back to indexBogleheads® Conference 2015 - John Bogle Q & A
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We're going to move right into the Q&A after just a few words, and we'll move right into the Q&A. 00:00:17.000 |
I don't know if Gus is still here or not, but a funny anecdote about my work with Gus over the years. 00:00:22.000 |
You know, when you stop being the head of the company, a lot of relationships break down. 00:00:26.000 |
That would never be true of Gus and me, and in February of 2009, I ran into him in the hall, 00:00:33.000 |
and we got talking about the markets, and he said, "You know, I think this is the greatest opportunity 00:00:39.000 |
to buy a common stock I've ever seen in my entire lifetime." 00:00:53.000 |
So we all bear the burden of our own palability. 00:00:57.000 |
He comes at the issue of market returns very differently from what I do, the way I do, 00:01:03.000 |
and almost antithetical, and yet we come out in the same place. 00:01:07.000 |
Gus doesn't seem to be as smart as I am in so many ways, and this may be the most important thing. 00:01:17.000 |
And so I took a look at what I said to you all yesterday, and I looked at a sort of low bearish return, 00:01:25.000 |
assuming a bunch of things go wrong, about a 4% return on stocks in the next decade. 00:01:31.000 |
That's with a severely large decline in the P/E. 00:01:36.000 |
And then I looked at what my system would predict for the next decade, 00:01:40.000 |
because I was kind of weighing in on my impression, and that's what I had in the charts. 00:01:44.000 |
And my system, which is also on slide 41--43, I should say. 00:01:50.000 |
And by the way, we're going to put those slides up on Monday on my website, 00:01:54.000 |
so if any of you want to get them, it would be very easy to do. 00:02:06.000 |
And so you'll see in there that the system predicts a 8.1 return. 00:02:10.000 |
So just for the heck of an average, we're talking about a 6% return compared to a 9.1% historical. 00:02:17.000 |
So Gus and I are going to be--if you give him a number, I'm going to guess it's going to be 7% of the mills. 00:02:23.000 |
So we come out of the same place, but what a difference in the way we get there. 00:02:28.000 |
And I have a lot of quarrels with the efficient market hypothesis, 00:02:35.000 |
and a lot of problems with the math, and that is that we talk a lot about risk. 00:02:42.000 |
Let me put a number like 9 or 14 or whatever it is on that. 00:02:52.000 |
That is the volatility of the stock market or the volatility of your portfolio. 00:02:57.000 |
Now, I'm guessing all of you know this intuitively, because I'd like to have a show of hands here. 00:03:03.000 |
Bill Bernstein is not allowed to answer this question. 00:03:07.000 |
What is the volatility--do you know the volatility, the standard deviation of your equity portfolio? 00:03:23.000 |
And the index, depending on how you do it, the S&P is around 14%. 00:03:27.000 |
That doesn't have anything to do with risk. That has to do with volatility. 00:03:31.000 |
And the risk of the market, I'm persuaded today, is quite large, 00:03:35.000 |
and I think the market recognizes some of that risk, but not all. 00:03:39.000 |
And when you think about risk, what are you really thinking about? 00:03:43.000 |
You're thinking about the state of the world. 00:03:47.000 |
You're thinking about the state of the economy. 00:03:49.000 |
You're thinking about financial leverage, greatly acceptable all over the world. 00:03:53.000 |
You're thinking about a lot of things that can go wrong--global warming, health epidemic, 00:03:59.000 |
growing concentration and bigness of our world. 00:04:02.000 |
These are all big risks that we'll have to deal with over time. 00:04:10.000 |
I would come up with a conclusion that when you put all this together, 00:04:18.000 |
you would absolutely conclude that the world is going to hell in a handbasket. 00:04:23.000 |
The fact of the matter is, in history, it's always been going to hell in a handbasket. 00:04:34.000 |
So I look at it in a very different way, and I come out about where he does. 00:04:44.000 |
And then there's--I've always had this argument, which you may have heard me use from time to time. 00:04:49.000 |
If you look at that chart of justice, and there's a percentage point here and a percentage point there, 00:04:54.000 |
and here's the risk, and here's the--I guess the return is over here, and the risk is down here. 00:05:00.000 |
And it kind of equates a percentage point in standard deviation, the way that line is drawn, 00:05:09.000 |
You take one percentage point more risk, you get one percentage point more return. 00:05:14.000 |
Well, I always argue, in kind of a nasty way, 00:05:19.000 |
that what sense does that make when an extra percentage point of return is priceless 00:05:25.000 |
and an extra percentage point of standard deviation is meaningless? 00:05:30.000 |
Think about that. You're comparing the meaningless with the priceless. 00:05:34.000 |
So be a little skeptical of all these things, even though Gus, intellectually honest, 00:05:39.000 |
at the University of Chicago, efficient frontier model, 00:05:43.000 |
probably comes out about the same place I do with the future returns. 00:05:50.000 |
I want to mention one other thing about Gus talking about threats to Vanguard, 00:05:57.000 |
And I have a different kind of threat, which is best exemplified. 00:06:01.000 |
This is not to do with innovation in the firm. 00:06:05.000 |
You know, all those wonderful people you saw last night. 00:06:08.000 |
And I saw a group I didn't even know existed at Vanguard, 00:06:10.000 |
helping to educate children at the grade school, the high school, and the college level. 00:06:25.000 |
And I was so happy to meet so many crew members that I hadn't met before. 00:06:30.000 |
These are the people who are doing the hard work of keeping this place going every day. 00:06:34.000 |
When you talk about, I think, one of our big risks is a different kind of innovation, 00:06:39.000 |
and that's trying to innovate in the funds we offer. 00:06:46.000 |
How can you bring out a new fund that you think will do better than the index? 00:06:57.000 |
So I'm reminded of one of my favorite stories, as much as no one knows, 00:07:05.000 |
And there was an ad in the New York Times three or four years ago, 00:07:09.000 |
and all it has in the middle of the page is a shredded wheat biscuit. 00:07:17.000 |
And it says, "This is the same biscuit we've made for 100 years. 00:07:28.000 |
And it tastes exactly the same and bites exactly the same." 00:07:39.000 |
And when it comes to, "I think our risk is over-innovating," 00:07:42.000 |
that probably said to anybody who's progressive, 00:07:45.000 |
as a typical statement by an aging veteran who thinks there's only one way to do things, 00:07:50.000 |
is, "I am an aging veteran, and I do think there's only one way to do things." 00:07:59.000 |
I think that's probably enough, Mel, to open the session. 00:08:08.000 |
You can give me a couple of minutes at the end. 00:08:12.000 |
I know you like to respond to questions from people who are attending, 00:08:19.000 |
Just raise your hand so Jack knows who he's speaking to. 00:08:27.000 |
He asks, "When Vanguard was developed as a mutual company, 00:08:37.000 |
Well, I'm not sure I really thought other companies would follow. 00:08:41.000 |
I didn't see how they could follow, and I don't think they will follow, 00:08:45.000 |
because this is a business that is basically turned from a professionally managed, 00:08:49.000 |
as it was when I came in, very small business, 00:08:53.000 |
where, as I said yesterday, we sold what we made. 00:09:00.000 |
We make what we sell, and it's gotten bigger, 00:09:03.000 |
and largely because of public ownership, conglomerate ownership, 00:09:08.000 |
About 80% of it has become an entrepreneur's dream, 00:09:14.000 |
And when you look at what's going on in the ETF world, 00:09:16.000 |
exchange-traded fund world, we have a lot of entrepreneurs out there. 00:09:20.000 |
They're in it simply to capture the next moment. 00:09:22.000 |
They're in it to make money for themselves rather than clients. 00:09:25.000 |
They're what Henry Kaufman called, I think I used this yesterday, 00:09:33.000 |
It's great for the entrepreneur, and they'll all make a lot of money, 00:09:38.000 |
So if you're making a lot of money and losing to performance all the time, 00:09:45.000 |
If someone were to try and get their costs down, 00:09:49.000 |
I might have mentioned this briefly yesterday, 00:09:51.000 |
get their costs down to Vanguard's expense ratio, 00:09:54.000 |
which I think is a weighted number of about 15 basis points. 00:09:57.000 |
Well, take someone like Fidelity or T. Rose Price, 00:10:00.000 |
or even Dodge and Cox, which are a little bit lower. 00:10:03.000 |
They're running at about 70 basis points on Woodford's expense ratio. 00:10:07.000 |
And if they destroyed the firm, eliminated marketing, 00:10:10.000 |
fired the portfolio manager, started indexing, 00:10:13.000 |
took away a little bit of Ned Johnson's 26 billion, 00:10:23.000 |
They could probably get their costs down from, say, 00:10:33.000 |
There's still three times what our expense ratio is. 00:10:36.000 |
They're not competitive, and they've given up all the purchases 00:10:39.000 |
and stuff that they have, and they're all the way up doing things. 00:10:45.000 |
And to visualize it even a little more clearly, 00:10:48.000 |
there must be an innovator out there, not in the industry, 00:10:51.000 |
saying, "Well, it looks like this industry has only one way to go. 00:10:58.000 |
"I want to go out and raise capital to get into the business. 00:11:01.000 |
"It's going to take"-- let me pull a number out of the air-- 00:11:03.000 |
"$200 million to bust into the mutual fund business. 00:11:11.000 |
"they're going to want a 15% minimum return on that capital. 00:11:15.000 |
"So somehow they've got to make $30 million a year. 00:11:21.000 |
"I've got this new IPO, this wonderful innovation, 00:11:24.000 |
"but it's not going to produce any money for you at all. 00:11:30.000 |
So I don't know at what point competitive pressure 00:11:34.000 |
drives people into trying to protect their market share 00:11:39.000 |
and their cash flow when they're making money now. 00:11:51.000 |
for significant earnings growth are gradually diminishing, 00:11:58.000 |
So this cash cow will generate money to the managers, 00:12:01.000 |
money to the conglomerates, money to the public shareholders, 00:12:08.000 |
And a lot of the companies that are now owned by conglomerates-- 00:12:14.000 |
I would guess would be sold to some kind of a financial firm 00:12:17.000 |
within, say, five years for each work period. 00:12:22.000 |
because it's the least possible I'll be alive 00:12:27.000 |
So I don't even see what's happening, and it's dramatic. 00:12:34.000 |
They're doing 140% of the industry's cash flow. 00:12:40.000 |
They're happy there's enough money to keep everybody rich. 00:13:00.000 |
Well, Jack, did you get any degree of satisfaction 00:13:05.000 |
when Fidelity tried to respond to Vanguard's index funds 00:13:09.000 |
when it was a Vanguard-- I mean, Spartan Funds out? 00:13:14.000 |
Yeah, well, the Spartan Funds are a pretty good-- 00:13:20.000 |
They're the only-- Fidelity is the only fund group, 00:13:29.000 |
They probably have-- is it 50 billion, 400 billion? 00:13:42.000 |
And they charge kind of Vanguard-type prices. 00:13:45.000 |
Every once in a while, they try and undercut. 00:13:49.000 |
And then they go back to trying to make a little penny here 00:14:10.000 |
I think those directors have breached their fiduciary duty 00:14:21.000 |
There's a JP Morgan that charges 100 basis points. 00:14:32.000 |
By the way, I don't know how that word slipped out. 00:14:35.000 |
So it's pretty much monopoly, except for BlackRock, 00:14:43.000 |
which is doing quite well, and State Street, which is just 00:14:46.000 |
kind of hanging in there and has the most widely traded stock 00:14:51.000 |
But it's not going to be a very profitable business for them. 00:14:54.000 |
And they're pretty marginal in terms of cash flow. 00:14:57.000 |
So it's basically come down to BlackRock and Vanguard. 00:15:04.000 |
and 75% of the traditional index fund business. 00:15:08.000 |
And BlackRock is probably 5% of the traditional fund business, 00:15:22.000 |
And whether that will give me any satisfaction or not 00:15:27.000 |
There are ways to use our ETS that are satisfactory 00:15:35.000 |
But there seem to me to be a lot more ways to use them 00:15:37.000 |
in a very foolish way, not so much as Vanguard. 00:15:40.000 |
But when you get-- we talked about this yesterday. 00:15:49.000 |
And it's now basically 100% of their cash flow 00:16:04.000 |
But investors are only going to lose with that strategy 00:16:08.000 |
So it's probably a little dumb to say I don't see 00:16:16.000 |
But the mathematics that I always come back to-- 00:16:23.000 |
And no matter what they do-- and I think this is 00:16:25.000 |
an important point-- if they can do anything, 00:16:28.000 |
If you want to lose money, they can bring in that index fund 00:16:43.000 |
That was just an idea that goes into the investment 00:16:48.000 |
But from, say, 1980, 1985 on, particularly in the '90s, 00:16:53.000 |
this zeal of perpetuating the value of indexing-- 00:16:56.000 |
books, academic articles, the kind of things I've been doing. 00:17:00.000 |
Having somebody that's been dragged kicking and screaming 00:17:06.000 |
who has this missionary zeal, as if it's the Holy Writ, 00:17:12.000 |
So we will sustain our position, I'm quite sure, 00:17:19.000 |
And that would have such a small-- at the beginning, 00:17:25.000 |
So you don't require anybody in indexing to go somewhere else. 00:17:50.000 |
You could see, almost touch, the growth in our firm. 00:17:59.000 |
So in 1989, it was not going to slow down very much. 00:18:03.000 |
We had been growing at a 24% rate, annual rate. 00:18:06.000 |
I mean, your assets double every three years. 00:18:09.000 |
And we were doubling every three years, in fact. 00:18:21.000 |
You know, we always talk about the miracle of compounding. 00:18:24.000 |
What I was trying to point out was a lot of tyranny to it. 00:18:27.000 |
So I said, look, if we continue to grow through the '90s 00:18:50.000 |
I probably should have repeated that exercise in 2000. 00:19:41.000 |
And that's not too far from a little bit higher. 00:19:53.000 |
And it says, do you think shorter duration bond funds, 00:19:59.000 |
or stay with intermediates and heavier on corporate bonds? 00:20:22.000 |
a percentage point and a quarter, something like that, 00:20:26.000 |
And two percentage points more in the short term. 00:20:46.000 |
which is roughly what would happen, very roughly. 00:20:49.000 |
And I think most people could not handle that. 00:20:54.000 |
we all have a little, we're influenced by the short run. 00:21:04.000 |
you think, gee, I'd better do something about this. 00:21:09.000 |
So it's the psychosomatic or behavioral effect 00:21:35.000 |
- And on my corporate, I have some mostly short term. 00:21:38.000 |
We don't have limited term on the corporate side 00:21:45.000 |
I told you yesterday, I'm a total bond marketer. 00:21:48.000 |
I just think that's too much in the way of government, 00:22:16.000 |
than the Treasury bond if you have corporates. 00:22:19.000 |
The low default rate, maybe the corporate return 00:22:23.000 |
but not enough to get it down to the Treasury rate. 00:22:35.000 |
It troubles me that Treasuries and mortgage-backed, 00:22:54.000 |
"You know, we're doing the bond thing wrong." 00:23:19.000 |
When you get to 2% and 3%, that's a 50% difference. 00:25:01.000 |
an extra percentage point of return is priceless. 00:25:10.000 |
what is your personal asset allocation and why? 00:25:15.000 |
And believe it or not, I just actually changed it. 00:25:25.000 |
at Morningstar in, I think, the spring of 2000. 00:25:53.000 |
And I said to him, we looked this up in my interview 00:26:24.000 |
and I combined various retirement plan accounts, 00:26:30.000 |
But I reduced, I wouldn't dare down the stock market. 00:26:46.000 |
I reduced my equities from about 65% of my portfolio 00:27:05.000 |
in the stock and bond market relative to one another, 00:27:30.000 |
as I looked around this risky world out there, 00:27:34.000 |
international conflicts, problems in the U.S., 00:27:51.000 |
has changed the dimensions of price competition 00:27:58.000 |
and therefore against the interest of producers. 00:28:00.000 |
The producers of the companies are making money. 00:28:51.000 |
so I'm having a funny way of looking at things, 00:29:23.000 |
"James, how does your office management style 00:29:41.000 |
What time of day do I find to be the most creative? 00:37:09.000 |
"that propose starting retirement withdrawals 00:38:14.000 |
not exactly my dearest friend in the business, 00:39:17.000 |
that there's not a lot that's permanent in this field. 00:39:56.000 |
and buying the lower long-term return asset, bonds. 00:39:59.000 |
So the more you rebalance, the less wealthy you do, 00:40:13.000 |
the smaller and smaller portion of the portfolio. 00:40:19.000 |
It's something that we all want to think about. 00:40:22.000 |
And times change, conditions change, interest rates change. 00:40:27.000 |
So basically the answer is there is no answer. 00:40:36.000 |
I think it should be compared to the life strategy approach, 00:40:39.000 |
which is a firmly conservative growth income objective, 00:40:46.000 |
but 30% equities, 50% equities, 70% equities, 00:40:49.000 |
or something like that, maybe even a little higher, 00:41:14.000 |
You know, we get a little bit crotchety and nervous 00:41:20.000 |
- We're talking just on the life strategy funds 00:41:25.000 |
Do you have any idea, when an investor looks, 00:41:59.000 |
about the number of things that are on my mind, 00:42:12.000 |
- That's the first time you've ever answered that. 00:42:19.000 |
you know, if they get a 10 percentage point difference, 00:42:21.000 |
and you multiply it by the expected stock return 00:42:32.000 |
I think sometimes we're too darn mathematical. 00:42:59.000 |
And that's why anything that is too formulaic 00:43:21.000 |
and that not everything can be converted to numbers. 00:43:32.000 |
- Well, see, that would depend on which retirement. 00:43:56.000 |
It's just a gradual scaling of the equity ratio. 00:44:45.000 |
that it's not going to be 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6. 00:44:59.000 |
to thinking about things at the time continuity. 00:45:22.000 |
but if you're building a fund for retirement, 00:45:27.000 |
not just Sunday, but Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, 00:45:32.000 |
because you'll be investing at lower prices for years. 00:45:57.000 |
than they can challenge the growth of retirement. 00:46:03.000 |
- Jack, you said, the first two words you said 00:46:14.000 |
It says, "Dear Jack, no one in the mutual fund industry 00:46:20.000 |
"practical experience, knowledge, inventive genius, 00:46:32.000 |
"What are your most important words of wisdom 00:46:37.000 |
- Well, first of all, my wife would agree with all that. 00:46:52.000 |
We'll be celebrating our 60th wedding anniversary 00:46:55.000 |
next September, and so I don't want to do anything 00:47:12.000 |
it's one of my big themes, promote your bonds and stocks, 00:47:15.000 |
and just try and figure out how much risk you can tolerate. 00:47:19.000 |
You know, it's easy to put in a questionnaire, 00:47:21.000 |
"What would you do if the market went down 50%?" 00:47:24.000 |
And people say, "I guess it wouldn't bother me at all." 00:47:30.000 |
It's easy to contemplate 50% decline and say, 00:47:35.000 |
Then it goes down 50%, you're on your way out the door. 00:47:50.000 |
You know, listen to what people like me are telling you 00:47:53.000 |
that are reasonably unbiased about future market returns. 00:47:56.000 |
And conservative, I would always lean to the conservative, 00:48:01.000 |
because you will then be in the awful position of over-saving, 00:48:05.000 |
which is so much better than being in a position of under-saving 00:48:11.000 |
And then I would add, and I'll throw a little anecdote here, 00:48:31.000 |
"Just throw the darn thing in the wastebasket." 00:48:49.000 |
Because you're going to have a heart problem, 00:48:51.000 |
and you won't believe what you've accumulated. 00:48:53.000 |
And the anecdote part of this, and every once in a while, 00:49:09.000 |
Long letter, and a couple of long follow-ups. 00:49:21.000 |
because the next question was from Backpacker, 00:49:29.000 |
I believe your exact words were, "Don't peek, don't peek, 00:49:39.000 |
"they'll be floored by how much they've saved. 00:49:43.000 |
"Don't investors need to monitor their portfolio 00:49:55.000 |
I mean, you know, read "The Tortoise and the Hare." 00:50:07.000 |
So the question is, how much of us is a tortoise, 00:50:11.000 |
You read these things about how all people are divided 00:50:21.000 |
I mean, this group is divided into 220 different classes. 00:50:25.000 |
you have to recognize people's individuality, 00:50:31.000 |
and I'm not sure I'm good at this, by the way, 00:50:51.000 |
a little bit like one of my commencement speeches 00:51:07.000 |
Shakespeare probably would have said, "Man over man or woman." 00:52:29.000 |
family circumstances. I mean, they're so different. 00:53:01.000 |
with a dollar sign and a certain number of digits. 00:53:31.000 |
given that Fidelity and other large fund companies 00:53:55.000 |
The idea that we are doing other than best execution 00:55:33.000 |
in Chester Brook, and we got a little bit bigger. 00:55:51.000 |
They had a very peculiar way of taxing investment 00:56:31.000 |
I said to the people, we're going to have to leave the state 00:57:01.000 |
So we did it all by ourselves, and they got the benefit too. 00:57:21.000 |
was signed by the Governor, it was then Dick Thornbury. 00:57:39.000 |
unacceptable, it would not be something the fiduciary 00:58:17.000 |
and don't have to deal with the problem of Philadelphia 00:58:31.000 |
it's still possible for you to get a workforce from 00:58:33.000 |
Philadelphia, and we still do it. They come out in the 00:58:43.000 |
we have a better workforce. Whether it's some intellectual, 00:58:51.000 |
free from the influence of Wall Street anyway. 00:59:15.000 |
you're away from all that funny influence and all that 00:59:39.000 |
had done, I don't think it would really matter 01:00:07.000 |
recruit here. I think it helps them in that way, 01:00:45.000 |
Perhaps we could thank him for his dedication 01:00:49.000 |
and work with Bogle heads that meant to him." 01:01:29.000 |
about my taking home a half a sandwich I didn't finish. 01:01:43.000 |
And I was told, "You would not be allowed on campus." 01:01:53.000 |
I was trying to figure out what to do about it. 01:02:13.000 |
there was an article in the Philadelphia Enquirer 01:02:43.000 |
And then the next year we got a little bit of religion. 01:02:45.000 |
Hal was kidding me about this a few minutes ago. 01:02:57.000 |
And then the next year, I think it was mainly Glenn Reeves. 01:03:25.000 |
but what the company thinks is an important asset. 01:03:43.000 |
handwritten letters to every single one of them. 01:06:05.000 |
the wonderful young people that we have over there. 01:06:09.000 |
that I don't even know how they recognize me, 01:06:21.000 |
of their career. So this has been a wonderful 01:06:23.000 |
time. I want to thank you for that. Number two,