:31.760 |
in the wild, right, so if you're on a computer on the on the open 00:48:36.880 |
freeberg, you cannot run an app on your computer, you know that, 00:48:39.240 |
right? It needs to be connected to the internet, right? Like if 00:48:41.600 |
you wanted to run an auto GPT, it actually crawls the internet, 00:48:45.040 |
it actually touches other API's, it tries to then basically send 00:48:48.760 |
a push request, sees what it gets back parses the JSON 00:48:52.240 |
figures out what it needs to do. All of that is allowed because 00:48:55.600 |
it's hosted by somebody, right? That code is running not 00:49:02.120 |
sure, if you want to run it locally, you can do whatever you 00:49:05.400 |
But evil agents are going to do that, right. So if I'm an evil 00:49:07.800 |
agent, I'm not going to go use AWS to run my evil agent, I'm 00:49:10.840 |
gonna set up a bunch of servers and connect to the internet. 00:49:14.240 |
I could use VPNs. The internet is open, there's open 00:49:18.120 |
in another rogue country, they can do whatever. I think that 00:49:21.760 |
what you're gonna see is that if you, for example, try to VPN and 00:49:24.880 |
run it out of like, to Gika stand back to the United States, 00:49:28.520 |
it's not going to take years for us to figure out that we need to 00:49:31.760 |
IP block rando shit coming in push and pull requests from all 00:49:35.400 |
kinds of IPs that we don't trust anymore, because we don't now 00:49:38.200 |
trust the regulatory oversight that they have for code that's 00:49:40.960 |
running from those IPs that are not us domesticated. 00:49:43.400 |
Just to let me steal man, Chamath position for a second, 00:49:46.160 |
Jason, hold on, I think the ultimate if what Chamath is 00:49:49.600 |
saying, is the point of view of Congress, and if Chamath has 00:49:53.480 |
this point of view, then there will certainly be people in 00:49:55.320 |
Congress that will adopt this point of view. The only way to 00:49:59.040 |
ultimately do that degree of regulation and restriction is 00:50:02.600 |
going to be to restrict the open internet, it is going to be to 00:50:04.920 |
have monitoring and firewalls and safety protocols across the 00:50:07.600 |
open internet. Because you can have a set of models running on 00:50:10.200 |
any set of servers sitting in any physical location. And as 00:50:13.320 |
long as they can move data packets around, they're going to 00:50:15.920 |
be able to get up to their nefarious activities. 00:50:17.920 |
Let me still man that for you, freeberg. I think, yes, you're 00:50:22.280 |
correct. The internet has existed in a very open way. But 00:50:25.480 |
there are organizations and there are places like the 00:50:28.520 |
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, if I were to 00:50:31.160 |
steal mention mods position, if you want to manufacture a car, 00:50:34.600 |
and you want to make one in your backyard and put it on your 00:50:37.960 |
track and on your land up in Napa somewhere, and you don't 00:50:41.400 |
want to have brakes on the car and you don't want to have, you 00:50:44.360 |
know, a speed limiter or airbags or seatbelts and you want to 00:50:47.360 |
drive on the hood of the car, you can do that. But once you 00:50:49.640 |
want it to go on the open road, the open internet, you need to 00:50:52.680 |
get you need to submit it for some safety standards like NHT 00:50:56.840 |
sa like Tesla has to afford has to. So sacks, where do you sit 00:51:00.440 |
on this? Or is, let's assume that people are going to do very 00:51:05.280 |
bad things with very powerful models that are becoming 00:51:09.080 |
available. Amazon today said they'll be Switzerland, they're 00:51:11.160 |
going to put a bunch of LLM and other models available on AWS, 00:51:14.480 |
Bloomberg's LLM, Facebook's, Google barred, and of course, 00:51:18.640 |
chance upt opening and being all this stuff's available to have 00:51:21.800 |
access to that. Do you need to have some regulation of who has 00:51:25.520 |
access to those at scale powerful tools? Should there be 00:51:31.840 |
I don't think we know how to regulate it yet. I think it's 00:51:34.000 |
too early. And I think the harms that we're speculating about 00:51:36.920 |
we're making the AI more powerful than it is. And I 00:51:40.320 |
believe it will be that powerful. But I think that it's 00:51:43.040 |
premature to be talking about regulating something that 00:51:44.840 |
doesn't really exist yet take the chaos GPT scenario. The way 00:51:48.960 |
that would play out would be you've got some future 00:51:52.360 |
incarnation of auto GPT. And somebody says, Okay, auto GPT, I 00:51:57.240 |
want you to be, you know, WMD AI, and figure out how to cause 00:52:02.480 |
like a mass destruction event, you know, and then it creates 00:52:05.400 |
like a planning checklist and that kind of stuff. So that's 00:52:08.640 |
basically the the type of scenario we're we're talking 00:52:11.880 |
about. We're not anywhere close to that yet. I mean, the chaos 00:52:15.400 |
GPT is kind of a joke. It doesn't produce it doesn't 00:52:20.400 |
I can give an example that would actually be completely plausible. 00:52:24.760 |
One of the first things on the chaos GPT checklist was to stay 00:52:27.920 |
within the boundaries of the law because it didn't want to get 00:52:30.880 |
Got it. So the person who did that had some sort of good 00:52:33.800 |
intent. But I can give you an example right now. That could be 00:52:37.080 |
done by chat GPT and auto GPT that could take down large 00:52:40.200 |
swaths of society and cause massive destruction. I'm almost 00:52:42.480 |
reticent to say it here. Say it. Well, I'll say and then maybe 00:52:45.840 |
we'll have to delete this. But if somebody created this, and 00:52:48.640 |
they said, figure out a way to compromise as many powerful 00:52:52.440 |
peoples and as many systems, passwords, then go in there and 00:52:55.960 |
delete all their files and turn off as many systems as you can. 00:53:00.240 |
chat GPT and auto GPT could very easily create phishing accounts 00:53:03.960 |
create billions of websites to create billions of logins, have 00:53:07.760 |
people log into them, get their passwords, log into whatever 00:53:10.520 |
they do, and then delete everything in their account. 00:53:12.920 |
Chaos, you're right to be done today. I don't think we've done 00:53:16.960 |
today. simpler than this. How about how about you fish? 00:53:19.120 |
website? Yeah, pieces of it can be created today. But you're 00:53:25.000 |
Yeah, but you can automate what fishing now to an hour days. 00:53:28.120 |
Yeah, exactly. And by the way, I'm accelerating it in weeks. 00:53:31.280 |
Why don't you just spoof the bank accounts and just steal the 00:53:34.160 |
money like that's even simpler, like people will do this stuff 00:53:37.160 |
because they're trying to do it today. Holy cow, they just have 00:53:39.640 |
a more efficient way to solve the problem about bank accounts. 00:53:41.920 |
So number one, this is a tool. And if people use a tool in 00:53:45.680 |
nefarious ways, you prosecute them. Number two, the platforms 00:53:49.320 |
that are commercializing these tools do have trust and safety 00:53:52.760 |
teams. Now in the past, trust and safety has been a euphemism 00:53:56.760 |
for censorship, which it shouldn't be. But you know, open 00:54:00.080 |
AI has a safety team and they try to detect when people are 00:54:03.480 |
using their tech in a nefarious way and they try to prevent it. 00:54:07.040 |
Do you trust? Well, no, not on censorship. But I think that 00:54:13.720 |
they're policing it. Are you willing to abdicate your work 00:54:18.680 |
societal responsibility to to open AI to do the trust and 00:54:22.040 |
what I'm what I'm saying is I'd like to see how far we get in 00:54:27.640 |
Yeah. So you want to see the mistakes, you want to see where 00:54:30.240 |
the mistakes are, and how bad the mistakes are. 00:54:32.400 |
I'm saying it's still very early to be imposing regulation, we 00:54:34.920 |
don't even know what to regulate. So I think we have to 00:54:37.160 |
keep tracking this to develop some understanding of how it 00:54:40.880 |
might be misused, how the industry is going to develop 00:54:43.560 |
safety guardrails. Okay. And then you can talk about 00:54:47.920 |
regulation. Look, you create some new FDA right now. Okay. 00:54:50.960 |
First of all, we know what would happen. Look at the drug 00:54:53.600 |
process. As soon as the FDA got involved in slow down massively. 00:54:56.720 |
Now it takes years, many years to get a drug approved. 00:54:59.480 |
Appropriately. So yes, but at least with a drug, we know what 00:55:04.160 |
the gold standard is, you run a double blind study to see 00:55:08.000 |
whether it causes harm or whether it's beneficial. We 00:55:10.960 |
don't know what that standard is for AI yet. We have no idea. 00:55:14.200 |
You can study in AI. What? No, we don't have somebody review 00:55:19.320 |
the code. You have two instances in a sandbox use a code to do 00:55:22.360 |
what? Oh, sacks. Listen, point, auto GPT. It's benign. I mean, 00:55:28.240 |
by friend use it to book a wine tasting. So who's going to 00:55:33.520 |
review that code and then speculate and say, Oh, well, 00:55:36.320 |
he's 99.9% of cases. It's perfectly benevolent and fine. 00:55:41.760 |
And innocuous. I can fantasize about some cases someone might 00:55:45.600 |
do. How are you supposed to resolve that? Very simple. 00:55:48.360 |
There are two types of regulation that occur in any 00:55:50.720 |
industry. You can do what the movie industry did, which is 00:55:53.240 |
they self regulate and they came up with their own rating system. 00:55:55.840 |
Or you can do what happens with the FDA and what happens with 00:55:59.480 |
cars, which is an external government based body. I think 00:56:02.800 |
now is the time for self regulation, so that we avoid the 00:56:06.080 |
massive heavy hand of government having to come in here. But 00:56:09.800 |
these tools can be used today to create massive harm. They're 00:56:12.560 |
moving at a pace we just said in the first half of the show that 00:56:15.520 |
none of us have ever seen every 48 hours something drops. That 00:56:18.840 |
is mind blowing. That's never happened before. And you can 00:56:22.280 |
take these tools. And in the one example that Truman and I came 00:56:26.920 |
up with the top of our head in 30 seconds, you could create 00:56:30.000 |
phishing sites, compromise people's bank accounts, take all 00:56:32.960 |
the money out, delete all the files and cause chaos on a scale 00:56:36.080 |
that has never been possible by a series of Russian hackers or 00:56:40.400 |
Chinese hackers working in a boiler room. This can scale and 00:56:44.520 |
that is the fundamental difference here. And I didn't 00:56:46.800 |
think I would be sitting here steel manning trumans argument. 00:56:49.120 |
I think humans have a high level ability to compound. I think 00:56:52.040 |
people do not understand compound interest. And this is a 00:56:54.360 |
perfect example, where when you start to compound technology at 00:56:57.480 |
the rate of 24 hours, or 48 hours, which we've never really 00:57:00.920 |
had to acknowledge, most people's brains break, and they 00:57:03.520 |
don't understand what six months from now looks like. And six 00:57:06.480 |
months from now, when you're compounding at 48, or 72 hours, 00:57:10.160 |
is like 10 to 12 years in other technology solutions. This is 00:57:15.080 |
compounding. This is this is different because of the 00:57:16.960 |
compounding. I agree with that the pace of evolution is very 00:57:19.880 |
fast. We are on a bullet train to something. And we don't know 00:57:22.880 |
exactly what it is. And that's disconcerting. However, let me 00:57:25.960 |
tell you what would happen if we create a new regulatory body 00:57:28.160 |
like the FDA to regulate this, they would have no idea how to 00:57:32.000 |
arbitrate whether a technology should be approved or not. 00:57:34.640 |
Development will basically slow to a crawl just like drug 00:57:37.880 |
development. There is no double blind stand. I agree. What 00:57:40.840 |
regulation can we do? What self regulation can we do? There is 00:57:43.600 |
no double blind standard in AI that everyone can agree on right 00:57:47.200 |
now to know whether something should be approved. And what's 00:57:49.720 |
going to happen is the thing that's made software development 00:57:52.400 |
so magical and allowed all this innovation over the last 25 00:57:56.160 |
years is permissionless innovation. Any developer, any 00:58:01.000 |
dropout from a university can go create their own project, which 00:58:04.720 |
turns into a company. And that is what has driven all the 00:58:08.320 |
innovation and progress in our economy over the last 25 years. 00:58:11.480 |
So you're going to replace permissionless innovation with 00:58:13.840 |
going to Washington to go through some approval process. 00:58:16.200 |
And it will be the politically connected, it'll be the big 00:58:19.320 |
donors who get their projects approved. And the next Mark 00:58:22.720 |
Zuckerberg, who's trying to do his little project in a dorm 00:58:24.840 |
room somewhere will not know how to do that will not know how to 00:58:30.560 |
Come on, I think you're mixing a bunch of things together. So 00:58:32.720 |
first of all, permissionless innovation happens today in 00:58:36.640 |
biotech as well. It's just that it's what Jason said, when you 00:58:39.720 |
want to put it on the rails of society, and make it available 00:58:43.120 |
to everybody, you actually have to go and do something 00:58:46.200 |
substantive. In the negotiation of these drug approvals, it's 00:58:50.200 |
not some standardized thing, you actually sit with the FDA, and 00:58:52.760 |
you have to decide what are our endpoints? What is the 00:58:54.920 |
mechanism of action? And how will we measure the efficacy of 00:58:58.320 |
this thing? The idea that you can't do this today in AI is 00:59:01.360 |
laughable? Yes, you can. And I think that smart people so for 00:59:04.280 |
example, if you pit deep minds team versus open AI team, to 00:59:09.280 |
both agree that a model is good and correct, I bet you they 00:59:12.040 |
would find a systematic way to test that it's fine. 00:59:15.280 |
I just want to point out, okay, so basically, in order to do 00:59:18.760 |
what you're saying, okay, this entrepreneur, who just dropped 00:59:22.560 |
out of college to do their project, they're gonna have to 00:59:24.240 |
learn how to go sit with regulators, have a conversation 00:59:27.160 |
with them, go through some complicated approval process. 00:59:29.840 |
And you're trying to say that that won't turn into a game of 00:59:33.200 |
political connections. Of course it will, of course it will. 00:59:39.640 |
Yeah, well, let's get to that. Hold on a second. And let's look 00:59:42.880 |
at the drug approval process. If you want to create a drug 00:59:45.760 |
company, you need to raise hundreds of millions of dollars. 00:59:48.520 |
It's incredibly expensive. It's incredibly capital intensive. 00:59:51.640 |
There is no drug company that is two guys in their garage. Like 00:59:56.960 |
many of the biggest companies, like many of the biggest 01:00:01.040 |
That is because you're talking about taking a chemical or 01:00:04.800 |
biological compound and injecting into some hundreds or 01:00:08.240 |
thousands of people who are both racially gender based, age 01:00:13.680 |
based, highly stratified all around the world, or at a 01:00:17.000 |
minimum all around the country. You're not talking about that 01:00:19.720 |
here, David, I think that you could have a much simpler and 01:00:22.680 |
cheaper way where you have a version of the internet that's 01:00:26.760 |
running in a huge sandbox someplace that's closed off from 01:00:29.360 |
the rest of the internet, and another version of the internet 01:00:31.640 |
that's closed off from everything else as well. And you 01:00:33.920 |
can run on a parallel path, as it is with this agent, and you 01:00:37.800 |
can easily, in my opinion, actually figure out whether this 01:00:41.080 |
agent is good or bad, and you can probably do it in weeks. So I 01:00:44.880 |
actually think the approvals are actually not that complicated. 01:00:47.600 |
And the reason to do it here is because I get that it may cause 01:00:52.200 |
a little bit more friction for some of these mom and pops. But 01:00:56.600 |
if you think about what's the societal and consequences of 01:01:01.640 |
letting the worst case outcomes happen, the AGI type outcomes 01:01:05.560 |
happen, I think those are so bad. They're worth slowing some 01:01:10.320 |
folks down. And I think like, just because you want to, you 01:01:13.400 |
know, buy groceries for $100, you should be able to do it, I 01:01:16.400 |
get it. But if people don't realize and connect the dots 01:01:19.800 |
between that and bringing airplanes down, then that's 01:01:22.480 |
because they don't understand what this is capable of. 01:01:24.280 |
I'm not saying we're never going to need regulation. What I'm 01:01:27.000 |
saying is, it's way too early. We don't even know what we're 01:01:29.920 |
calculating. I don't know what the standard would be. And what 01:01:32.800 |
we will do by racing to create a new FDA is destroying American 01:01:36.240 |
innovation in the sector, and other countries will not slow 01:01:40.840 |
Got it. I think there's a middle ground here of self regulation 01:01:45.400 |
and thoughtfulness on the part of the people who are providing 01:01:47.840 |
these tools at scale. To give just one example here, and this 01:01:51.720 |
tweet is from five minutes ago. So to look at the pace of this 01:01:55.200 |
five minutes ago, this tweet came out, a developer who is an 01:01:59.200 |
AI developer says AI agents continue to amaze my GPT for 01:02:02.960 |
coding and says learn how to build apps with authenticated 01:02:05.840 |
users that can build and design a web app, create a back end, 01:02:08.600 |
handle off, logins, upload code to GitHub and deploy. He 01:02:14.640 |
literally while we were talking is deploying websites. Now if 01:02:18.440 |
this website was a phishing app, or the one that Chamath is 01:02:23.000 |
talking about, he could make a gazillion different versions of 01:02:26.760 |
Bank of America, Wells Fargo, etc, then find everybody on the 01:02:30.480 |
internet's email, then start sending different spoofing 01:02:32.840 |
emails, determine which spoofing emails work, iterate on those, 01:02:36.200 |
and create a global financial collapse. Now this sounds 01:02:38.520 |
insane, but it's happening right now. People get hacked every day 01:02:42.200 |
at 123%. Saks fraud is occurring right now in the low single 01:02:47.600 |
digit percentages identity theft is happening in the low single 01:02:50.480 |
identity percentages. This technology is moving so fast 01:02:54.320 |
that bad actors could 10x that relatively easy. So if 10% of us 01:02:59.400 |
want to be hacked and have our credit card attacked, this could 01:03:01.680 |
create chaos. I think self regulation is the solution. I'm 01:03:05.720 |
the one who brought up self regulation. What I said first, I 01:03:10.040 |
I'm not it's not about credit. I'm no regulation. 01:03:15.960 |
you talked for eight minutes. So if you have a point to make you 01:03:19.040 |
Oh my god, you guys kept interrupting me. Go ahead. What I 01:03:22.440 |
said is that there are trust and safety teams at these big AI 01:03:26.840 |
companies, these big foundation model companies like open AI. 01:03:30.600 |
Like I said, in the past, trust and safety has been a euphemism 01:03:34.400 |
for censorship. And that's why people don't trust it. But I 01:03:37.520 |
think it would be appropriate for these platform companies to 01:03:40.840 |
apply some guardrails on how their tools can be used. And 01:03:44.120 |
based on everything I know they're doing that. So 01:03:47.200 |
websites on the open web with chat GP four, and he's going to 01:03:50.840 |
have it do it automated, you're basically postulating 01:03:56.040 |
I just tweeted the guy's doing it. He's got a video of himself 01:03:58.640 |
doing it on the web. What do you think? That's a far cry from 01:04:01.640 |
basically running like some fishing expedition that's going 01:04:07.240 |
A literally a fishing a fishing site and a site with OAuth are 01:04:11.880 |
I think that that guy is doing something illegal if he's 01:04:16.960 |
hacking into computers, into people's emails and bank 01:04:20.680 |
accounts. That's illegal. You're not allowed to do that. And so 01:04:24.520 |
that action breaks the law, that person can be prosecuted for 01:04:28.480 |
doing that. The tooling that one might use to do that can be used 01:04:33.200 |
in a lot of different ways. Just like you could use Microsoft 01:04:37.200 |
Word to forge letters, just like you could use Microsoft Excel to 01:04:42.200 |
create fraudulent financial statements. I think that the 01:04:44.600 |
application of a platform technology needs to be 01:04:48.520 |
distinguished from the technology itself. And while we 01:04:53.160 |
all feel extraordinarily fearful, because the unbelievable 01:04:56.040 |
leverage that these AI tools provide, again, I'll remind you 01:05:00.480 |
that this chat GPT-4 or this GPT-4 model, by some estimates, 01:05:05.880 |
is call it a few terabytes, you could store it on a hard drive, 01:05:08.280 |
or you can store it on your iPhone. And you could then go 01:05:11.120 |
run it on any set of servers that you could go set up 01:05:13.680 |
physically anywhere. So you know, it's a little bit naive to 01:05:17.160 |
say we can go ahead and, you know, regulate platforms and we 01:05:20.640 |
can go regulate the tools. Certainly, we should continue to 01:05:23.720 |
enforce and protect ourselves against nefarious actors using, 01:05:27.920 |
you know, new tools in inappropriate and illegal ways. 01:05:30.800 |
You know, I also think that there's a moment here that we 01:05:35.880 |
should all kind of observe just how quickly we want to shut 01:05:40.840 |
things down, when, you know, they take away what feels like 01:05:46.320 |
the control that we all have from one day to the next. And, 01:05:51.480 |
you know, that the real side kind of sense of fear that seems 01:05:56.960 |
to be quite contagious for a large number of people that have 01:05:59.800 |
significant assets or significant things to lose is 01:06:05.120 |
that, you know, tooling that's, that's, you know, creating 01:06:08.440 |
entirely newly disruptive systems and models for business 01:06:11.400 |
and economics. And opportunity for so many needs to be 01:06:16.400 |
regulated away to minimize, you know, what we claim to be some 01:06:20.520 |
potential downside when we already have laws that protect 01:06:22.920 |
us on the other side. So, you know, I just kind of want to 01:06:28.120 |
also consider that this set of tools creates extraordinary 01:06:31.800 |
opportunity, we gave one sort of simple example about the 01:06:34.640 |
opportunity for creators, but we talked about how new business 01:06:37.760 |
models, new businesses can be started with one or two people, 01:06:40.720 |
you know, entirely new tools can be built with a handful of 01:06:43.840 |
people, entirely new businesses, this is an incredible economic 01:06:47.600 |
opportunity. And again, if the US tries to regulate it, or the 01:06:51.440 |
US tries to come in and stop the application of models in general 01:06:54.360 |
or regulate models in general, you're certainly going to see 01:06:57.040 |
those models of continue to evolve and continue to be 01:06:59.280 |
utilized in very powerful ways are going to be advantageous to 01:07:03.720 |
places outside the US, there's over 180 countries on earth, 01:07:06.960 |
they're not all going to regulate together. It's been 01:07:09.280 |
hard enough to get any sort of coordination around financial 01:07:12.600 |
systems to get coordination around climate change to get 01:07:15.360 |
coordination around anything on a global basis to try and get 01:07:18.720 |
coordination around the software models that are being developed, 01:07:23.680 |
You don't want to have a global organization, I think you need 01:07:25.960 |
to have a domestic organization that protects us. And I think 01:07:29.520 |
Europe will have their own thing. Again, FDA versus Emma, 01:07:33.200 |
Canada has its own Japan has its own, China has its own, and they 01:07:38.080 |
have a lot of overlap and a lot of commonality and then the guard 01:07:41.000 |
rules they use. And I think that's what's going to happen 01:07:43.200 |
This will be beneficial only for political insiders who will 01:07:45.880 |
basically be able to get their projects and their apps approved 01:07:48.560 |
with a huge deadweight loss for the system because innovation 01:07:50.880 |
will completely slow down. But to me build on freeberg's point, 01:07:53.840 |
which is that we have to remember that AI won't just be 01:07:58.840 |
used by nefarious actors, it'll be used by positive actors. So 01:08:02.720 |
there will be new tools that law enforcement will be able to use. 01:08:05.680 |
And if somebody is creating phishing sites at scale, they're 01:08:08.480 |
going to be probably pretty easy for you know, law enforcement 01:08:11.880 |
AI is to detect. So let's not forget that there'll be co 01:08:15.040 |
pilots written for our law enforcement authorities, they'll 01:08:18.520 |
be able to use that to basically detect and fight crime. And a 01:08:21.520 |
really good example of this was in the crypto space. We saw this 01:08:24.360 |
article over the past week that chain analysis has figured out 01:08:28.360 |
how to basically track, you know, illicit Bitcoin 01:08:31.040 |
transactions. And there's now a huge number of prosecutions 01:08:34.240 |
that are happening of illegal use of Bitcoin. And if you go 01:08:37.920 |
back to when Bitcoin first took off, there was a lot of 01:08:42.080 |
conversations around Silk Road. And the only thing that Bitcoin 01:08:44.920 |
was good for was basically illegal transactions, 01:08:47.720 |
blackmailing, drug trafficking, and therefore we had to stop 01:08:51.640 |
Bitcoin. Remember, that was the main argument. And the counter 01:08:55.240 |
argument was that will know Bitcoin, like any technology can 01:08:59.240 |
be used for good or bad. However, there will be 01:09:01.640 |
technologies that spring up to combat those nefarious or 01:09:06.040 |
illicit use cases. And sure enough, you had a company like 01:09:08.680 |
chain analysis come along. And now it's been used by law 01:09:11.160 |
enforcement to basically crack down on the illicit use of 01:09:14.680 |
Bitcoin. And if anything, it's cleaned up the Bitcoin community 01:09:17.920 |
tremendously. And I think it's dispelled this idea that the 01:09:21.160 |
only thing you'd use Bitcoin for is black market transactions. 01:09:24.800 |
Quite the contrary. I think you'd be really stupid now to 01:09:27.800 |
use Bitcoin in that way. It's actually turned Bitcoin into 01:09:30.840 |
something of a honeypot now. Because if you used it for 01:09:34.040 |
nefarious transactions, your transactions record in the 01:09:36.920 |
blockchain forever just waiting for chain analysis to find it. 01:09:40.320 |
So again, using Bitcoin to do something illegal be really 01:09:43.280 |
stupid. I think in a similar way, you're going to see self 01:09:46.680 |
regulation by these major AI platform companies combined with 01:09:50.400 |
new tools are used new AI tools that spring up to help combat 01:09:54.840 |
the nefarious uses. And until we let those forces play out. I'm 01:09:59.560 |
not saying regulate never, I'm just saying we need to let those 01:10:02.600 |
forces play out. Before we leap to creating some new regulatory 01:10:06.920 |
body that doesn't even understand what its mandate 01:10:15.000 |
unbelievable. Pretty epic. It took years. But basically, this 01:10:18.440 |
guy was buying blow on Silk Road. And he deposited his 01:10:23.160 |
Bitcoin. And then when he withdrew it, he there was a bug 01:10:26.560 |
that gave him twice as many Bitcoin. So he kept creating 01:10:29.000 |
more accounts putting more money into Silk Road and getting more 01:10:31.800 |
Bitcoin out. And then years later, the authorities figured 01:10:35.640 |
this out again with you know, chain analysis type things. 01:10:40.520 |
James Zong, the accused, had a Lamborghini, a Tesla, a lake 01:10:45.000 |
house, and was living his best life apparently, when the feds 01:10:50.760 |
knocked on his door and found the digital keys to his crypto 01:10:54.400 |
fortune in a popcorn tin in his bathroom, and in a safe in his 01:11:03.280 |
a phone. The reason the reason I posted this was I was like, 01:11:05.840 |
what if this claim that you can have all these anonymous 01:11:10.640 |
transactions actually fooled an entire market? Because it looks 01:11:16.600 |
like that this anonymity has effectively been reverse 01:11:20.760 |
engineered, and there's no anonymity at all. And so what 01:11:24.280 |
Bitcoin is quickly becoming is like the most singular honeypot 01:11:29.120 |
of transactional information that's complete and available in 01:11:33.360 |
public. And I think what this article talks about is how 01:11:36.280 |
companies like chain analysis, and others have worked now, for 01:11:40.400 |
years, almost a decade, with law enforcement to be able to map 01:11:44.560 |
all of it. And so now every time money goes from one Bitcoin 01:11:49.280 |
wallet to another, they effectively know the sender and 01:11:52.480 |
And I just want to make one quick correction here. It wasn't 01:11:55.320 |
actually exactly popcorn. It was Cheetos spicy flavored popcorn. 01:12:00.400 |
And there's the tin where he had a motherboard of a computer that 01:12:05.840 |
is there a chance that that this project was actually 01:12:09.400 |
introduced by the government? I mean, there's been reports of 01:12:12.440 |
tour on anonymous or network that the CIA had their hands all 01:12:17.000 |
over tour. to our if you don't know it, which is an anonymous 01:12:20.280 |
like multi relay, peer to peer web browsing system, and people 01:12:25.680 |
believe it's a CIA honeypot, an intentional trap for criminals 01:12:31.280 |
to get themselves caught up in. All right, as we wrap here, what 01:12:36.920 |
an amazing discussion, my lord, I didn't I never thought I would 01:12:42.360 |
We saw that someone was arrested for the murder of Bob Lee. 01:12:47.600 |
That's what I was about this morning. Yeah, which turns out 01:12:50.640 |
that the report of the SF PDs arrest is that it's someone that 01:12:54.760 |
he knew that also works in the tech industry, someone possibly 01:12:57.440 |
know, right. So still breaking news. Yes, possibly. But I want 01:13:01.960 |
to say two things. One, obviously, based on this arrest 01:13:04.840 |
and the storyline, it's quite different than what we all 01:13:08.080 |
assumed it to be, which was some sort of homeless robbery type 01:13:11.480 |
moment that has become all too commonplace in SF. It's a 01:13:16.080 |
commentary for me on two things. One is how quick we all were to 01:13:20.240 |
kind of judge and assume that, you know, a homeless robber type 01:13:24.920 |
person would do this in SF, which I think speaks to the 01:13:28.120 |
condition in SF right now, also speaks to our conditioning that 01:13:32.080 |
that we all kind of lacked or didn't even want to engage in a 01:13:35.520 |
conversation that maybe this person was murdered by someone 01:13:37.960 |
that they knew. Because we wanted to kind of very quickly 01:13:42.200 |
fill our own narrative about how bad SF is. And that's just 01:13:45.560 |
something that I really felt when I read this this morning, I 01:13:47.520 |
was like, man, like, I didn't even consider the possibility 01:13:50.280 |
that this guy was murdered by someone that he knew, because I 01:13:54.040 |
am so enthralled right now by this narrative that SF is so 01:13:57.000 |
bad, and it must be another data point that validates my point of 01:13:59.680 |
view on SF. So you know, I kind of want to just acknowledge that 01:14:02.680 |
and acknowledge that we all kind of do that right now. But I do 01:14:05.440 |
think it also does, in fact, unfortunately speak to how bad 01:14:08.160 |
things are in SF, because we all are. We've all had these 01:14:11.240 |
experiences of feeling like we're in danger and under 01:14:13.520 |
threat all the time we're walking around in SF, in so many 01:14:16.560 |
parts of San Francisco, I should say, where things feel like 01:14:19.360 |
they've gotten really bad. I think both things can be true 01:14:22.760 |
that we can kind of feel biased and fill our own narrative by 01:14:28.240 |
kind of latching on to our assumption about what something 01:14:30.800 |
tells us. But But it also tells us quite a lot about what is 01:14:34.040 |
going on. So I just wanted to make that point. 01:14:36.760 |
In fairness, and I think it's fine for you to make that point. 01:14:39.000 |
I am extremely vigilant on this program to always say when 01:14:42.800 |
something is breaking news, withhold judgment, whether it's 01:14:45.200 |
the Trump case or Jesse Smollett or anything in between January 01:14:48.480 |
6, let's wait until we get all the facts. And in fact, quote 01:14:51.680 |
from Sacks, we don't know exactly what happened yet. 01:14:56.920 |
Literally, Sacks started with that. We do that every fucking 01:15:01.200 |
time on this program. We know when there's breaking news to 01:15:04.680 |
withhold judgment, but you can also know two things can be 01:15:08.760 |
true. A tolerance for ambiguity is necessary. 01:15:11.640 |
But I'm saying I didn't even do that. As soon as I heard this, I 01:15:15.200 |
assumption. But you know, David, that is a fine assumption to 01:15:20.520 |
assumption. It's a logical assumption. Listen, 01:15:22.280 |
you make that assumption for your own protection. 01:15:24.680 |
We got all these reporters who are basically propagandists 01:15:27.920 |
trying to claim that crime is down in San Francisco. They're 01:15:29.840 |
all basically seeking comment from me this morning, sending 01:15:32.680 |
emails or trying to God on us because we basically talked 01:15:36.320 |
about the bubbly case in that way. Listen, we said that we 01:15:41.680 |
didn't know what happened. But if we were to bet, at least what 01:15:44.880 |
I said is I bet this case, it looks like a lot like the 01:15:47.440 |
Brianna Kupfer case. That was logical. That's not 01:15:50.160 |
conditioning or bias. That's logic. And you need to look at 01:15:53.760 |
what else happened that week. Okay, so just the same week that 01:15:58.120 |
Bob Lee was killed, let me give you three other examples of 01:16:00.960 |
things that happened in Gotham City, aka San Francisco. So 01:16:04.600 |
number one, former fire commissioner, Don carminiani was 01:16:08.960 |
beaten within an inch of his life by a group of homeless 01:16:11.760 |
addicts in the marina. And one of them was interviewed in terms 01:16:16.520 |
of why it happened. And basically, Don came down from 01:16:19.520 |
his mother's house and told them to move off his mother's front 01:16:22.640 |
porch, because they were obstructing her ability to get 01:16:25.160 |
in and out of her apartment. They interpreted that as 01:16:27.240 |
disrespect. And they beat him with a tire iron or a metal 01:16:30.640 |
pipe. And one of the hoodlums who was involved in this 01:16:34.560 |
apparently admitted this. Yeah, play the video. 01:16:37.040 |
Somebody over the head like that and attack him. 01:16:49.320 |
Don Don. So he was being disrespectful. And then but is 01:16:58.800 |
so this is case number one. And apparently in the reporting on 01:17:02.760 |
that person who was just interviewed, he's been in the 01:17:04.760 |
marina kind of terrorizing people, maybe not physically, 01:17:07.600 |
but verbally. So you have, you know, bands of homeless people 01:17:12.880 |
encamped in front of people's houses. Don carminiani gets 01:17:16.560 |
beaten within an inch of his life. You then had the case of 01:17:19.520 |
the Whole Foods store on Market Street shut down in San 01:17:23.000 |
Francisco. And this was not a case of shoplifting like some of 01:17:26.280 |
the other store closings we've seen. They said they were 01:17:28.600 |
closing the store because they could not protect their 01:17:31.320 |
employees. The bathrooms were filled with needles and pipes 01:17:35.640 |
that were drug paraphernalia. You had drug addicts going in 01:17:38.440 |
there using it they were engaging in altercations with 01:17:41.400 |
store employees. And Whole Foods felt like that to close the 01:17:44.160 |
store because again, they cannot protect their employees. Third 01:17:47.760 |
example, Board of Supervisors had to disband their own meeting 01:17:51.520 |
because their internet connection got vandalized. The 01:17:55.520 |
fiber for the cable connection to provide their internet got 01:17:59.560 |
vandalized. So they had to basically disband their meeting 01:18:01.600 |
Aaron Preskin was the one who announced this and you saw in 01:18:04.240 |
the response to this. Yeah, my retweeting him went viral. There 01:18:08.760 |
were lots of people said, Yeah, I've got a small business and 01:18:11.360 |
the fiber, the copper wire, whatever was vandalized. And in 01:18:15.240 |
a lot of cases, I think it's basically drug addicts stealing 01:18:17.320 |
whatever they can they steal $10 of copper wire, sell that to 01:18:20.760 |
get a hit. And it causes $40,000 of property damage. 01:18:24.540 |
Here's the insincerity, sex, literally, the proper response 01:18:29.040 |
when there's violence in San Francisco is, hey, we need to 01:18:31.920 |
make this place less violent. Is there a chance that it could be 01:18:34.740 |
people who know each other? Of course, that's inherent in any 01:18:37.680 |
crime that occurs that there'll be time to investigate it. But 01:18:40.800 |
literally, the press is now using this as a moment to say 01:18:44.240 |
there's no crime in San Francisco, or that we're 01:18:47.040 |
reacting. And like, I just have the New York Times email me 01:18:49.500 |
during the podcast. Heather Knight from the Chronicle, San 01:18:52.980 |
Francisco Chronicle, in light of the Bob Lee killing appearing 01:18:56.160 |
to be an interpersonal dispute. She still doesn't know, right? 01:18:58.760 |
We don't have all the facts with another tech leader. Do you 01:19:01.320 |
think the tech community jumped to conclusions? Why are so many 01:19:03.920 |
tech leaders painting San Francisco as a dystopian 01:19:06.880 |
hellscape with the reality with the reality is more nuanced. I 01:19:10.620 |
think it's a little typo there. Yes. Of course, the reality is 01:19:15.160 |
nuanced. Of course, it's a hellscape. Walk down the 01:19:18.840 |
street. Heather, can I give you a theory, please? I think it was 01:19:24.580 |
most evident in the way that Ilan dismantled and manhandled 01:19:29.940 |
the BBC reporter. Oh my god, that was brutal. This is a small 01:19:34.180 |
microcosm of what I think media is. So I used to think that 01:19:38.900 |
media had an agenda. I actually now think that they don't 01:19:44.300 |
particularly have an agenda, other than to be relevant, 01:19:48.620 |
because they see waning relevance. And so I think what 01:19:52.980 |
happens is whenever there are a bunch of articles that tilt the 01:19:56.700 |
pendulum into a narrative, they all of a sudden become very 01:20:01.860 |
focused on refuting that narrative. And even if it means 01:20:07.300 |
they have to lie, they'll do it. Right. So, you know, I think for 01:20:10.980 |
months and months, I think people have seen that the 01:20:13.500 |
quality of the discourse on Twitter became better and 01:20:16.020 |
better. Ilan is doing a lot with bots and all of this stuff, 01:20:19.220 |
cleaning it up. And this guy had to try to establish the 01:20:23.780 |
counter narrative, and was willing to lie in order to do 01:20:26.780 |
it, then he was dismantled. Here, you guys, I don't have a 01:20:30.340 |
bone to pick so much with San Francisco. I think I've been 01:20:32.660 |
relatively silent on this topic. But you guys, as residents and 01:20:36.180 |
former residents, I think have a vested interest in the quality 01:20:38.700 |
of that city. And you guys have been very vocal. But I think 01:20:41.620 |
that you're not the only ones Michelle Tandler, you know, 01:20:44.220 |
Schellenberger, there's a bunch of smart, thoughtful people 01:20:47.260 |
who've been beating this drum, Gary tan. And so now I think 01:20:52.820 |
reporters don't want to write the end plus first article 01:20:55.780 |
saying that San Francisco is a hellscape. So they have to take 01:20:59.140 |
the other side. And so now they're going to go and kick up 01:21:02.100 |
the counter narrative. And they'll probably dismantle the 01:21:05.340 |
truth and kind of redirect it in order to do it. So I think that 01:21:09.380 |
what you're seeing is, they'll initially tell a story, but 01:21:12.820 |
what then there's too much of the truth, they'll go to the 01:21:15.220 |
other side, because that's the only way to get clicks and be 01:21:17.180 |
seen. So I think that that's what you guys are a part of 01:21:20.300 |
they are in the business of protecting the narrative. But I 01:21:22.980 |
do think there's a huge ideological component to the 01:21:24.900 |
narrative, both in the long case where they're trying to claim 01:21:28.420 |
that there was a huge rise in hate speech on Twitter. The 01:21:30.740 |
reason they're saying that is because they want Twitter to 01:21:34.020 |
engage in more censorship. That's the ideological agenda 01:21:36.780 |
here. The agenda is this radical agenda of decarceration, they 01:21:41.740 |
actually believe that more and more people should be let out of 01:21:44.260 |
prison. And so therefore, they have an incentive to deny the 01:21:50.260 |
existence of crime in San Francisco and the rise in crime 01:21:53.580 |
in San Francisco. If you pull most people in San Francisco, 01:21:56.500 |
large majorities of San Francisco believe that crime is 01:21:58.660 |
on the rise, because they can see it, they hear it. And what I 01:22:01.420 |
would say is, look, I think there's a pyramid of activity, a 01:22:05.700 |
pyramid of criminal or anti social behavior in San 01:22:08.940 |
Francisco, that we can all see the base level is you've got a 01:22:12.660 |
level of chaos on the streets, where you have open air drug 01:22:16.220 |
markets, people doing drugs, sometimes you'll see, you know, 01:22:20.060 |
a person doing something disgusting, you know, like 01:22:22.420 |
people defecating on the streets or even worse, then there's like 01:22:25.860 |
a level up where they're chasing after you, or, you know, 01:22:28.060 |
harassing you people have experienced that I've 01:22:30.300 |
experienced that, then there's a level up where there's petty 01:22:33.460 |
crime, your car gets broken into, or something like that, 01:22:36.660 |
then there's the level where you get mugged. And then finally, 01:22:39.860 |
the top of the pyramid is that there's a murder. And it's true 01:22:43.300 |
that most of the time, the issues don't go all the way to 01:22:46.420 |
the top of the pyramid where someone is murdered. Okay, but 01:22:49.660 |
that doesn't mean there's not a vast pyramid underneath that, of 01:22:53.540 |
basically quality of life issues. And I think this term 01:22:56.660 |
quality of life was originally used as some sort of way to 01:23:02.140 |
minimize the behavior that was going on saying that they 01:23:05.220 |
weren't really crimes, we shouldn't worry about them. But 01:23:08.100 |
if anything, what we've seen in San Francisco is that when you 01:23:10.420 |
ignore quality of life crimes, you will actually see a huge 01:23:15.260 |
diminishment in what it's like to live in these cities, like 01:23:18.900 |
quality of life is real. And that's the issue. And I think 01:23:21.420 |
what they're trying to do now is that say that because Bob Lee 01:23:24.860 |
wasn't the case that we thought it was that that whole pyramid 01:23:28.420 |
doesn't exist, doesn't exist pyramid exists, we can all 01:23:31.300 |
experience Oh, my God. And that's the insincerity of this. 01:23:34.620 |
It is insincere. And the existence of that pyramid that 01:23:37.340 |
we can see, and hear and feel and experience every day is why 01:23:41.340 |
we're willing to make a bet. We called it a bet that the Bob Lee 01:23:45.060 |
case was like the Brianna Kupfer case. And in that 01:23:47.700 |
with a disclaimer, with a disclaimer, and we always do a 01:23:50.700 |
disclaimer here. And just to George Hammond from the 01:23:53.660 |
Financial Times who emailed me, here's what he asked me, there's 01:23:55.740 |
a lot of public attention lately on whether San Francisco status 01:23:58.380 |
has one of the top business and technology hubs in the US is at 01:24:00.780 |
risk in the aftermath of the pandemic. Duh, obviously it is. 01:24:04.020 |
I wonder if you had a moment to chat about that. And whether 01:24:06.860 |
there is a danger that negative perceptions about the city will 01:24:10.060 |
damage its reputation for founders and capital allocators 01:24:12.300 |
in the future. So essentially, the and it says the obviously a 01:24:15.900 |
lot of potential for hysteria in this conversation, which I'm 01:24:18.540 |
keen to avoid. And it's like, hey, have you walked down the 01:24:21.540 |
street? And I asked him, have you walked down the street and 01:24:24.620 |
Jason, the best response is send him the thing that sacks and 01:24:27.740 |
which is the amount of available office space in San Francisco. 01:24:32.380 |
People are voting for hours, companies are voting with their 01:24:35.260 |
feet. So it's already if the quality of life wasn't so poor, 01:24:38.820 |
This is the essence of gaslighting is what they do is 01:24:41.820 |
that people who've actually created the situation, San 01:24:44.220 |
Francisco with their policies, their policies of defunding the 01:24:47.700 |
police, making it harder for the police to do their job 01:24:50.220 |
decriminalizing theft under $950, allowing open air drug 01:24:54.460 |
markets, the people who have now created that matrix of policies 01:24:57.500 |
that create the situation, what they then turn around and do is 01:25:00.260 |
say no, the people who are creating the problem are the 01:25:02.380 |
ones who are observing this. That's all we're doing is 01:25:05.380 |
observing and complaining about it. And what they try to do is 01:25:08.460 |
say, Well, no, you're you're running down San Francisco, 01:25:10.460 |
we're not the ones creating the problem, we're observing it. And 01:25:12.460 |
just this week, another data point is that the mayor's office 01:25:15.660 |
said that they were short more than 500 police officers in San 01:25:19.700 |
Yeah, nobody who's going to become a police officer here. 01:25:23.060 |
Well, and there was another article just this week about 01:25:29.220 |
swirling of an unofficial strike, an informal strike by 01:25:32.740 |
police officers who are normally on the force who are tired of 01:25:36.140 |
risking life and limb. And then you know, they basically risk 01:25:39.620 |
getting out of physical altercation with a homeless 01:25:42.500 |
person, they bring them in, and then they're just released 01:25:45.020 |
again. So there's a lot of quiet quitting that's going on in the 01:25:47.820 |
job. It's like this learned helplessness, because why take a 01:25:51.300 |
risk and then the police commission doesn't have your 01:25:53.140 |
back. It seems like the only time you have prosecutorial 01:25:56.180 |
zeal by a lot of these prosecutors is when they can go 01:25:58.860 |
after a cop, not one of these repeat offenders. And you just 01:26:03.100 |
look, motherboard and New York Times just emailed and DM me. 01:26:06.260 |
And then and then did you guys say that instead of solving 01:26:09.180 |
these issues, the Board of Supervisors was dealing with a 01:26:18.580 |
they had, or Yeah, they had scheduled a meeting to vote on 01:26:22.540 |
whether the wild parrots are the official animal of the city of 01:26:26.780 |
San Francisco. So that was the scheduled meeting that got 01:26:32.100 |
Also, can I just clarify what Chumash talked about with the 01:26:35.060 |
Elon interview, a BBC reporter interviewed Elon and said, 01:26:38.340 |
there is much more race and hate and hate speech in the feeds on 01:26:44.100 |
Twitter. And he said, Can you give me an example? And he said, 01:26:46.660 |
Well, I don't have an example. But people are saying this is 01:26:48.660 |
that which people are saying it. And the BBC reporter said, 01:26:51.540 |
Well, just different groups of people are saying it. And you 01:26:53.620 |
know, I've certainly seen he said, Okay, you saw it. And for 01:26:56.260 |
you, he goes, No, I stopped looking at for you. He said, so 01:26:58.540 |
give me one example of hate speech that you've seen in your 01:27:01.860 |
feed. Now, we without speaking about any inside information, 01:27:05.900 |
which I do not have much of, they've been pretty deliberate 01:27:08.900 |
of removing hate speech from places like for you. And, you 01:27:12.140 |
know, it's a very complicated issue when you have an open 01:27:13.820 |
platform, but the people may say a word, but it doesn't reach a 01:27:18.620 |
lot of people. So if you were to say something really nasty, it 01:27:20.900 |
doesn't take a genius to block that and not have it reach a 01:27:23.740 |
bunch of people. This reporter kept insisting to Elon that this 01:27:27.500 |
was on the rise with no factual basis for it that other people 01:27:30.580 |
said it. And then he said, But I don't look at the feed. He said, 01:27:33.180 |
So you're telling me that there's more hate speech that 01:27:35.780 |
you've seen, but you just admitted to me that you haven't 01:27:37.700 |
looked at the for you feed in three months. And it was just 01:27:40.180 |
like this completely weird thing. I just had mother calling 01:27:43.060 |
it a lie. He called it a lie. caught him. And this is the 01:27:45.980 |
thing. If you're a journalist, just cut it down the middle. 01:27:49.540 |
Come prepared with a position either way. I want to connect 01:27:54.380 |
one dot, please, which is that he filled in his own narrative, 01:27:59.820 |
even though the data wasn't necessarily there. In the same 01:28:03.620 |
way that, you know, we kind of filled in our narrative about 01:28:06.300 |
San Francisco, with the Bob Lee, you know, murder, being another 01:28:13.820 |
He said, Well, we didn't hold on a second. We so we knew we 01:28:17.740 |
didn't know. And furthermore, we're taking great pains this 01:28:21.260 |
week to correct the record and explain what we now know. Yeah. 01:28:25.180 |
He was intellectually honest. This is just intellectual 01:28:31.420 |
Honestly, you're you're you're going soft here. Freeberg, 01:28:36.180 |
I'm not getting gaslit by anyone. I think the guy totally 01:28:39.660 |
the guy totally had zero data. By the way, when you're 01:28:42.540 |
journalist, you're supposed to report on data and evidence. So 01:28:46.500 |
just replacing Bob Lee with Don carminiani. It's the same 01:28:49.580 |
story. Yeah. This is that Don Don happened to survive. 01:28:56.060 |
Goodbye. Here's what Maxwell from mother body. Have fun. 01:28:59.660 |
There's been a lot of discussion about the future of San 01:29:02.100 |
Francisco and the death has quickly become politicized. Has 01:29:05.420 |
that caused any division or disagreement from what you've 01:29:15.140 |
Oh, just like the right was gleeful with Jesse Smollett. 01:29:18.820 |
Having gotten himself beaten up or you know, setting up his own. 01:29:22.460 |
All right, everybody for the Sultan of science currently 01:29:27.740 |
conducting experiments on a beach to see exactly how burned 01:29:33.300 |
he can get with his SPF 200 under an umbrella wearing a sun 01:29:37.300 |
shirt and pants. Freeberg freeberg on the beach was the 01:29:41.420 |
same outfit astronauts wear when they do spacewalks. Hey, 01:29:44.740 |
stable diffusion. Make me an image of David freeberg wearing 01:29:48.820 |
a full body baiting suit covered in SPF 200 under three 01:29:59.060 |
For the dictator. Chamath Palihapitiya creating 01:30:03.620 |
And the regular the regulator you can call me the regular 01:30:06.580 |
regulator. See you tonight when we'll eat our orchelons what's 01:30:10.100 |
left of them. The final four or five orchelons in existence. 01:30:13.820 |
Don't be late. Otherwise I'm putting you on the B list today 01:30:16.180 |
if you're like I will be there. I'll be there. I promise. I 01:30:18.260 |
promise. I promise. Can't wait to be there and the rain man 01:30:22.300 |
himself namaste didn't even get to putting Ron 01:30:28.300 |
I think you should ask auto GPT how you can eat more endangered 01:30:37.660 |
Yes. And then have it go kill those animals. In the real 01:30:41.220 |
world. Put something on the dark web to go kill the remaining 01:30:44.180 |
rhinos and bring them to Chamath's house for poker night. 01:30:49.700 |
Was that the Plava movie? It was a Oh, did you guys see is 01:30:53.940 |
cocaine bear out yet? No, it was a Matthew Broderick Marlon 01:30:56.660 |
Brando movie right where they're doing the takeoff on the 01:30:58.700 |
godfather was the first father. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's 01:31:01.660 |
like a conspiracy to eat. Endangered animals. Yes, the 01:31:05.740 |
freshman. The pressure came out in 1990. Yeah, Marlon Brando did 01:31:10.980 |
it with Matthew Broderick. And like Bruno Kirby. They actually 01:31:15.540 |
they that was the whole thing. No Kirby. That's a deep they 01:31:18.100 |
were actually they were eating endangered animals. What do you 01:31:22.180 |
what do you think he too? Is that going to be good? Saks? I 01:31:24.620 |
know he's one of your favorite films. Me too. It's awesome. Is 01:31:27.580 |
there a sequel coming? They're gonna do he took in the novels 01:31:30.500 |
already come out. Adam. I saw the novel. Yeah, he's amazing. 01:31:34.060 |
He does. He's one of those movies where when it comes on, 01:31:37.020 |
you just can't stop watching. Yes. To screener. Best bank 01:31:40.900 |
robbery slash shootout in movie history. You know, that is 01:31:44.500 |
literally the best film ever. Like it's up there with like the 01:31:47.420 |
Joker with reservoir dogs. The Joker in that Batman movie where 01:31:52.260 |
he robs the bank like, I mean, what I love you guys. All right. 01:31:55.180 |
Love you besties and for blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. This is 01:31:58.580 |
gonna be all in podcast 124. If you want to go to the fan meetups 01:32:01.340 |
and hang out with other blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. 01:32:12.340 |
we open source it to the fans and they've just gone crazy with 01:32:29.900 |
We should all just get a room and just have one big huge orgy 01:32:41.660 |
because they're all just like this like sexual tension that