back to indexE162: Live from Davos! Milei goes viral, Adam Neumann's headwinds, streaming's broken model & more
Chapters
0:0 Live from the WEF: "Oh Davos, Kumbaya"
4:25 Why Davos lost its luster, plus major moments: Milei's speech, Jamie Dimon on Trump
21:53 Boeing's regulatory capture leading to negative impact on consumer safety
35:16 Adam Neumann facing familiar challenges at his new startup, Flow
50:24 Evaluating "tech-enabled businesses" vs. traditional businesses that are utilizing technology
60:47 Streaming at a crossroads: is the business model broken?
80:51 Science Corner: New study on microplastics in water bottles
92:42 All-In Poker
00:00:00.000 |
All right, everybody, welcome to the 54th Annual World Economic Forum here in Davos. 00:00:06.000 |
You guys didn't know this, but as elites ourselves, we were invited to kick off the festivities. 00:00:13.120 |
Yeah. You know, the all-in podcast, very popular. And so they wanted us to come and represent the 00:00:18.080 |
pod and our audience there. And it's been amazing. If you haven't seen some of the great musical 00:00:24.480 |
performances this year, I mean, they're so notable. Let's just start off here. I mean, 00:00:38.320 |
Wait, wait, there's a great moment where she really starts vibing. Wait for the head shake. 00:00:46.960 |
The eyebrows are great, but the head shake comes in at about there. 00:00:56.320 |
Have you ever played the air flute or just the skin flute? 00:01:00.320 |
But guys, guys, this isn't it. There were other, there was a witch doctor or something. I'm not 00:01:08.320 |
sure exactly what's going on here. I'm going to just apologize in advance for mocking this. 00:01:16.800 |
This was incredible. I don't know exactly what's going on here with the blowing of the hair. 00:01:26.880 |
We've come a long way from COVID, that's for sure. 00:01:27.520 |
So they're blowing the COVID on each person's forehead here to spread the COVID. 00:01:32.400 |
They've all taken the mRNA vaccine. But you know, we each have a speaking gig. Each of us is 00:01:38.880 |
speaking. And so I thought to kick us off here, gentlemen, instead of us just telling everybody 00:01:46.240 |
our schedule, I would sing our schedule. And so let me just grab a, let me see if I got my guitar 00:01:52.400 |
here. Hold on. Let me just grab it here. Oh, here it is. Okay. Hold on. It's happened to have the 00:01:58.000 |
guitar. Is that an air guitar or a real guitar? Oh, no, it's a real guitar. It's actually a real 00:02:01.600 |
guitar here. So, but I thought, you know, everybody is really excited about each of our speaking gigs. 00:02:06.720 |
So I thought we would just kick it off here. Let me just see if it's in tune. 00:02:10.080 |
You guys hear that? Oh, okay. All right. What was that? I think we got it. 00:02:21.360 |
Sax is interviewing Putin, my lord, Kumbaya. In the dictator lounge at noon, Kumbaya. 00:02:33.280 |
Conquering Europe, Kumbaya. And now I'm gonna, there's a little audience participation in here, 00:02:42.960 |
besties. I need you each to sing with me. Okay. It's, we're gonna start here. It's gonna be just 00:02:48.640 |
listen one time and then you're gonna repeat. Okay, here we go. 00:02:50.960 |
Oh, Davos, Kumbaya. So just Oh, Davos, Kumbaya. Ready? Three, two. 00:03:08.320 |
Okay, very good. Very good. Okay. Now go to the next verse here. 00:03:11.440 |
Hosting Steve Bannon at 1pm, Kumbaya. Friedbergs at 2pm, Kumbaya. 00:03:29.360 |
Billionaire bunker panel, Kumbaya. Teal just bought one, Kumbaya. 00:03:39.200 |
Hunter Biden after party at 1am. Eight balls and escorts for everyone brought to you by Barisima. 00:04:01.200 |
Wow. Fabulous. You really are the world's greatest moderator. 00:04:14.560 |
And it said, we open source it to the fans and they've just gone crazy. 00:04:21.760 |
All right, everybody. Yes, the World Economic Forum is wrapping up in Davos. If you don't know 00:04:32.640 |
what the WF is, I'll just give you the brief overview. 3000 people, five days, tons of parties 00:04:37.760 |
happens in Davos, Switzerland. It's run by a foundation. They call these non government 00:04:43.280 |
organizations NGOs. I can think of it kind of like the TED conference topic this year was rebuilding 00:04:49.120 |
trust. It's politicians, business leaders, economists, journalists, all the elites, 00:04:53.600 |
the mission statement of the WF improving the state of the world by engaging business, 00:04:57.680 |
political, academic and other leaders of society to shape global regional and industry agendas. 00:05:03.680 |
It's money printing machine. I'll give you a funny backstory later if you care to know, 00:05:07.760 |
but basically, they try to shake it down for about 40 grand a year to go to this thing. 00:05:11.200 |
Tons of notable moments that we can get to on the docket here. Free break any highlights for you 00:05:18.400 |
watching this, you know, get mocked on social media this year. It's been a slow unraveling 00:05:24.080 |
from this being something that people used to flex about going to Davos. Now people are literally 00:05:31.120 |
apologizing on social media, Twitter, etc. explaining why they're going because they're 00:05:37.680 |
kind of feeling shame and going to this event. So, what are your thoughts on the sort of whole 00:05:43.360 |
flipping of this from being a flex to requiring an apology in advance? 00:05:49.280 |
You guys know, Andrew Ross Sorkin, the journalist for CNBC, I think he posted on Twitter, you know, 00:05:55.280 |
I know, I know, forgive me, I got to go to Davos. It's almost like, embarrassing now 00:06:00.640 |
that you are associating yourself with the elite cabal in the Swiss Alps, during a time of rising 00:06:07.920 |
global populism and all the criticism that's been rained down on Davos in the last couple of years. 00:06:12.800 |
And then Davos is trying to adapt by trying to be more cool and appeal to the populist notions 00:06:20.960 |
that have criticized them. Thus, the flute playing, thus the shamanism, you know, and thus, 00:06:28.080 |
I think a lot of what Javier Millet has called general economic support for what he defines as 00:06:34.720 |
collectivism, which I'd love to talk about, but why don't we just say that? So, I think, yeah, 00:06:38.320 |
there's generally been like a response from the community that attends Davos. But there's a lot 00:06:43.600 |
of conflict here with the fact that folks are flying in on private jets and telling everyone 00:06:46.960 |
to stop producing carbon. The fact that they're all dining and spending lots of money and telling 00:06:52.160 |
everyone that we should move to more towards socialist conditions and higher taxation. It's 00:06:55.920 |
all a lot of irony wound up in this whole thing. It's almost like a, like a, like a Simpsons show. 00:07:02.400 |
Well, and the theme rebuilding trust is kind of 00:07:04.880 |
insulting at its face, at least to me, like, we don't trust you. You don't need to rebuild trust 00:07:12.560 |
with us. We're not going to trust you. There's no way for you to do that, especially after what 00:07:15.760 |
happened with COVID. Sax, did you have any sort of reaction to this year's Davos and just how 00:07:22.720 |
people are reacting to it? You heard Freyberg sort of thoughts on it. 00:07:28.000 |
Well, Davos has become a parody of itself. And that's why you saw these clips go viral of these 00:07:33.520 |
ridiculous antics of the priestess doing, I don't know what she was doing. But the only two sets of 00:07:40.720 |
remarks that actually were taken seriously on their own terms was the speech by Millet from 00:07:46.720 |
Argentina, and then also comments by Jamie Dimon. And the reason why they went viral is because 00:07:54.240 |
they were actually saying sensible things that contradicted the sort of established wisdom or 00:08:00.480 |
consensus at Davos. I mean, they were effectively subtweeting the other elites at Davos. I mean, 00:08:07.200 |
Millet gets up there, and I think he was introduced by Klaus Schwab, and he immediately starts 00:08:12.640 |
denouncing collectivist experiments and says that the West is in danger because its elites have been 00:08:20.240 |
co-opted by a vision of the world, which leads inexorably to socialism and thereby to poverty. 00:08:26.000 |
So Millet basically says this right in front of Klaus Schwab. I mean, he's describing 00:08:29.920 |
the people at Davos. That's why that took off and went viral. 00:08:39.360 |
I didn't know that. Yeah, kudos to him. Jamie Dimon gave this interview, I think it was on CNBC, 00:08:49.040 |
where he basically went full Chamath. He basically admitted that Trump had been right 00:08:53.440 |
and that a lot of the criticism of Trump and all the derogatory comments for years 00:08:59.520 |
were basically just lazy. And he said that Trump was largely right on NATO, on immigration, 00:09:11.360 |
Immigration. He was mostly right on China, he said. 00:09:14.880 |
Dimon said he didn't always like how Trump said things or talked about people, but he said his 00:09:20.080 |
policies were largely sound and only look better in time since we've abandoned them. And he's 00:09:26.880 |
basically saying that, "Look at where we are right now." And he questioned the kind of everything is 00:09:31.600 |
hunky-dory narrative that the Biden campaign is pushing out. So he really went off script there. 00:09:36.720 |
And like I said, I think Chamath said it first here on this pod three months ago, 00:09:40.880 |
and now Jamie Dimon is accepting that. So that was a huge subtweet, you could say, of all the 00:09:47.840 |
elites at Davos and the accepted wisdom and the narrative that they're all pushing out. 00:09:54.000 |
So that was the other big interview that went viral. And I think that's really saying something, 00:10:01.920 |
that the elites now have parodied themselves to the point where Davos has become a joke, 00:10:09.680 |
and the only talks or remarks out of Davos that people pay attention to are the ones talking sense 00:10:17.600 |
to the people at Davos because they're not listening. 00:10:22.560 |
Look, everything has a season. And I think that when 00:10:27.040 |
there was a much more singular hierarchy of status, Davos played a very important role 00:10:36.000 |
to signal to other people that you had made it. But these things come and go. And I think that 00:10:42.880 |
this is sort of in the back half of its usefulness and half-life. What is it probably more than 00:10:50.240 |
anything else now? A glorified enterprise software sales conference, where the reason to go to these 00:10:56.400 |
conferences for a lot of these companies, I suspect, is that it allows you to close very big 00:11:02.320 |
deals, multi-million dollar licenses of this, that, and the other thing, where you can get the 00:11:07.520 |
leaders of that counterparty across the table from you and hammer out a deal. And I think you pay 00:11:12.640 |
40 grand a ticket for the right to get everybody together to do that. So I think they want to 00:11:18.160 |
pretend that it's a lot more than what it is. And I think what it is, is that. And I think whenever 00:11:22.960 |
you have the ability to convene people to close business, that's valuable. Beyond that, I think 00:11:29.600 |
it's sort of in the eye of the beholder. And it used to be that the beholder thought that this 00:11:34.320 |
was important. And now I think we realize it's much of nothing. It's shame in and air flutes and 00:11:41.120 |
all kinds of stupidity, which is why people have the courage to go and mock it. And I think that 00:11:45.600 |
Malay's comments and Jamie Dimon's comments exemplify that. The only other thing I would 00:11:52.000 |
say is that I had heard although I haven't seen it, so I don't know, is that Alex Karp apparently 00:11:56.880 |
did a very thoughtful speech about anti semitism. And it is also, which is also very countercultural 00:12:03.840 |
to the established logic that the the surplus elites at Davos want to believe, which is the 00:12:09.760 |
anti Israel pro Palestine line. I haven't heard of those. I don't know. Yeah, how impactful that 00:12:15.360 |
was. But those are the three things that I that I've just seen on Twitter, just kind of speech, 00:12:20.400 |
I think is the one that everybody is keying on. And, and correctly. So, you know, obviously, 00:12:25.600 |
he's the he's the new president of Argentina. And this speech was amazing. People might not, 00:12:32.240 |
people might not also know that he was an economics teacher. And so this talk about 00:12:39.040 |
collectivism leading to suffering and regulatory capture and bloat, which we'll talk a little bit 00:12:43.920 |
about when we talk about Boeing today, was incredibly powerful. It's super basic, you know, 00:12:49.920 |
listen, free markets work, there are people opting into either side of it, he went over essentially 00:12:54.400 |
without saying it, the rule of 72. And like 200 years of GDP growth, and how GDP growth under 00:13:00.240 |
capitalism rises everybody up, and then collectivism, aka socialism is a bit of a disaster. 00:13:07.120 |
But it's well worth watching it, there was a really cool thing that a company called Hagen 00:13:13.280 |
did he y g n, with their AI tool, they just immediately took his speech, put it in his own 00:13:19.280 |
words, and published it and translated it as if he was speaking English, because he was he was 00:13:25.840 |
speaking in his native tongue. So really worth checking it out. And yeah, it was super notable. 00:13:32.240 |
It's pretty basic. But I think it's everybody wants to hear this right now, which is, 00:13:37.040 |
if you're picking collectivism and socialism and redistribution of wealth, 00:13:40.560 |
Argentina has like a really good history of watching this fail. And now they're in the 00:13:47.360 |
process of dismantling say something else before free bird says something here, which I think is 00:13:53.280 |
going to be very thoughtful. Jason, the other reason why Argentina is a really good example to 00:13:57.600 |
use is that what does Davos represent at a different level? Well, what it is, is old Europe 00:14:07.920 |
getting together in a way that allows them to continue to coalesce power. And what's interesting 00:14:13.360 |
is if you had presented the case of any other country, trying collectivism and failing, 00:14:18.240 |
it wouldn't get nearly the same attention as Argentina. And the reason is that Argentina 00:14:23.840 |
has so many ethnic Europeans. And I think that's another reason which is like, when you present 00:14:29.120 |
people that are telling you it didn't work that, frankly, look like you speak the same language as 00:14:33.520 |
you. I think it actually goes further in making the point than if you found somebody in South 00:14:39.040 |
Asia or Africa that said the same thing to these folks, which they have, which they've not listened 00:14:43.840 |
to. And so this is why I think Malay is so interesting and important, because he looks 00:14:48.960 |
the part of a Western leader. And I think that that, unfortunately, is what it's going to take 00:14:54.480 |
for some of these folks to listen. Yeah, and everyone's acutely aware. I mean, I'll say three 00:14:58.240 |
things on this one is just talking to your point, you're not about the history of Argentina and how 00:15:01.600 |
it relates to this position that Malay holds and being able to speak credibly to this. Second is 00:15:07.360 |
what he said, which I think is really important. And third is how it relates to the United States. 00:15:10.960 |
But this was clearly to my, from my view, one of the most important media events of the year. 00:15:15.200 |
I do think that anyone that's listening to us right now should go watch it and go listen to 00:15:18.960 |
the entirety of the speech. It is so important. I hope everyone really takes in what he said. 00:15:24.560 |
Just briefly on Argentina in the mid 19th century, Argentina was a colonial 00:15:28.800 |
nation, very agricultural, but a lot of free market, pioneerism going on, 00:15:36.240 |
businesses were built, and an economy flourished in Argentina. This photo I put up here is from 00:15:42.640 |
1913. Buenos Aires, which at the time was called Paris of the West. I was about to say it looks 00:15:49.280 |
like Paris, right? The architecture, everything's beautiful. And stunning. But here's here's some 00:15:52.960 |
statistics. A lot of people don't know, Argentina at this time was wealthier than France or Germany, 00:15:58.400 |
twice as wealthy as Spain, and had one of the top 10 highest GDP per capita of any nation on earth 00:16:05.280 |
in 1913. And so it was this flourishing, vibrant economy with a lot of innovation, a lot of arts, 00:16:13.280 |
a lot of building, a lot of employment, a lot of immigration. And then as the series of military 00:16:20.560 |
coups began, I don't know if you guys are aware, but there was a military coup in 1930 1943 1955 00:16:27.280 |
1962 1966 1976. And in every one of these cases, the essence of the coup was one of relativism, 00:16:35.360 |
which is some people have benefited more than others. As a result, we need to change the way 00:16:39.520 |
that the government and the social structure is functioning. And it has to be taken by force. 00:16:44.080 |
And I think this is the big story of Argentina that says so much more than any other nation 00:16:50.160 |
of the past century, century and a half, which is that these cycles happen based on not 00:16:56.480 |
absolutism, but on relativism. And I'll just give you what I mean by that. Millie made this point, 00:17:02.000 |
which is so important. From the year 1800 to the year 2020. In the year 1800, we saw 95% of the 00:17:08.960 |
world's population in extreme poverty by 2020. It was less than 5%. And this was driven by free 00:17:17.200 |
market capitalism democracies that allowed people individuals to pursue their own self interest and 00:17:23.360 |
as a result, deliver products into a marketplace that people wanted and were willing to pay for. 00:17:28.800 |
And that incentive that market based system allowed the entire world to move forward. 00:17:34.160 |
The relativism problem is that some people move forward faster than others. And that causes this 00:17:39.040 |
great cycle of what some people might call envy or jealousy. And Malay said it best, 00:17:43.040 |
the West is in jeopardy, which is the key statement he was trying to make in his point 00:17:48.240 |
that countries are no longer defending free markets. This is a quote, private property 00:17:52.560 |
and other institutions of libertarian libertarianism due to errors in their theoretical 00:17:57.360 |
framework and ambition for power, opening doors to socialism and condemning us to poverty, misery 00:18:03.600 |
and stagnation. Socialism has failed in all countries where it was attempted. And then he 00:18:08.800 |
started to harp on about neoclassical economic theory and the issues with that. But I want to 00:18:12.640 |
show you one last image, which speaks so clearly to the point that he's making, which is as these 00:18:17.360 |
governments that are well intentioned, and the people that elect the governments and put them 00:18:21.360 |
in power are well intentioned, then try to redistribute wealth by getting the governments 00:18:26.240 |
to step in and play a market role. The market role that they play causes inflation causes 00:18:32.720 |
degradation and economic opportunity, economic mobility and prosperity for most people. And you 00:18:38.560 |
can see this in this chart, which we've looked at many times. But everything on the top of this 00:18:43.040 |
chart, this is a chart that shows the 20 years of price changes of various goods and services in 00:18:47.360 |
the United States. Everything that's gone up in price is something that the US government has a 00:18:53.520 |
role in buying or paying for. Yeah, controlling. Yeah. And everything that's gone down in price 00:18:59.680 |
is where there is a free market that has allowed people to access goods and services at a lower 00:19:04.720 |
price over time as opposed to a higher price over time. And while the intention is that the 00:19:08.960 |
government is doing good for people by making education, healthcare, and other goods and 00:19:15.440 |
services available to them, the government stepping in and intervening in the free market 00:19:20.160 |
causes the price to go up. And ultimately, you end up in a really negative cycle that resolves in 00:19:25.200 |
this collectivism approach that he's talking about. And that's why I just wanted to tie back 00:19:29.040 |
what he said to what's going on in the US today. And the and I've harped on this a lot, but the 00:19:33.120 |
growing role that the federal government is playing, and the intention is good, but the impact 00:19:38.400 |
is bad over time. And that's really, I think why it was such an important speech. He was so clear, 00:19:43.040 |
it was so important for me to hear it. I'm sorry, I harped on but I just really know. 00:19:46.560 |
It's the highlight the key of his speeches, hey, good intentions can lead to a bad outcome here. 00:19:52.080 |
Yeah, you want everybody to have healthcare, you want everybody to have education, 00:19:54.880 |
the government is providing it. And there's no customer and there's no market, there's no 00:19:59.040 |
competition. And the products and services that you are referring to, they include medicine, 00:20:04.000 |
they include college, they include tutoring, they they don't just include and include air 00:20:07.920 |
conditioning, they include refrigerators and televisions, smartphones, all of that. And 00:20:12.640 |
picking which system and which set of problems you want to have, I guess, 00:20:16.480 |
is what societies need to do. And free markets. 00:20:20.480 |
It's a weird reflexive loop, though, for governments, because these people, 00:20:23.360 |
what he also said was, these aren't just well intentioned people. They're also a small class 00:20:27.280 |
of elites that wanted to feel like they were better than everybody else by implementing 00:20:32.320 |
things at work. And so there is a dark part of this as well, which is their desire for power. 00:20:36.800 |
And I think it's important to not gloss that over. So this wasn't just a bunch of 00:20:40.800 |
bumbling do gooders that screwed things up. This was also a bunch of folks that, 00:20:44.880 |
that irrespective of the data, had an opportunity to gain influence and power. And I think that 00:20:51.360 |
that's that's an important thing to acknowledge, because it created a very negative reflexive loop 00:20:57.520 |
that governments used. Meaning, if you look at freebergs charts, why did that happen? Well, 00:21:04.400 |
part of what happened was, the administrative state became more and more powerful, they were 00:21:10.320 |
able to pass laws, they were there to decide who the winners and losers were. That is a drug. And 00:21:16.080 |
that drug is very addictive. And so what happened as this happened, was the laws went and reinforced 00:21:22.320 |
those dynamics of those people being able to decide winners and losers. The thing that it has 00:21:28.080 |
that has not happened yet, though, and we're maybe we're beginning to see it in some of these markets 00:21:32.960 |
that the government is too involved in, is that it is bred a level of incompetence and incapability 00:21:38.400 |
that we now have to unwind because the average everyday citizens lives are either at risk, 00:21:46.560 |
or the services are just so expensive that it's just untenable. And I think that's where we are 00:21:52.320 |
now. It's a great segue, I think, into this Boeing issue that we've seen, because here's an issue of 00:21:57.520 |
regulation and safety, where you want the government and you want safe planes, and you want 00:22:02.160 |
some level of regulation, but then you get regulatory capture. So maybe the government, 00:22:05.360 |
the government has not been the supporter of the safety agenda that citizens think. 00:22:11.040 |
Meaning when you look at what has happened in the US airline industry, there are a handful of end 00:22:18.720 |
user providers, but those are all using OEM equipment from one of two vendors, Boeing or 00:22:25.760 |
Airbus. So it's a duopoly, but in many ways, it's a monopoly, the way that these folks fight with 00:22:31.840 |
respect to tariffs and imports and incentives. So the United States airline industry is a monopoly 00:22:38.400 |
of one company. Now, if you look at what's happened, what they would say is, well, planes 00:22:42.880 |
have become safer and safer and safer. Yes, but they've become safer, in some ways, in the most 00:22:50.000 |
simple and obvious ways, but they've become unsafe in that you have these fleets of planes that are 00:22:55.600 |
now behaving very unpredictably. And if you look under the hood, what happens is Boeing as an 00:23:02.800 |
example, in like the last four years, how much money do you think they've spent on lobbyists and 00:23:07.840 |
PACs? I'll tell you $65 million. How much have they spent just in the last year? Almost $11 00:23:14.000 |
million. They're like the 15th most active spender in in politics in Washington. Now, 00:23:20.720 |
what did they use that money for? Well, that's also documented. See, the crazy thing is this 00:23:24.560 |
stuff happens in plain in plain sight. So they were able to water down the safety regulations. 00:23:29.840 |
What does that allow you to do? It allows you to have a situation like this unfold. 00:23:34.000 |
And then on the other side, the pilots unions can lobby those same politicians who are taking 00:23:40.080 |
money from Boeing and prevent systems that would actually make these planes safer. 00:23:46.880 |
You can have more improvements in the guide by wire technology, you can have more improvements 00:23:53.120 |
in GPS, you can have more improvements in a computer's ability to help improve and augment 00:23:59.200 |
the capability of the pilot. Unfortunately, that will result either in fewer pilots or less pay. 00:24:05.040 |
And so that doesn't happen nearly as fast and obviously as it should. It's the same for air 00:24:09.680 |
traffic control. And all of these issues build up because we've allowed monopolies to build up. So 00:24:14.640 |
as much as we think we are a capitalist society, we have veered into this collectivism in certain 00:24:21.840 |
markets and where it's measurable and obvious. We need to point at it and say, let's go fix. 00:24:26.720 |
Yeah. And this would be let me just tee up a little bit of what you're referring to in case 00:24:30.800 |
people don't know, but everybody probably saw the news that on January 5, the door blew off of 00:24:35.760 |
one of these Boeing 737 Max jets. If you've heard that name before, it's because this isn't the 00:24:41.360 |
first time that the Max jets have had problems. This plane safely landed, thank God, and there 00:24:46.720 |
was nobody sitting in the row where the door blew off. And this has to do with some bolts on the 00:24:52.720 |
doors. But this is just the start of problems with the 737 Max. There's an incredible documentary, 00:24:57.920 |
if you haven't seen it, we'll put it in the show notes, Boeing's fatal flaw. And the version before 00:25:03.440 |
this, the 737 Max 9 is the one that had the bolts come off, Jamal. The Max 8, if you remember, 00:25:09.040 |
there were two really harrowing instances where tragically 346 people died in these two instances 00:25:15.200 |
because the plane, literally the software on the plane, which is called Max maneuvering 00:25:20.720 |
characteristics augmentation system, which was designed, because they were trying to get more 00:25:25.360 |
fuel efficiency, and they had positioned the engines in a weird way on the wings. 00:25:32.080 |
So they had to kind of help pilots level this stuff. And to your point about regulatory capture, 00:25:37.040 |
there was all this behind the scenes manipulation of the market to try to get these planes built to 00:25:43.920 |
try to get them out the door because there was so much money at stake. Well, on these two terrible 00:25:48.240 |
accidents, the plane the nose literally dove and the pilots were fighting it in both cases, 00:25:53.600 |
right, they just crashed and everybody on board died. And for 20 months, the 737 Max models were 00:26:00.960 |
grounded. And that cost the company over $21 billion. So there is no competition to your point. 00:26:08.240 |
And then in a free market, if there were 10 providers, would this be much different to mouth? 00:26:11.520 |
And absolutely, yeah. So I mean, that's what you have to realize here is that these duopolies, 00:26:16.000 |
you think there's competition in a duopoly, there isn't competition. 00:26:18.960 |
No, I mean, like, for example, like, if you look at the car market, how many instances I think the 00:26:23.360 |
last big incidents that I remember was, I think, Ford had an issue with the fuel tanks of some 00:26:28.640 |
cars that were exploding, right? Yeah. But the reality is, when that happens, 00:26:32.640 |
there are alternatives. One is that there's a legal requirement for Ford to just fix these 00:26:38.560 |
things quickly. There are lawsuits that happened, there was class actions, there was settlements, 00:26:44.400 |
but there's also the ability for folks that can afford it is just to switch vendor and of which 00:26:48.560 |
there are 50 other vendors to choose from. That is a healthy dynamic. So today, when you look 00:26:53.680 |
at the auto market, what do you see a plethora of choice. And when you see fatalities or safety 00:26:59.440 |
issues, they are overwhelmingly driver error. Yes, we assume that and we get insurance to deal with 00:27:05.760 |
that. When you look at airplanes, you have these three sections of risk that each are compounding 00:27:12.560 |
because there is no competition. Number one is that the monopoly vendor has zero pressure to 00:27:18.960 |
actually test these things adequately. Because on the other side of building something well, 00:27:24.560 |
is shareholder pressure to deliver something sooner and faster so that they can reap more profits. 00:27:30.960 |
Then second is you have a regulatory infrastructure that puts rules on top of rules, but then will bend 00:27:36.320 |
the rules if you donate to them. Right? And that's measured and known. And then the third are the 00:27:41.680 |
folks that actually operate the planes, who have this actual incentive to not see technical 00:27:46.960 |
improvements because it defends their job for longer. And in all of these cases, there isn't 00:27:52.400 |
enough competition to shine a light on this to say, how does society actually want this market 00:27:57.680 |
to operate? This is collectivism. It's not working. 00:28:01.920 |
Freeberg, you have thoughts on this Boeing regulatory capture and the issue of only 00:28:05.520 |
having two vendors there. And the complexity of these machines now in relation to that, 00:28:12.880 |
Freeberg Nick, you can pull this up. This is an audit 00:28:15.440 |
of the business model for a company called TransTime Group. TransTime Group is a 00:28:22.320 |
aircraft aerospace parts manufacturer. They sell certified, regulated aircraft parts 00:28:30.640 |
to aviation companies as well as to airlines, private pilots and also the government. 00:28:36.720 |
And they do about 7 billion in revenue, three and a half billion in EBITDA. 00:28:42.640 |
So to your point a couple weeks ago about what's the appropriate competitive EBITDA 00:28:48.960 |
margin that a company can ultimately achieve their EBITDA margins 53% this company better 00:28:54.560 |
than Facebook insane on 7 billion of revenue and growing. Nick, if you want to pull up their stock 00:28:59.360 |
chart, and you guys can see how the business has performed over the years and their business model 00:29:03.760 |
has been relatively simple. They've acquired aerospace companies got that have certified parts, 00:29:10.000 |
they drop the cost and raise the price. And they do that over and over again. And here's 00:29:13.680 |
the business over the last 10 years. This thing is, you know, roughly 10 bagger, 00:29:19.200 |
eight to 10 bagger in the last 10 years. The market cap is 60 billion today, no end in sight. 00:29:26.480 |
And so there was a government audit done of the business by using uncertified cost data, 00:29:32.400 |
which is one of the most reliable sources of information to perform cost analysis, we found 00:29:35.920 |
that trans time earned excess profit profit of at least $21 million on 105 spare parts 00:29:42.240 |
on 150 contracts. So they're selling spare parts into the government. The government auditor came 00:29:47.760 |
in, audited them and identified because there's no real audit, there's no real accountability 00:29:53.440 |
in government as purchasers. But there is regulatory authority on deciding who are the 00:29:57.760 |
winners and who are the losers in the market. Trans time has been elected a winner because 00:30:02.240 |
they have regulatory approval to make and sell these parts. The cost to get approval to make and 00:30:07.200 |
sell these parts is so high, that it makes it prohibitive for startups to come in and compete 00:30:12.400 |
in this marketplace. And now that they're a preferred supplier, and they get the single 00:30:16.720 |
contracts, where there's no competition to be a supplier, they can raise the price every year. 00:30:22.080 |
Multiple audit reports over the last 23 years have highlighted the problem of the Department 00:30:26.320 |
of Defense paying excess profits on sole source contracts, where cost analysis was not used to 00:30:31.200 |
determine fair and reasonable prices. And this problem continues to occur. Now, I'm not necessarily 00:30:36.560 |
saying that this is a negative on trans time. It's a fantastic business. It's well run. It's one of 00:30:40.880 |
the best run public companies with a multi $10 billion market cap in the world. But the condition 00:30:46.080 |
is that the US government comes in and picks and chooses through its regulatory authority, 00:30:50.000 |
which companies can make products, the cost to enter and compete becomes prohibitively high. 00:30:55.440 |
And then the company has complete pricing power, and there's very little accountability in the 00:30:58.640 |
overall system. And I think that this plays out not just with this company, but obviously also 00:31:03.360 |
with Boeing and the fact that we've narrowed down the competitive market space to just a few sole 00:31:08.160 |
source providers that have very little accountability. And eventually, these sorts of 00:31:12.000 |
conditions arise, either prices get too high quality degrades all the other things that natural 00:31:16.560 |
market forces would keep a check on. Yeah. And in terms of competition, 00:31:20.480 |
Chamath, the I guess the only thing you could say is consumers could potentially maybe try to avoid 00:31:28.080 |
the 737. Max, I know I did when all these accidents happen. I just told you know, my person who books 00:31:34.320 |
the flights, hey, do not put me on a 737. Max period full stop. And you know what, you're 00:31:39.360 |
going to wind up paying a lot more, you're going to have a hard time getting certain routes, you're 00:31:42.560 |
going to reduce it because, you know, most airlines, I think, have these 737. Max is in 00:31:48.320 |
there. So you when you have such a few number of providers to your point about it's not like cars, 00:31:52.640 |
it's not fragmented like that you can't avoid a certain car type, a plane type the way you can 00:31:57.360 |
avoid a car type. So just wrapping up your Chamath, what changes should we see in terms of 00:32:03.680 |
late stage capitalism, something the example like air travel and manufacturers, is there any way to 00:32:09.920 |
unwind this reasonably? Or is it too late? Because we're at this? Well, I go back to some of the 00:32:18.960 |
examples that we've made fun of before, you have to rely on the government to actually be competent 00:32:26.320 |
in key moments in time. I think this is one of them, the organization that could do something 00:32:31.600 |
about it, for example, take the FTC, or even take the DOJ. We are investigating Amazon's 00:32:40.480 |
purchase of the portable vacuum cleaner Roomba, right? critically important issue. 00:32:47.600 |
And that is apparently for the American people, higher than the sclerosis that the government has 00:32:56.000 |
enabled, enabled in the airline industry, which affects everybody. So could the right government 00:33:03.600 |
agencies choose to actually focus on something important here and actually figure out why is 00:33:10.000 |
this happening? Because I think the door plugs issue is endemic of a much bigger problem. This 00:33:16.560 |
is a company that's rotting because there is no accountability. And the reason there's no 00:33:21.040 |
accountability is there's no real functional competition. And I have not seen any good answer 00:33:26.480 |
to accountability other than competition. Yeah, I mean, the the good news is the FAA 00:33:33.440 |
really took quick action to ground these 171 Boeing 737 nine max airplanes, but they don't 00:33:41.680 |
they do not understand the scope of the problem if they let them back in the fleet. And this is 00:33:46.000 |
happening. The bigger picture problem of lack of competition. Yeah, they're no, no, no, my 00:33:50.800 |
my safety of these. Yeah, my point is like, you had to adjudicate the interaction of very 00:33:56.800 |
complicated hardware and software. In that first go around. Here is just a pure, systemic hardware 00:34:04.720 |
failure. So the point is that whether it's them or their suppliers, there's just some complacency 00:34:13.600 |
that sets in when you know you will always have the business to Friedberg's point, it is a very 00:34:19.280 |
corrosive thing in running a business, trying to have motivated employees, when they know on the 00:34:28.800 |
back end of it that they could make anything in the world. And they'll just be able to sell it 00:34:33.920 |
to somebody and they'll have to take it. That's that example that Friedberg just cited 20 odd 00:34:39.200 |
million dollars for just random stuff for what is it 15 pieces. That's crazy. That's just straight 00:34:46.240 |
up theft. And so when you have that, how do you expect the employees of that organization to give 00:34:51.680 |
a I don't see how I don't see how you could expect that. And so my point is the FAA has a much bigger 00:34:58.240 |
problem. So for example, like the D o E has a loan program to try to create a diverse energy 00:35:04.080 |
infrastructure in the United States. Maybe we need to look at some of these sectors and instead of 00:35:08.240 |
building the administrative state, take some of that money instead and just create programs to 00:35:13.360 |
get more competition. All right. In other news, Adam Neumann, you remember from WeWork infamy 00:35:19.360 |
slash fame, it has a new startup, you may have heard of it flow, they've raised a ton of money, 00:35:24.640 |
he started buying a bunch of apartment buildings, the idea, people can rent nice apartments in cool 00:35:29.680 |
cities, that focus more on social interaction, and hanging out in common spaces, all that great 00:35:35.920 |
stuff. And there's also allegedly or reportedly some sort of rent to own, where renters can 00:35:41.360 |
receive equity in the company over time. And I don't think this has ever been released. But the 00:35:47.600 |
idea would be maybe you own shares in flow, flow manages around 3000 units, most of which were 00:35:53.040 |
purchased by Newman after he left, we work and you know, he took down a windfall as an exit package. 00:35:58.400 |
And so according to the real deal, this real estate publication, Newman had a 60 million 00:36:02.880 |
variable rate mortgage on one of these properties in June, sex, maybe you could explain to us what's 00:36:07.840 |
going on here, since you have a lot of experience in real estate. Well, it's pretty simple, 00:36:12.640 |
he can't make his interest payments. Okay, so the reason is, is because he had floating rate debt. 00:36:18.240 |
So if he had locked in his dad over, say 10 years back in when he bought this building in 2021, 00:36:25.440 |
or whenever it was, when interest rates were extremely low, you know, that was during the 00:36:30.400 |
desert period, probably could have locked in long term debt at maybe even 3%, three or 4%. 00:36:36.960 |
And instead, he got floating rate debt. And if you look at where commercial debt is now, 00:36:42.080 |
I mean, it's seven, eight, 9%, if you can get it, which is pretty hard. 00:36:46.240 |
So he maxed out on debt when he bought these buildings, he bought them top of market. 00:36:50.800 |
It sounds like in 2021, because real estate, like a lot of things moves inversely to interest rates. 00:36:58.240 |
So when interest rates spiked over the last year or so, then real estate valuations went down. So 00:37:04.800 |
he bought a bunch of buildings, top of market using a lot of debt that was floating rate, 00:37:09.680 |
interest rates spike, perfect storm, now he can't make his interest payments. 00:37:13.920 |
The crazy part about this, when I was watching it happen, we talked about it, I think on the 00:37:18.480 |
program at the time was Andreessen Horowitz put in like, over 300 million at a billion dollar 00:37:24.160 |
valuation. But they didn't do that in peak Zurb. They did that in 2022. And the writing was on the 00:37:29.040 |
wall. What are your thoughts on why they would make a bet like that? And yeah, just tech VCs 00:37:36.480 |
betting on real estate for a second time? How does that occur? 00:37:39.680 |
Well, I don't think it occurs because they cared about real estate. I think it allows them to 00:37:45.360 |
take $300 million of committed capital and put it out there so that they're $300 million less 00:37:54.160 |
available, which means that they're $300 million closer to raising a new fund, 00:37:58.160 |
which means that they can raise they can charge 2% on more money. That's why they did it. 00:38:02.720 |
Got it. Yeah. So just keep the money train deploying capital. It's a place where you 00:38:08.000 |
can put a big huge check. And you can raise your next fund. And yeah, why not? Okay, well, 00:38:13.520 |
they have. Let me let me offer. I mean, I don't disagree. I think that candidly, what you've said 00:38:19.120 |
is exactly how mega funds are thinking about it. We have to deploy capital to raise our next fund. 00:38:23.440 |
And if we still have capital in our last fund, then we can't deploy freeberg. 00:38:27.520 |
Well, if you're gonna have to deploy large amounts of capital, 00:38:30.640 |
wouldn't you feel better deploying that capital with an entrepreneur who's actually run a big 00:38:37.120 |
business before even though the business failed? No, no, no, if you're if you're if you if you 00:38:41.120 |
were not optimized for fees, you would do a Peter Thiel did and just have the fund and return the 00:38:44.800 |
money. Right? And for further because he's already won, but everybody else that's trying to win the 00:38:52.080 |
only way to win in a world where your your exits are not that great is to actually generate money 00:38:58.880 |
via fees, even though that fees are taxed at current income. That's the way to win in venture 00:39:03.280 |
is not carry. It's by fees. And so it's and I don't blame Andreessen. I think like that's that's 00:39:10.640 |
smart for them to do. And if they have folks that are willing to enable that by giving them money, 00:39:15.360 |
they should do it. But are they going to generate huge rates of return? Probably not because that's 00:39:21.200 |
not what real estate is known for real estate is known for long steady tax arms that slowly compound 00:39:27.520 |
for the for the owner of the company over 20 or the owner of the business over 25 to 35 years. 00:39:33.120 |
That's not what a venture fund is supposed to be doing for a 10 year 12 year return cycle. So 00:39:38.000 |
obviously, they're doing it for fees. That's okay. I think that's capitalism. 00:39:40.960 |
What are the LPS then think sacks if we look at this, you know, you're an LP in a technology 00:39:46.400 |
firm. I'll take Andreessen out of it for a second. But let's just say some giant LP gives 00:39:50.400 |
giant amounts of money to a venture capital firm, and then they're deployed in real estate. 00:39:56.320 |
What happens, you know, in their minds? And is there any kind of tension that would occur? 00:40:01.040 |
Well, handy having the situation, you can never judge a VC based on one investment. 00:40:06.960 |
If we were to do that, every VC would have a lot of egg on their face, because we're supposed to 00:40:11.360 |
take big swings and swing for the fences and try and hit home runs and grand slams. And a lot of 00:40:16.160 |
them are going to make you look foolish, you have to look at an investment portfolio and track 00:40:21.440 |
returns over time. So I wouldn't judge any particular investor based on one investment. 00:40:27.120 |
So I don't think that's fair. Now, in the case of this investment, if you want me to explain what I 00:40:32.560 |
think went wrong. I think Adam Newman had a compelling vision. His vision was to create a 00:40:39.520 |
new experience in in, I guess you'd call it apartment living, and that people will be willing 00:40:45.120 |
to pay more for that, because he would create this national brand in apartments. And right now, 00:40:50.800 |
apartments are super local, and there is no brand in, you know, apartment living. So I think as a 00:40:57.200 |
entrepreneur, as an operator, he had a great vision. And I think he actually achieved his 00:41:02.640 |
vision. If you read these articles carefully, what they say is that his occupancy was high, 00:41:07.840 |
and people were willing to pay at least a little bit more for the experience of being in a flow 00:41:13.200 |
apartment. The problem for Adam Newman is that at the end of the day, his plan to raise rents by 00:41:20.800 |
creating experience, even though it worked, it just didn't raise rents that much. And what ended 00:41:26.240 |
up being much more important were the moves in interest rates and how he capitalized these 00:41:32.720 |
acquisitions and the price he paid on the acquisitions. So there's an old saying in real 00:41:37.520 |
estate that you make money based on the buy, not on the sell, meaning that, you know, when you go 00:41:43.360 |
and sell your apartment building, office building, or whatever, you're monetizing an acquisition that 00:41:49.200 |
you did correctly. And if you don't buy at the right price, you're never going to be able to 00:41:53.040 |
make money on the sale. And I think this is a really good example of this, where he bought 00:41:57.680 |
at top of market, his capital stack was over reliant on debt, and he had floating rate debt. 00:42:05.120 |
I mean, those are just financial mistakes and timing mistakes that you can't make up for, 00:42:10.400 |
no matter how good an operator you are in real estate. And in a way, I mean, this is the same 00:42:15.520 |
thing that happened with WeWork, which is he delivered an excellent product. I mean, people 00:42:20.320 |
love WeWork offices. Absolutely. Yeah, they pick them over other offices because of the vibes, 00:42:27.040 |
because of the culture, because of the community. So he has some mastery of that. But to your point, 00:42:32.880 |
entry price matters, and the economics matter. If you look at WeWork, it didn't fail because 00:42:37.920 |
the product wasn't good. It was because he didn't pay enough attention to the financial 00:42:42.000 |
aspects of the business. With WeWork, he leased a bunch of offices at the absolute top of the market, 00:42:47.600 |
and then over invested in TI's, tenant improvements. With Flow, he bought a bunch 00:42:52.000 |
of real estate at the top of the market and sort of did it with the wrong capital stack. 00:42:56.320 |
So this is the problem is that when you get into a real estate business, it doesn't really matter 00:43:02.080 |
how great you are as an entrepreneur operator if you're not good at sort of the legacy, 00:43:09.040 |
old school real estate part of it. And the old school real estate guys were saying during WeWork, 00:43:16.160 |
"This is not going to work. This is Regis, but with a bad capital structure." And the old school 00:43:22.160 |
real estate guys were saying something similar about this. And it just goes to show that if you 00:43:28.080 |
are going to try and disrupt a legacy industry, you do have to kind of understand the ins and 00:43:32.880 |
outs of that legacy industry. And the great paradox of this, Sax, was when he did Green 00:43:38.000 |
Desk, which was the precursor to WeWork, when he did the first WeWorks in San Francisco and other 00:43:42.400 |
places, his playbook was find a building that's empty that cannot be leased. So he got 25 Taylor 00:43:48.880 |
Street, like 6th and Market, the worst area by the Tenderloin, and we had an office there for 00:43:53.600 |
a little bit. And I had my podcasting studio there for a little bit. This was a terrible off, this was 00:43:57.760 |
a terrible area, but he made it hip and cool. And it was really cheap. And man, it sold out and it 00:44:03.280 |
was packed and the vibes were great. But then as you're saying, then he moved all of a sudden to 00:44:08.160 |
Soma, and he started opening up these glass filled ones. And, you know, the he was renting them for 00:44:13.760 |
less with all their giveaways and six months free and all this stuff than they could ever afford. 00:44:18.080 |
So he kind of had mission drift, right? The playbook, they just they changed the playbook. 00:44:25.200 |
Well, the timing, the timing got really bad. And again, they didn't pay attention to the 00:44:29.840 |
financial aspects as much as they should. In this case, I think that if he was trying to execute 00:44:36.000 |
this play today, and doing his acquisitions today, he could actually make it where he would, 00:44:41.200 |
he would need a lot more equity because he wouldn't be able to get as much debt financing. 00:44:44.640 |
But if he had the equity and could do more of an acquisition based on equity, the prices he'd pay 00:44:49.120 |
right now would be much lower. And then as interest rates come down, he could ride that 00:44:54.080 |
wave, he could refi, pull his equity out, and put debt on it that is cheaper as the price goes down. 00:45:00.800 |
So there was a way to maybe make this work. But you know, with real estate, 00:45:05.520 |
the timing is just so important. Again, your cost basis of when you get in the investment 00:45:10.800 |
is probably the most important thing in terms of whether you make money or not. 00:45:15.520 |
Did you see this by chance, the real estate piece in 60 minutes, the package they did 00:45:19.520 |
last week, Saks? It was basically what we were talking about here a year ago. 00:45:23.520 |
Super compelling, if you haven't seen it. It's basically the all in podcast from 12 or 18 months 00:45:27.680 |
ago. Has anything changed on the field in terms of commercial real estate? Or is it just continuing 00:45:33.600 |
to collapse? No, I mean, nothing's changed. I think that all the commercial real estate 00:45:37.360 |
guys, the sponsors and the dealmakers and so forth, they're all kind of hanging on by their 00:45:43.120 |
fingernails waiting for interest rates to come down. And all the leases are still coming off, 00:45:48.720 |
right? Like people are still who had six, seven, eight year leases that were signed pre-COVID. 00:45:52.720 |
It depends on the market. I mean, some of the markets are coming back. But again, what this 00:45:59.200 |
flow news showed, this Adam Neumann news shows is that you could be fully occupied and you could 00:46:07.040 |
still default. And the reason is because of your capital structure, the interest rates have spiked 00:46:11.440 |
up. You're now paying all of your operating income is being eaten up by your debt service. 00:46:19.360 |
The only way to make it through that is you go to your bank, it's one of these regional 00:46:23.520 |
banks, and you work out a deal to extend. They call it pretend and extend. And they let you 00:46:30.480 |
hang on there. You'll extend the term of your- Kick the can down the road, yeah. 00:46:35.440 |
Yeah. They'll lower your debt payments in exchange for more term. And you just try to 00:46:38.960 |
get to the other side of these high interest rates. And then once you get to the other side, 00:46:44.160 |
again, you're hanging on, you're not defaulting. That's what everyone's doing. So, if rates don't 00:46:49.280 |
come down as expected this year, I think the market's expecting 150 basis points of rate cuts. 00:46:55.360 |
If that doesn't actually happen, there's a lot of real estate sponsors who are in trouble. 00:47:00.080 |
And in turn, there's a lot of regional banks who are in trouble because they're the ones 00:47:04.640 |
who made all these loans to these sponsors. So, everyone's trying to, like you said, 00:47:08.640 |
kick the can down the road. Yeah. And the 60 Minutes piece also 00:47:13.440 |
talked about how there's some emergency rezoning going on in New York specifically where 00:47:17.920 |
they take the floor plate in the middle, which I think you talked about, Sach, you have to have 00:47:21.920 |
windows if you want to convert to residential. And they just make an empty space, the void, 00:47:27.040 |
they call it, in the middle of the building that they'll deal with in the future. But they just 00:47:31.840 |
have this empty space in the middle of the building that's not going to get used. And 00:47:35.600 |
then the rest that has windows gets used to be converted into lofts, etc, in New York. So, 00:47:40.400 |
people are starting to think creatively. If people don't come back to office. Okay, 00:47:44.560 |
let me ask you a question just based on that comp, the set of comments, given Adam Newman's 00:47:49.440 |
experience as an investor in this space, and this general opportunity, wouldn't you rather back a 00:47:54.720 |
known someone who knows and has been through the market and has experience versus some founder 00:47:59.760 |
who shows up and has never run a business in this space? I mean, this guy has more experience. 00:48:03.440 |
It's such a great point. Well, here's the thing, Freeberg, the great point about that is, 00:48:08.400 |
you don't see a lot of founders who explicitly come out and say, I want to build $100 billion 00:48:13.120 |
business, I want to build a giant business. They're so rare, that VCs who have a lot of chips, 00:48:19.040 |
they would like to back those, you know, swing for the fences, folks. And so, I do understand 00:48:24.320 |
why people would back him again. And they've run out of before they've done it. To some degree. 00:48:27.840 |
So, maybe they learned from mistakes, and this time around, he learned from those mistakes. 00:48:35.840 |
I'm not advocating, by the way. I'm just asking. 00:48:38.080 |
No, I understand. But to your point, Freeberg, I can understand. People want to bet on somebody 00:48:41.920 |
who is crazy and swings for the fences. This entrepreneur clearly does not learn from their 00:48:46.960 |
mistakes. I think both of those things could be true. Right, Shama? 00:48:50.000 |
What I would say is that I think that where I've made the biggest mistakes in my investing career 00:48:55.760 |
is when I confused what I was investing in for one thing when it was the other. And so, 00:49:02.000 |
when I look back, and I had a small dallyance in biotech, because I thought, oh, this is going to 00:49:08.480 |
be more computational biology, and I understand computation. So, this gives me an edge. Turned 00:49:14.080 |
out I was wrong. There was another time where I've invested in certain sectors of the economy, 00:49:19.280 |
because I thought they were technology businesses, and at best, they were tech-enabled 00:49:23.040 |
versions of an existing industry. And when I look at those investments, the thing that I got wrong 00:49:28.960 |
was not listening to the very experienced investors in those sectors and why they passed. 00:49:37.200 |
And that has caused me no shortage of headache and grief. And so, if I had to learn anything 00:49:45.040 |
from all of this, it would be that if it looks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, it's a 00:49:50.160 |
duck. It's not a tech company. And so, if that duck means it's a real estate business, I would 00:49:56.240 |
talk to a real estate investor and wonder to myself why they wouldn't have done this deal. 00:50:00.400 |
Similarly, you know, when it's a biotech business, I have to ask myself, 00:50:05.200 |
why wouldn't they have done it? They know more than I ever will in this space. And so, similarly, 00:50:10.240 |
I kind of look at this as an example of that, which is, could be a very talented person in an 00:50:16.160 |
industry. I think just like it's important for us to be very clear and lucid and intellectually 00:50:22.080 |
honest about what industry that is. I think it's a great point. I mean, look, I think whenever 00:50:25.760 |
you're dealing with a tech-enabled business, which I would define as a more traditional 00:50:31.600 |
business model with some sort of software layer, you know, on top of it, you have to kind of assess 00:50:40.160 |
like how much of a difference does that software really make at the end of the day. In this case, 00:50:46.080 |
this is a real estate business with a very thin kind of software slash operating technology. 00:50:53.360 |
Yeah, the experience layer is a very small part of the overall, let's call it P&L of this business. 00:51:02.000 |
Such a great point. Saks, I mean, a perfect analogy would be like if you have, if you're 00:51:06.560 |
taking a flight on United, the United app is delightful now. It's a really good app. I don't 00:51:10.800 |
use this as a commercial airline. It's called United Airlines, Saks. You pay for one ticket 00:51:14.480 |
instead of the whole plane. But have you been to a McDonald's recently? I actually went to 00:51:17.680 |
McDonald's. Yeah. You order through an app now and there's a big screen. The point is you walk 00:51:21.360 |
in there and it's probably not the McDonald's you knew 15 or 20 years ago. It's not about waiting in 00:51:26.480 |
line and ordering and that's not how it works anymore. There. So the point is, is that a tech 00:51:32.000 |
enabled business or is that still a restaurant? Well, if you spend a lot of your time intellectually 00:51:37.040 |
contorting yourself to try to justify why the next version of McDonald's is a tech enabled 00:51:42.080 |
business, you're just going to lose a lot of money. It's a restaurant. Now all restaurants 00:51:46.880 |
need technology. And what you see by McDonald's is even the oldest and most established are running 00:51:52.240 |
forward very quickly to implement technology because they know that it creates efficiency, 00:51:57.840 |
which then flows to the bottom line for them. Yeah. So the reality is that we have lived in 00:52:02.720 |
this wonderland where we've looked at these software businesses that have 80 and 90% gross 00:52:07.680 |
margins and impose that expectation on other markets and then made investment decisions by 00:52:12.480 |
trying to justify how that it's a tech enabled real estate business, a tech enabled healthcare 00:52:18.000 |
business, a tech enabled energy business without being honest with ourselves that those businesses 00:52:23.120 |
have over decades because of lots of competition found a consistent and reliable 00:52:31.360 |
resting place in terms of gross margins far below 80 and 90%. And so instead of willing 00:52:38.320 |
tech enabled businesses to be at 80 and 90 and tricking oneself, I think it's more realistic 00:52:43.120 |
to ask yourself why aren't 80 and 90% gross margin businesses decaying to 30 and 40% gross 00:52:48.800 |
margins like every other part of the economy, when everything will be technology enabled? I think that 00:52:53.600 |
that's a very reasonable question. And I think the answer is, there is no safe place. I don't think 00:52:58.320 |
that you can justify 80 90% gross margins in software, when you can use a model and whip up 00:53:03.520 |
a competitor. I just think that we are all going to a place where everything is a tech enabled 00:53:08.960 |
version of some marketplaces would be a notable exception there with network effects. So DoorDash 00:53:14.320 |
versus the tech enabled restaurant, asset light marketplaces, you and I and sacks have been 00:53:18.640 |
involved in a bunch of different marketplaces together. Sometimes they're asset heavy, 00:53:22.560 |
sometimes they're asset light when they're asset heavy, man, it's really hard to make those 00:53:26.240 |
businesses work on sacks. Yeah, I mean, I think we should differentiate between gross margin and then 00:53:33.200 |
the net operating margin or profit, right. And so, you know, gross margin is what is the cost 00:53:40.560 |
on the margin of providing one incremental unit. And the thing about pure software businesses 00:53:47.120 |
is that on the margin, you can provision another instance of the product almost for free. I mean, 00:53:51.760 |
there's a little bit of hosting costs at AWS or whatever. So on the margins, it's, you know, 00:53:57.120 |
it's like the perfect gross margin business, as opposed to a hamburger, as opposed to a, 00:54:01.440 |
yeah, a restaurant is going to have very large costs of goods sold or cogs. The simple heuristic 00:54:09.360 |
that I use is just does this company have large cogs, costs of goods sold? And are they physical 00:54:16.800 |
world cogs? If they are, it's not a software business, it's at best a tech enabled business. 00:54:23.920 |
So just look for that. You know, does this business have large physical world cogs? Now, 00:54:30.960 |
what I would say is if the cogs are virtual, like, you know, it could be hosting costs, 00:54:36.240 |
or it could be paying Twilio for telephony or something like that, then at least it's still 00:54:43.120 |
not like as good a business because the margins aren't as good, but it's very scalable, right? 00:54:48.800 |
Because you're not you don't have that like huge friction of needing to scale up physical world 00:54:53.120 |
infrastructure, physical world, supply chains, that kind of stuff. So I like virtual cogs a 00:54:58.480 |
lot better. There are digital cogs a lot better than physical cogs. 00:55:02.800 |
I love it when marketplaces though, I mean, we could speak to that, too. You know, 00:55:05.920 |
when I had Dara on the pod the other week, and when he launches an adjacency, 00:55:10.480 |
hey, we're going to sell alcohol, hey, we're going to sell groceries, hey, we're gonna 00:55:13.680 |
add this thing that's right next to the already, you know, portfolio of Uber offerings, 00:55:18.800 |
doesn't cost them much, right? They just have to get the supply side up and running, 00:55:21.840 |
but they already have the demand side. And I think that's where like, these super apps are 00:55:24.720 |
doing really well, or Airbnb adding, you know, some inventory in a new city that they unlock, 00:55:30.240 |
right? Well, true, true marketplaces are perfect gross margin businesses as well, 00:55:34.720 |
because they don't have physical inventory that they themselves own. What you'll see is with a 00:55:38.960 |
lot of marketplaces, they'll cheat by buying the inventory themselves, at least to jumpstart the 00:55:46.400 |
market and then selling it. And so when you see that line item on the P&L, you know, that they 00:55:52.240 |
have real cost of goods sold, you know, oh, wait a second, this isn't a true marketplace, they're 00:55:57.840 |
providing the service. And so again, it's just a way to like catch whether the business is truly 00:56:04.480 |
one of these great, high gross margin businesses, or whether it's more of a tech enabled business 00:56:10.240 |
that's pretending to be a pure software business. Yeah, direct to consumer got people in a lot of 00:56:15.040 |
trouble during the last cycle in venture capital. If you look at a lot of these companies, 00:56:21.920 |
even the best SaaS businesses have seen their gross margins erode by about 15 to 20%. It used 00:56:31.120 |
to be that best in class software business can generate 90 91% 88 high 80s to low 90s gross 00:56:38.400 |
margins. Now that's not true. You see a lot of these best in class companies that are in the 00:56:41.760 |
high 60s, low 70s. So it already just shows you that that pressure has has come upon the market. 00:56:47.200 |
And so is it that the software enabled business goes towards 85? Or is that the 85% gross margin 00:56:52.960 |
business goes towards 30? It looks like it's the latter. That's just what the data says. 00:56:56.880 |
Well, ma'am, just categorizing certain costs differently than you are. But I don't know why 00:57:01.200 |
software business would go all the way to 30. Right? Because again, sales and marketing don't 00:57:04.560 |
count in the gross margin. GNA doesn't count even R&D doesn't count in the gross margin has to be, 00:57:10.640 |
you know, a unit cost that you can attribute on the margin to that incremental instance of the 00:57:17.520 |
product. So things like, again, paying Twilio for meter telephony or paying open AI for like 00:57:24.800 |
metered API access, all of that is definitely in cogs. And I think some customer support costs 00:57:31.120 |
that can be attributed on kind of a per instance basis that goes in there. But if if sales and 00:57:37.280 |
marketing and R&D and GNA aren't going in there, I mean, I don't know why I go all the way to 30. 00:57:43.120 |
I guess I'm just saying that I still think software businesses and marketplaces for that 00:57:47.520 |
matter are still the best kinds of businesses on a margin profile basis. The problem is that 00:57:53.520 |
there's a lot of fake software businesses or fake marketplaces out there that are pretending 00:57:59.120 |
to be pure tech businesses when actually, they're they're more like old school businesses that have 00:58:05.280 |
the veneer of technology. And I think, to your point there, like the trick of saying I'm an 80% 00:58:11.920 |
gross margin business, but having no profitability is then who cares? So when you look at the profit, 00:58:18.640 |
when you look at the profitability of these businesses, again, you'll be in the 20 to 30%. 00:58:23.200 |
That's why when you see companies that are in the high 30s to low 50s, they're a very unique. 00:58:30.240 |
And be, you should expect that there is something fundamentally monopolistic about them. 00:58:37.680 |
And that is the simplest way to filter out these companies, because in a highly competitive market, 00:58:43.600 |
you cannot extract those kinds of profit dollars. Capitalism says you can't do that. So you can only 00:58:48.720 |
do it when when you have an N of one or N of two kind of competitive dynamic where there's essentially 00:58:54.880 |
a mutual to talk with your biggest competitor. Yeah, it is it is a good point that just because 00:59:00.160 |
you have good unit economics or good gross margins doesn't mean that the business is profitable at 00:59:05.680 |
the end of the day. Yeah, it could be totally 80% gross margins and still be losing a ton of money 00:59:10.320 |
because you've got too much overhead. You've got too much sales and marketing. You're too much R&D. 00:59:14.960 |
Yes. So you're selling to customers who don't really need it. And then they eventually cancel, 00:59:18.800 |
right? Like we see that a lot. Look at the streamers. Look at the streamers. That's just 00:59:23.280 |
a big recycling exercise. It's just like people come to the top of the funnel, they use the product, 00:59:27.360 |
and then they leave and then you have to reacquire them over and over again. And it and it could be 00:59:31.760 |
the case that SAS actually looks a little bit like that too, at the bottom level, 00:59:35.200 |
but when you hit your natural audience, it does get challenging. 00:59:38.240 |
Well, this is why in SAS, there's a heuristic called the rule of 40, 00:59:42.800 |
which is for public market SAS companies, you want to see that their operating margin 00:59:48.480 |
plus their growth rate equals 40 or is greater than 40, ideally. So in other words, you could 00:59:54.560 |
have a SAS business with a 20% operating margin and a 20% growth rate, and that would hit rule 01:00:01.200 |
of 40 and that would be a very attractive business. Or you could have, I don't know, 01:00:06.080 |
it could be growing 50% year over year, and its operating margin could be negative 10%. 01:00:11.200 |
And that'd be okay too, because they're losing money, but at least the investment is leading to 01:00:17.040 |
well above average growth. Or you could be growing, you could be growing slower, you could 01:00:23.360 |
have a 10% growth rate and have a 30% operating margin, and that would also be hitting the rule 01:00:28.160 |
of 40. So it's just a simple way of tracking whether this is a good business at scale. 01:00:34.640 |
I don't think startups have to worry about this until they get to the later growth stage. 01:00:38.880 |
Yeah. When you're in your BC round, you're making 50, 100 million. Yeah, you got to be 01:00:42.880 |
really thoughtful about this. In the beginning, you're trying to get product market fit and 01:00:45.520 |
triangulate on something. So Chamath just mentioned streaming, NBCUniversal, if you 01:00:50.240 |
didn't know it, paid the NFL $100 million for the exclusive streaming rights to one, 01:00:56.880 |
that's right, one first round playoff game for the NFL. That happened last weekend between the 01:01:01.680 |
Chiefs and the Dolphins. That was on their service Peacock, NBC's app, basically their 01:01:07.280 |
version of Netflix or Disney Plus. It garnered 23 million viewers, which makes it the most streamed 01:01:12.880 |
live event in US history. Even so, that's almost half of what the Packers and Cowboys had about 40 01:01:22.080 |
million. Lions versus Rams, same weekend, 36 million. And so this has brought into question 01:01:28.800 |
what's going on with streaming? Have these businesses gotten ahead of their skis? Just 01:01:32.320 |
to give you a couple of charts. Disney Plus took off like a massive rocket peaked in q4 of 2022 at 01:01:38.640 |
164 million subscribers are now at 150 million. Here's a chart. I mean, just amazing how quickly 01:01:45.760 |
they got to Netflix ish numbers. Here's Netflix's chart. Again, this is quarterly, they're up to 01:01:52.640 |
now an all time high 247 million subscribers, and the annual growth rate all the way back to 2001 01:01:59.680 |
still pretty spectacular. And their revenue also very respectable for Netflix. However, they 01:02:06.640 |
overspent massively during the peak streaming era 2019 to 2022. And that's when subscriber growth 01:02:13.200 |
started to slow. Obviously, they were spending way too much and other entrants came in like Apple 01:02:19.200 |
Plus and Amazon Prime where they really didn't even think that they had to make a profit. They 01:02:23.920 |
were using streaming maybe to sell more iPhones or to get more Amazon Prime subscribers. So here is 01:02:31.040 |
the major problem. Here's the churn chart. Basically churn means people cancel, right. And 01:02:36.080 |
so as these services have cut what they're offering the number of Marvel shows or Disney, 01:02:42.240 |
you know, having Star Wars shows, the churn goes way up. People are also having subscription 01:02:48.640 |
overload. I don't know how many of these I subscribe to, but I think it's all of them. 01:02:53.120 |
Or maybe out of these 123456789 on the chart, I think I have seven of these. So there is definitely 01:03:00.400 |
some unbelievable subscription burnout. And the streamers in order to get these businesses above 01:03:08.000 |
water have raised their prices. We all know that you've probably seen your streaming bills, 01:03:11.440 |
you know, have three, four or five bucks added to them every month. And at the same time, 01:03:15.200 |
they're cutting how much they're spending. So you're paying more for less. Chamath, 01:03:18.320 |
your thoughts on this dynamic? If you bring the chart back up, here's the 01:03:22.480 |
most important thing that's worth noting. Let's take stars as an example, it turns 12% of their 01:03:28.640 |
users every month, which means that over a year, they've turned 144% of their user base. 01:03:33.680 |
That means that they have to basically turn their entire membership base one and a half times in 01:03:41.280 |
order just to tread water. Right. So if you start with 100, it's a lot of money that you have to 01:03:47.920 |
spend to make sure you end the year at 100. Forget about growing. If you look at peacock, 01:03:53.520 |
they're going to lose 100% of their subscribers in a year. If you look at 01:03:57.760 |
discovery, they're going to lose 75%. If you look at max, they're going to lose 50 odd percent 01:04:06.800 |
Apple TV, same Hulu and Disney plus will lose 60%. Netflix will lose almost 40%. 01:04:15.120 |
So the only winner in all of this is Facebook and Google. The only winners are Facebook and Google, 01:04:21.360 |
because that's where the ads will appear to try to reacquire these folks, right? So I guess that's 01:04:27.200 |
a positive indication. But the reality is that money isn't infinite. And so what happens in a 01:04:32.720 |
dynamic where you have a category, where there's just a lot of consumer churn, I think what happens 01:04:38.240 |
is it evolves in phases. And in phase one, which is sort of where we are now where there's a bunch 01:04:43.120 |
of relatively well established folks, is that they are going to initially overspend on content, 01:04:49.920 |
because they are going to try to differentiate the cost of acquisition based on content, right, 01:04:54.960 |
which makes sense. I have a tentpole, come and watch it here. You can't watch it anywhere else. 01:04:59.120 |
And I think that was the peacock example, where they had this football game and all these people 01:05:04.480 |
showed up. And they thought this is exactly why we're paying so much money for these rights, 01:05:10.160 |
because people will show up. I think the problem is that when everybody is doing it, 01:05:14.400 |
everybody's doing it. And so you don't know how to differentiate even in our group chat. 01:05:20.880 |
Look at the number of times when somebody randomly says, Is there something to watch? And everybody's 01:05:24.640 |
got 50 recommendations. Guess what I do, I tune it all out, because I'm like 50 across six different 01:05:30.640 |
services, I have no way to track it. And then I lose interest. And I'm like, you know, I'll just 01:05:36.160 |
stick to YouTube. So I think what happens is in phase one, folks spend a lot of content in phase 01:05:42.320 |
two, they realize that actually, what you need to do is spend on a long tail of content in a much 01:05:49.200 |
more disciplined way. So there's a company that that I know about, for example, they just signed a 01:05:53.920 |
pretty big deal with Amazon. Hundreds of millions of dollars. 01:06:02.640 |
And I was trying to figure out is that a lot or a little. And it turns out that Amazon's trying to 01:06:07.920 |
get three or four or five versions of these going. Which means that before we probably could have 01:06:13.920 |
gotten five or 600 million and instead you get two or 300 million still an incredible thing, 01:06:18.560 |
but it just goes to show you that there's a lot of competition. And so instead of having 01:06:22.400 |
a single mode, right, if you were to graph something, where there's a few pieces that 01:06:27.840 |
just get all the money, now you're smearing this content across all kinds of stuff. And I think 01:06:34.320 |
that that makes it very difficult to keep folks so I suspect that you're just going to see a lot 01:06:40.000 |
of churn. I don't I don't like this category at all as an investor. Clearly, there's been 01:06:44.560 |
an overspend here, but consolidation is coming freeberg. Any thoughts on the streaming space? 01:06:48.400 |
I just think this is the opposite of what we were talking about earlier, 01:06:52.880 |
where there's a free market competing, and it's benefiting consumers. I mean, 01:06:57.120 |
the point that you made is a really good one that there's a lot of great content to watch. 01:07:00.560 |
Folks that raise prices, people cancel. So you got to drop prices, you got to offer good content. 01:07:06.160 |
And I actually think this is a really good and healthy thing to see happen is competition that 01:07:12.240 |
benefits consumers. And there'll be some set of winners here and some set of losers. But I think 01:07:16.160 |
ultimately, it's just really good to see this how it all shakes out, who's willing to put up the big 01:07:21.360 |
bucks, who's got the smarter algorithm that predicts how fresh your content has to be and 01:07:26.400 |
how unique it has to be relative to other platforms to keep the audience attention. 01:07:31.040 |
I would argue if you look at those numbers, and you look at the performance over time, 01:07:34.400 |
Netflix absolutely rules the roost in the sense they're an incredible operating team. 01:07:38.400 |
They have an incredible capability of predicting what content will work, how quickly they have to 01:07:43.040 |
refresh content, how much they should be investing in content per quarter per month. And they're 01:07:47.280 |
clearly retaining users and making money. And others maybe that are newer to the game haven't 01:07:51.920 |
figured that out yet. But it's just very good to see the competition. So I don't know how to predict 01:07:55.760 |
what's going to happen here. But it's good to see. 01:07:57.520 |
It's clearly going to be massive consolidation. Also, these folks are 01:08:00.560 |
launching advertising based version. So you probably saw Netflix has an advertising tier. 01:08:05.120 |
And so a lot of these folks didn't have those Disney plus, I think is going to have one as well. 01:08:10.000 |
You know what no one's paying attention to is YouTube TV. I don't know, 01:08:17.040 |
Yeah, I think it's fantastic. If you look at some third party data on YouTube TV, 01:08:21.040 |
the subscriptions are going through the friggin roof. And it's really interesting to see because 01:08:25.280 |
with YouTube TV, you're basically re bundling the unbundling that happened in cable, except you're 01:08:30.480 |
doing it over the internet, you can access it anywhere. So they've basically converted the pipe 01:08:34.720 |
as the value to the service itself as the value which you can access anywhere you want on any TV 01:08:39.520 |
in any room without boxes while you're on the road on your phone on your laptop. And it seems to be 01:08:44.960 |
kind of highlighting that maybe it wasn't necessarily the bundling that was the problem, 01:08:50.160 |
but the way that the service was being offered. So who knows maybe bundling versus all of this 01:08:55.600 |
part and parcel, you got to pick five different providers and buy content on the fly. Maybe 01:09:01.600 |
Young people don't care about the live channels old people do. But yeah, Hulu and YouTube TV 01:09:07.280 |
are really wonderful products because they work really well on Apple TV. The apps work great, 01:09:12.320 |
but they also work great on your iPhone, your iPad. So yeah, you know, they're really spectacular 01:09:19.200 |
Well, this is tie this conversation back to what we were talking about with margins and SAS and 01:09:24.400 |
tech enabled versus real software businesses. I personally have never seen a B2C subscription 01:09:31.040 |
business that works the churn is just too high. I mean, what I've seen is that the monthly churn 01:09:36.880 |
rates on a software subscription for consumers is somewhere in the five to 10% range. So on a 01:09:43.360 |
full year basis, you're attaining maybe 50% of your customer base, you're effectively rebuilding 01:09:47.600 |
your business from scratch every two years. It's a very tough place to be. This is why I basically 01:09:52.160 |
skewed towards B2B SAS is because a good B2B SAS business will have net expansion instead of 50% 01:10:00.000 |
churn, you'll do 120% expansion. And so you're actually building a subscriber base with long 01:10:05.920 |
term value. Now, how did Netflix do it? I mean, Netflix avoided that prohibitive level of churn 01:10:11.920 |
by spending literally billions of dollars on content and original programming. And again, 01:10:17.360 |
it goes back to the point, this is not a pure software, pure tech business. It includes an 01:10:23.680 |
old school studio, which is very capital intensive. And they financed a lot of the 01:10:31.920 |
content acquisition with billions and billions of dollars raised during that ZURP period, 01:10:37.360 |
from I think, both equity and debt. And you have to wonder if that could be done again in this 01:10:43.760 |
post ZURP period, where capital is just a lot scarcer. I think this is going to work really 01:10:48.320 |
well, though, for Netflix and Disney, man, these huge archives that they own, these libraries 01:10:52.560 |
are going to get them to three, four, 500 million global subs, and has become money printing machines 01:10:58.400 |
that I don't think they're going to need a ton of new content. The question is whether you could 01:11:02.480 |
recreate an archive of that level today, given how much more expensive capital is. My point is that 01:11:08.320 |
ZURP helped Netflix catch up to these studios and create this huge library. But still, I think that 01:11:14.560 |
what the streaming services have shown in their churn is that if you don't provide original 01:11:19.440 |
content and original programming, then users will churn off that. So, you have to kind of have both. 01:11:26.240 |
You kind of have like the library as filler, but if you don't have a hot show come along every 01:11:32.400 |
so often, the subscribers will churn off that. Yeah, you need to have some new content, depending 01:11:36.800 |
on how deep the library is. It feels like Netflix and Disney+ have done a great job with their 01:11:40.000 |
libraries, just to give you an idea. Revenue for Netflix for 2023, 33.5 billion, 247 million subs, 01:11:49.120 |
that's ARPU yearly revenue for those folks, 136 bucks a year. Now, the reason you're seeing that 01:11:55.760 |
number not make sense if you're paying 15 bucks a month is because internationally, 01:12:00.320 |
Netflix is a lot, lot cheaper. But I love those two businesses. I think they're going to be 01:12:05.280 |
extraordinary over time. Netflix has to acquire 100 million people a year just to stay even. 01:12:12.640 |
What's their churn rate? 4% a month. I think it's fine. Right. So, they're churning half their 01:12:16.880 |
customer base every year. That's my point. 100 million people. They're rebuilding their customer 01:12:23.760 |
base from scratch every two years. How does that make sense? It's totally fine because what happens 01:12:28.080 |
is you have people coming off their parents plan, getting their own, people go through a bad beat, 01:12:33.440 |
they don't like it, you know, whatever, they unsubscribe, but they all come back, 01:12:36.240 |
back and forth, back and forth. And then it just keeps growing over time. I think you're describing 01:12:42.240 |
something that's true. I think David is describing why it's a shit business. I mean, if they make 01:12:48.480 |
more money than they spend, and I don't think they need to do a ton of advertising. Eventually, 01:12:52.640 |
you churn through so much of the market that actually you can't maintain that growth rate. 01:12:57.440 |
I mean, if you reactivate, maybe you can do it. But I think that's what's happening. 01:13:02.000 |
From a business perspective, the only logical thing that I would do if I was running one of 01:13:07.120 |
these businesses is attach it to another business where you can think about it in terms of LTV. So, 01:13:13.520 |
the only obvious example of that, I think, is Amazon Video, because you can stick it beside 01:13:18.880 |
Prime and a bunch of other things. And now you have a very different way of justifying 01:13:24.400 |
LTV and minimizing churn. And that seems like a I buy that argument, Jason, I don't buy like 01:13:30.080 |
a standalone business like this trying to do it. Yucky. I know. Sorry, real quick. Have you guys 01:13:35.360 |
dug into Netflix's business? I mean, they're still growing top line, the EBITDA margin continues to 01:13:41.440 |
expand. I mean, all those facts might be true. But that churn engine and that recapture engine 01:13:46.160 |
seems to be working in a way that they're printing cash and growing. It's pretty impressive. I don't 01:13:51.200 |
know if there's a limit there. But I mean, I haven't looked at the analyst. I think that is 01:13:54.720 |
the key. Yeah, to the bundling point, Apple Plus, which is the TV component, not the hardware 01:14:01.200 |
product, is bundled as part of this Apple One program, which is kind of like Amazon Prime. 01:14:06.640 |
And so I think you're seeing a little bundling there. Netflix also added video games to make 01:14:11.040 |
it even more sticky. So I think there's like a subscription, super app coming, which the New 01:14:15.760 |
York Times is kind of done right with wordle, crosswords, the athletic wire cutter and the New 01:14:20.880 |
York Times. So I think you're going to start to see honestly, you just had a jumble of names that 01:14:25.440 |
went in one year and out the other. I don't remember a single one. You said this is my 01:14:28.480 |
point for most people, Jason, not a media aficionado like New York Times is doing fantastic 01:14:32.800 |
doing this bundling. Some people come for the crosswords and wordle. And that's why they 01:14:36.320 |
subscribe and they like the news. Other people come for the news, they discover crosswords and 01:14:40.000 |
wire cutter and the athletic and they stay for that. So I do think there's going to be an 01:14:44.000 |
incredible business here. I'll take the other side of it. Yeah, they spent a lot on content 01:14:48.240 |
though during that period where Disney plus came in. I think everybody's now has a little more 01:14:53.200 |
discipline and the budgets came way down. If you didn't know the Hulk cost 250 million or something, 01:14:59.200 |
the She-Hulk rather, that cost 225 million for nine episodes. What? The first Avengers, 01:15:03.440 |
225 million. Wait, sorry, 250 million for nine episodes? Of the She-Hulk. Oh my lord. And people 01:15:09.920 |
criticize it for having bad CGI. So it's, I think there's like new discipline coming to Hollywood. 01:15:14.080 |
Was this a Netflix show? A Disney plus show. A Disney plus show. 01:15:17.440 |
Yeah. I don't know about you guys. I've been rewatching the Sopranos. I find some of the 01:15:20.800 |
content on HBO max to be the best content out there. Oh my God. I've watched it twice. 01:15:24.640 |
There's so much rewatchability on it. Disney doesn't have that much rewatchability. I don't 01:15:28.400 |
know. The only reason I keep my max subscription is because I'm waiting for a house of the dragon 01:15:32.480 |
season two. I mean, if they didn't have that one show, I'd be like, yeah, cut it. You know? 01:15:36.960 |
Yeah. I do think this could help Netflix because a lot of these streaming services came along. 01:15:41.760 |
We had way too many, right? We got saturated with streaming services and most of them, 01:15:46.880 |
you subscribe to, you may not even remember subscribing. You may just subscribe to a free 01:15:51.200 |
trial to get an NFL game and then you get billed because you forgot to cancel it. 01:15:55.280 |
By the way. Yeah. Have you guys ever gone into Apple iCloud settings and looked at your 01:16:02.080 |
subscriptions? Oh boy. Yeah. Get in there and guys just go, if you have like an extra five 01:16:09.280 |
minutes, you will save so much money by going into subscriptions in your settings and just 01:16:14.880 |
turning them all off. I was shocked. I was shocked. I mean, this is part of your austerity 01:16:19.440 |
measure. Absolutely. You know how many subscriptions to Disney plus I had? 01:16:22.800 |
How many? This is what's so gross is why they even let me do this. I had three. 01:16:33.040 |
For the plane one, but I had, I had three, I had three, I had two HBOs. I had 01:16:41.440 |
two Netflix. Oh no. Netflix keeps sending you a message saying, Hey, you need to update your 01:16:45.440 |
payment information. But then I'm watching Netflix on my Apple TV. So I'm like, 01:16:50.080 |
I'm clearly playing for paying for it somehow. It's so confusing and I have the perfect solution 01:16:57.120 |
for you. There are credit cards now where you can set a spending limit. And so what I do is every 01:17:02.000 |
year I just turn off the limit on that credit card. I just take it from unlimited or on cap 01:17:07.920 |
down to zero. And I do this for business as well. And then all the subscriptions timeout, 01:17:11.760 |
you know what I call that? What Jeff, Jeff does that from Jeff. 01:17:15.680 |
But I mean, having somebody go in there and then you have a Jeff average, 01:17:20.880 |
just know, but it's very simple. You only use one card for subscriptions and then you turn it off 01:17:24.240 |
every year. Which ones you want to keep going. It works really well. And then you move the other 01:17:27.840 |
ones to a new car. I don't even want to say how many thousands of dollars I was wasting on like 01:17:31.840 |
duolingo. I was like, I'm paying for duolingo. And then I was paying for Italian. It's still 01:17:36.480 |
terrible. Yeah, terrible. And then I had, I had like a case against them. No, then I had duolingo 01:17:41.760 |
and I had Babel and I had Rosetta stone. So I'm like, my Italian is not improving because of any 01:17:47.120 |
of these three apps, but I was paying them collectively like $400. I had a whoop subscription. 01:17:51.840 |
I don't even have a loop. When Rick Thompson started manscaped, I was, I signed up for 01:17:57.840 |
manscaped. I get all this ball deodorant. I've never used it once. We know, we know we sit 01:18:02.720 |
next to you in poker. We know it's not working, bro. Just a message to manscaped. I have tried 01:18:08.720 |
to cancel. I have called, I have emailed, I took it upon myself to try. It's impossible to cancel. 01:18:15.040 |
They won't even let you reset your account so that you can get a link to cancel. It's so hard. 01:18:20.080 |
And still your balls are terrible. Yeah, my balls are phenomenal. I've sat next to you in 01:18:26.640 |
poker, man. Not real. Okay. Let's get into plastics and get off Chamath balls. I mean, 01:18:32.480 |
how did we get here? Subscription services, subscription services. Yes. Streaming is at a 01:18:38.640 |
crosswords, a crossroads apparently. So they're really trying to make that ball deodorant happen, 01:18:44.400 |
aren't they? They're trying to make it happen. Well, they're trying to make fetch happen. Ball 01:18:47.760 |
deodorant's not happening. I'm sorry. I mean, what are you supposed to do? Squat and swipe? 01:18:51.680 |
How does that work? Is it a spray? Are you lifting and spraying? 01:18:56.480 |
I mean, you gotta give him points for creativity, trying to create like a new thing, but yeah. 01:19:00.640 |
I was trying to support my friend in signing up for a subscription service, 01:19:04.400 |
and now I can't cancel. That's my problem. That's my predicament. 01:19:08.080 |
Could you also take a shower and use soap? I don't know. Just putting it out there. 01:19:15.200 |
Does it have to do with the product? I signed up because Rick was the venture investor that 01:19:19.600 |
seeded it and started. I supported my friend. Yes. 01:19:22.640 |
And now I want out and I cannot get out. You can't get out. 01:19:25.840 |
Every time I try to get out, they pull me back in. I'm just going to say when it comes to Manscaped, 01:19:30.880 |
no, no testimonials, please. No testimonials. The worst part is like, you know, it comes to the house 01:19:36.240 |
and... Oh, somebody opens your ball deodorant and puts it on your desk. 01:19:40.640 |
They do. No, they put it right on the kitchen. Now the entire staff knows you have stinky balls. 01:19:44.080 |
Well, that's what's so funny. They put it right on the kitchen counter. So as I walk through the 01:19:47.680 |
bathroom, I grab it and I'm like, who's seen this bottle? Oh, there it is. 01:20:04.640 |
So how do you apply it? Is it just a little dab will do you? 01:20:09.040 |
It's not a spray. It's apparently an ointment, Sax. It's an ointment. 01:20:20.960 |
You know what? I'm going to give you my subscription. 01:20:30.800 |
Use the promo code Chamath for 10% off your... 01:20:44.640 |
Dictator. Yeah, use the promo code Dictator. You get 10% off your ball deodorant at Manscaped. 01:20:50.960 |
All right, Freeberg, it's your turn to shine. No, not ball deodorant. 01:20:54.640 |
We wanted to talk about microplastics. A study came out. It's terrifying. We've known plastics 01:21:00.000 |
have been terrible for years. Obviously, it's been turned into some sort of political discourse 01:21:04.080 |
with straws and everything, but plastics are horrible. We shouldn't be using them, 01:21:07.920 |
but this study confirms a bunch about drinking microplastics. Educate us on this study 01:21:13.200 |
that everybody's talking about right now. Dr. Freedberg. 01:21:17.040 |
I wouldn't start with the statement that plastics are awful. 01:21:20.320 |
Plastics are polymers, which are long chains of what are called monomers. This is hydrogen, 01:21:27.200 |
carbon, and oxygen that comes together to form these specific molecules. 01:21:31.440 |
And then we can kind of bake them into crystal-like structures. And the reason the plastic 01:21:37.120 |
industry took off is because it ended up being very cheap to create materials that we could 01:21:41.120 |
turn into chairs, that we could turn into bottles to move stuff around. A lot of applications, 01:21:45.760 |
everything from solar photovoltaics to our computers, to our laptops, to our phones, 01:21:51.280 |
everything has some form of these polymers in it. The polymers that are commonly used for 01:21:57.040 |
making bottles that we consume beverages out of are PET plastics. These PET plastics are made from 01:22:04.800 |
a combination of natural gas and crude oil. So we kind of have a production process where we 01:22:10.800 |
get the carbon, hydrogen and oxygen that's naturally found in natural gas and crude oil, 01:22:16.000 |
convert it into these molecules that we turn into long chains, and we turn them into bottles, 01:22:20.560 |
and fill those bottles and they end up being a lower carbon footprint than using glass about 01:22:27.040 |
5x the carbon footprint to use glass instead of plastic and in making a bottle to store stuff and 01:22:34.800 |
move liquids around 40% cheaper. And a lot of other kind of reasons why the industry and the 01:22:41.360 |
world adopted plastics not just for bottle beverages, but for other applications. So in 01:22:46.480 |
bottle beverages, because these are polymers, there are these long chains of little molecules 01:22:50.800 |
that are stuck together, some of those chains break. And then some of those little chunks of 01:22:55.760 |
those molecules end up floating around in the liquid that we're consuming. And what this study 01:23:01.520 |
did that kind of highlighted a set of data that hadn't really been studied well before is they 01:23:06.960 |
used a form of spectroscopy. So kind of a multi spectral light system shining light at different 01:23:12.640 |
wavelengths on the liquid in a bottle in plastic bottle to figure out how many of these little 01:23:17.920 |
plastic particles there were in the liquid. And in doing that, they found that there was on the order 01:23:22.720 |
of 10,000 little plastic particles per liter of water or per liter of soda or drink or Gatorade 01:23:30.640 |
or whatever beverages that you're drinking. The real question then is, well, how risky is that? 01:23:34.960 |
So if you look at a lot of the health agency studies, the kind of well adopted and well 01:23:42.160 |
researched efforts on is there toxicity associated with PT plastics on its own, 01:23:47.600 |
they find that there's very little genotoxicity or no genotoxicity, meaning it doesn't doesn't 01:23:51.520 |
change your DNA. There's no carcinogen missing. It doesn't cause cancer. But there are other 01:23:57.200 |
studies recently, that have shown different mechanisms by which these little tiny micro 01:24:02.240 |
plastics might end up in yourself, because they absorb into your body, and they're small enough 01:24:06.720 |
that they can cross into barriers, they can get into your brain, they can get into your cells, 01:24:10.880 |
when they're in your cells. There are other mechanistic studies that are done in a petri 01:24:14.640 |
dish, as opposed to being studied in the body, where they've demonstrated that they could 01:24:18.720 |
actually disrupt the function of organelles like mitochondria, endoplasmic reticulum, 01:24:23.040 |
so all these little things that operate in your cell, they can cause irritation, 01:24:26.320 |
they can trigger chemicals to be produced that might cause allergies, that might cause inflammation, 01:24:31.760 |
and so on and so forth. So while the general molecule of PT itself isn't known or shown in 01:24:37.840 |
any way to cause cancer or to cause changes in your DNA, there are other mechanisms by which 01:24:42.880 |
these little tiny plastics might be disrupting cellular function might be causing other health 01:24:47.120 |
issues. And that's now going to open up a big area of research that that's going to be predicated, 01:24:52.880 |
I think, on the fact that this study now shows that there are 1000s, hundreds of 1000s of little 01:24:58.080 |
pieces of tiny plastic in these plastic bottles that we're drinking water, and soda and juice 01:25:02.560 |
from that are getting into our body and into ourselves. 240,000 little pieces in the average 01:25:08.880 |
one liter plastic bottle. It's a pretty scary statistic. When you hear that number enough to 01:25:14.240 |
cross the blood brain barrier, right? And in rats and mice, they've shown that these little 01:25:20.480 |
micro plastics can actually accumulate in the brain if they consume enough of them. Now, the 01:25:24.960 |
reason this hasn't been well understood or studied in the past is we kind of look at the aggregate 01:25:29.200 |
amount of plastic that's in a liquid. And it's like, oh, the amount is so small, it doesn't 01:25:32.880 |
matter. But when you start to look at how small these little pieces of plastic are, and add them 01:25:38.480 |
up the cumulative effect over time, that they can actually cross into cells cross the blood brain 01:25:43.520 |
barrier, maybe you're not getting removed from the body. That's opening up a whole lot of research, 01:25:47.760 |
because there's no easy way to just scan a body and say, is there plastic in it? How much plastic 01:25:51.920 |
is there? Because there isn't a good chemical signature for it. And what these guys did is 01:25:55.920 |
they use light to look in the liquid to find the plastics, which we can't easily do in the body 01:26:00.880 |
today. So free burger, you're going to drink plastic bottle water anymore. I'm not. Okay, 01:26:05.520 |
Jamal, I've already stopped this started for me about four months ago. My wife basically said 01:26:11.120 |
we're getting rid of all plastic. And at first I really pushed back and I'm like, this is crazy. 01:26:15.760 |
And she just kept talking to me about it and showing me all this data. And yeah, about a 01:26:20.800 |
month ago, I would say I switched. So now use glass and a craft like this. Yeah, much better. 01:26:27.440 |
We got rid of all of the plastic in our in our house in the gym, no more bottles. 01:26:31.920 |
It's wasteful anyway. Like why not? You have beautiful filtered water at home, put it in a 01:26:35.760 |
craft. Sure. But the scary thing, I mean, it's a little bit more inconvenient, I'll be honest with 01:26:41.200 |
you. But it is very scary. And I think that it does alter the phenotype of the human body over 01:26:48.400 |
time. And I think you'd have to be insane to bet against that. And I suspect when you look at the 01:26:54.880 |
rates of depression and autism and Alzheimer's and dementia and autoimmune diseases, Crohn's 01:27:00.080 |
rheumatoid arthritis, to think that all of these environmental factors have no impact, I think is, 01:27:07.040 |
is taking a very scary bet. Here's what I do. I buy these glass bottles on Amazon. 01:27:12.160 |
You know, two or three cases of them, I have the best water filter system at home. 01:27:16.800 |
We fill them, we put them in the refrigerator, and we haven't bought plastic in years. 01:27:21.920 |
So in years, in years, only because I care about the environment, because I'm a good person. 01:27:27.760 |
Jason, I'll also say like that, that application is a pretty small, like, I think on the order, 01:27:35.120 |
if I'm right, 80% of bottle beverages are drunk outside the home. So people are buying stuff at 01:27:41.440 |
convenience stores at gas stations at markets, taking them with them to work. And that's how a 01:27:46.720 |
lot of plastic bottles are can carry a container. Remember, I have us is such a small percentage of 01:27:51.600 |
the global population, you go to Africa, you go to Brazil, you go to China, there isn't a great 01:27:56.240 |
like people don't have these amenities that we have in our upper and middle class America, 01:28:01.200 |
that plastic bottles have provided access to products that consumers around the world 01:28:05.600 |
otherwise wouldn't be able to afford. So there's a reason they exist. But by the way, I also want 01:28:09.760 |
to just be really clear, there isn't conclusive evidence or science that shows these plastic 01:28:14.880 |
micro particles or nanoparticles are causing these health effects. There's certainly a lot 01:28:19.600 |
of questions that it brings on. Well, what is the cumulative effect of these little things getting 01:28:23.280 |
into cells? Do they get into cells? Why do they do when they're in there? Why would anybody bet 01:28:27.040 |
that it's zero? Right? So that is the upside, right? Well, the upside is that people get to 01:28:31.840 |
access cheap beverages on the street that otherwise, people that are living on $13,000 a year 01:28:36.400 |
that can buy a, you know, a plastic soda for 25 cents. You can also buy a candle. Yeah, so that's 01:28:43.680 |
that's definitely an alternative. They're a little more expensive. Generally plastic just became the 01:28:47.200 |
cheapest container. Saks your thoughts. Sorry, guys, I stepped out to get a drink here. Don't 01:28:54.080 |
miss anything. It would be better if you had put a straw in your water bottle. 01:29:05.200 |
Saks you just telling those arrow water bottles. Yeah, I missed something. 01:29:10.960 |
Also, I use these beautiful contigo. So I think some people use yetis or other kind of things. 01:29:19.840 |
And I actually carry them with me only because I try to like think about the environment, 01:29:24.960 |
just the amount of plaques is being created. I don't know if you've seen this, but like you 01:29:28.960 |
go to Whole Foods now or you go to any supermarket and you see this wall of salads. 01:29:34.080 |
Freiburg like this is unconscionable. Like the we're literally giving people salad in a giant 01:29:41.760 |
plastic box. Yeah, let me just say a couple things about this because there's this conception that 01:29:47.360 |
this is just awful, awful, awful, but plastics there, there is a degradation of these PTS when 01:29:53.120 |
they're exposed to sunlight. There is a recycling system that many of much of this material ends up 01:29:58.400 |
in much of it. Yeah, I mean, I don't think that's actually correct. Not a lot. But what would the 01:30:03.280 |
alternative be? Right? So the alternative is you put in a glass thing and you charge people $15 01:30:07.920 |
for a couple pieces of lettuce. The reason the reason plastic the plastic industry emerged is 01:30:12.560 |
because it provided a low cost way to transport materials. And that we're all very wealthy. So we 01:30:17.680 |
have to just step outside of our bubble for a second and recognize that most people, you know, 01:30:22.080 |
the dollar difference is a huge difference for most consumers, they're not going to make that 01:30:26.080 |
dollar leap. So you know, the fact that plastics emerged is to support a consumer market that's 01:30:31.360 |
grown up all over the world. Yeah, but how does this make sense? Look at these bananas, just as 01:30:35.120 |
an example, to give people an idea bananas already come with a case called crazy. And they're 01:30:41.440 |
literally wrapping bananas in plastic now. And you know, I think this is where regulation makes 01:30:47.600 |
sense. No, there must be a gas in here or something because they're trying to keep the 01:30:51.280 |
bananas from going bad. That's why I want to shout out like this is where I think regulations 01:30:55.680 |
actually do work France, Spain, a lot of countries now are just saying you know what for fruits, 01:31:01.040 |
vegetables like yeah, don't put them in plastic, please. We're not going to allow you to do that. 01:31:06.000 |
And I think I'm not pro plastic, by the way, I'm not drinking plastic from plastic bottles. 01:31:10.480 |
But we have to be cognizant of where this industry emerged from what the science says about it. Like 01:31:14.880 |
I don't want to just be flipping about it. What is doing to all plastics? What is doing in the 01:31:18.960 |
oceans? freeberg is unconscionable. Like this, this is not a do gooder thing. It's just awful. 01:31:24.640 |
There's no reason that we need to tell you. I'll give you some good optimism around this. 01:31:32.080 |
There's a lot of efforts right now to develop microbes that can actually biodegrade these 01:31:36.480 |
pt plastics. So there's, so we're engineering these microbes that will produce enzymes, 01:31:42.800 |
these little bacteria that will produce enzymes, those enzymes can then be made in the plastic 01:31:48.480 |
itself. So then the plastic will biodegrade within a year after you use it. So there's a lot of this 01:31:53.680 |
kind of effort on how do you make naturally biodegrading plastics using bio sources and 01:31:57.920 |
biological molecules as part of the production process. And a lot of big plastic packaging 01:32:02.800 |
companies and industrial biotech companies are investing in this area. This is where 01:32:06.960 |
collectivism can do good. You know, like, if we actually, as a society say we want to do sustainable 01:32:13.200 |
packaging, like because of the tragedy of the commons, like you're saying freeberg because 01:32:16.880 |
it's cheaper capitalism, like there's no floor here, you know, to stop people from doing this 01:32:22.880 |
and stop from using plastics unnecessarily like wrapping bananas, etc. All right, listen, 01:32:27.360 |
it's been an amazing episode of the all in podcast for the dictator. Wish me luck today, 01:32:34.080 |
boys. Wish me luck. Use the promo code Dick will be following the live stream on the chat following 01:32:38.880 |
the live stream. Use promo code deck to get 20% off your ball deodorant. What do you guys think 01:32:43.760 |
about actually like running some poker tournaments through the year called all in 100% That would be 01:32:50.240 |
super fun, though. 100% I think we could replace the WSOP pretty quick. I mean, it'd be pretty 01:32:57.040 |
cool. So I'm not kidding. We have still help me with on our school. I think Jason's right. 01:33:02.240 |
I'm not just tell me if I think you can get all the pros because I think the problem is like those 01:33:06.080 |
championships have been so watered down, right? There's 52 of them, just in Vegas in June and 01:33:12.560 |
July. And then now you have like the circuit rings so that there's bracelets and rings. And 01:33:18.080 |
then there's the European one. And there's this one, there's the Bahamas. You can't have I think 01:33:24.720 |
in order to be a world champion. Can you really have like 150 winners a year? 01:33:30.240 |
Sacks, are you bored with Holden? Well, I'll play with you guys. But yeah, 01:33:34.000 |
I'm kind of bored with it. Yeah, I played a tournament yesterday. Big Oh, 01:33:38.080 |
37 players. I came in first. I don't know if you play where did you play? I had a speaking 01:33:43.120 |
gig yesterday in LA after the speaking gig. I was going to the airport. I had a little time. 01:33:47.200 |
And I just stopped by Hollywood Park where I wanted to see the new one. 01:33:53.920 |
You're the best. And I don't know, there's nothing more boring. 01:33:58.320 |
Playing in a tournament with people you don't know. 01:34:00.160 |
Oh, it was great. It was great. There was like a fight. 01:34:02.320 |
The tournament's gone forever. I mean, I did the WSOP a couple of times. And you know, 01:34:05.920 |
I think I lasted like three days. It's a long time to be playing poker at tables with people. 01:34:10.800 |
This was one day, Chamath, I got to the final table. And they wanted to chop and I was the 01:34:15.120 |
short stack. I was like, well, you know, my flights in a couple hours, I'd rather not chop. 01:34:19.120 |
And this woman, I got in a fight at the casino almost, this woman was wearing a mask. And she 01:34:24.400 |
goes, this mother ever won't chop. And I said, Ma'am, it's my option to not shop. 01:34:35.520 |
I said, Madam, Madam, whatever, say them. And she went crazy. And the floor came over, 01:34:40.800 |
said, Ma'am, you have to sit down. She called me a mother effort twice to my face. 01:34:47.280 |
I was the short stack and I went on to win the tournament. I kid you not. 01:34:52.320 |
What was the hourly rate on that? You make like $14 an hour. 01:34:57.440 |
It was a hundred dollar buy in. So yeah, it was 200 bucks an hour, but here's what happened. 01:35:04.400 |
Six hours, maybe. It was awesome. It was great. I had the time of my life. It was the first time 01:35:09.200 |
I played in a tournament for like, since we played the one drop that time. I haven't played 01:35:13.440 |
in a tournament since then. It was so much fun. 01:35:17.040 |
Jason goes from playing the hundred K buy into the hundred dollar buy. 01:35:21.440 |
I had a time of my life because I've never played big O before. It's where you have five cards and 01:35:29.280 |
Big O is so fun. You have five pull cards and it's high low. So I was like, I'll learn big O. 01:35:34.320 |
I've never, I've literally not played one orbit of big O. I won the tournament. It was awesome. 01:35:39.440 |
And so then it's me and this one guy and I've got him like three to one or whatever. 01:35:45.760 |
And he's like, "Listen, I got to go. Please. I got my kids." I was like, "No problem. I'll 01:35:49.760 |
chop it with you if we take 400 off the top for the dealers." The dealer cried. She was like, 01:35:54.480 |
"What?" And I was like, "Yeah, I'll chop it with you evenly." And so I won and I just 01:36:00.960 |
What did you, did you get like a certificate or like- 01:36:04.000 |
I think they put you on the website or something like that. 01:36:07.200 |
Yeah. It's on the Poker Classic website that I, or I don't know if it's called the Poker 01:36:10.880 |
Classic, whatever it is. But my point is we would have a great tournament. We do each of the games. 01:36:15.120 |
Each of us gets a free roll into the game and then everybody else buys in. I like it. 01:36:19.280 |
Sax, you like PLO or you just like Chess now? 01:36:21.360 |
No, I like Hold'em, but I'm just saying I wouldn't play with a bunch of strangers. 01:36:30.480 |
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Like sitting, the problem with tournaments- 01:36:33.840 |
You'll RSVP to my game to show up at six and show up at 830. 01:36:38.000 |
And then listen to yourself on the pod and then leave. 01:36:43.840 |
There's a lot of things you can do while at a poker game. 01:36:45.840 |
You can watch your podcast. You can edit your podcast. 01:36:49.520 |
For the Sultan of Science, the King of Beep, David Freeburg, and yeah, definitely the Rain 01:36:56.080 |
Man himself. We're live from Davos. We'll see you next year. Bye-bye. 01:37:01.440 |
I did for the dictator himself. Use the promo code Dick. 01:37:04.400 |
Oh, Dictator Chairman. No, Chairman Dictator. 01:37:06.240 |
Chairman Dictator. Use the promo code Chair, Man, or Dick to get 10, 20, or 30% off. 01:37:12.800 |
Can somebody from Manscape please let me cancel? Please, please. 01:37:17.280 |
It's like 10 bucks a month. It's just 10 bucks a month. I'll give you the money. 01:37:23.360 |
I just don't want to get- I want to be able to cancel. 01:37:25.600 |
I'll pay you 10 bucks a month to not send all the deodorant. 01:37:28.240 |
I'm going all in. We'll let your winners ride. 01:37:40.160 |
and they've just gone crazy with it. Love you, Weston. 01:37:45.120 |
Let your winners ride. Let your winners ride. 01:37:51.840 |
That is my dog taking a notice in your driveway. 01:37:59.280 |
My avatar will meet me at the place. We should all just get a room and just have 01:38:02.880 |
one big huge orgy because they're all just useless. It's like this sexual tension that 01:38:06.720 |
they just need to release somehow. What the beep?