- There's still this desire to get answers to the why question that if the world is a simulation, if we're living in a simulation, that there's a programmer-like creature that we can ask questions of. - Okay, well, let's pursue the idea that we're living in a simulation, which is not totally ridiculous, by the way.

- There we go. - Then you still need to explain the programmer. The programmer had to come into existence by some, even if we're in a simulation, the programmer must have evolved. Or if he's in a sort of-- - Or she. - Or she. If she's in a meta-simulation, then the meta-meta-programmer must have evolved by a gradual process.

You can't escape that. Fundamentally, you've got to come back to a gradual incremental process of explanation to start with. - There's no shortcuts in this world. - No, exactly. - But maybe to linger on that point about the simulation, do you think it's an interesting, basically talk to, bore the heck out of everybody asking this question, but whether you live in a simulation, do you think, first, do you think we live in a simulation?

Second, do you think it's an interesting thought experiment? - It's certainly an interesting thought experiment. I first met it in a science fiction novel by Daniel Galloway called "Counterfeit World," in which it's all about, I mean, our heroes are running a gigantic computer which simulates the world, and something goes wrong, and so one of them has to go down into the simulated world in order to fix it.

And then the denouement of the thing, the climax to the novel is that they discover that they themselves are in another simulation at a higher level. So I was intrigued by this, and I love others of Daniel Galloway's science fiction novels. Then it was revived seriously by Nick Bostrom.

- Bostrom, talking to him in an hour. - Okay. (laughing) And he goes further, not just to treat it as a science fiction speculation, he actually thinks it's positively likely. - Yes. - I mean, he thinks it's very likely, actually. - Well, he makes a probabilistic argument which you can use to come up with very interesting conclusions about the nature of this universe.

- I mean, he thinks that we're in a simulation done by, so to speak, our descendants of the future, that the products, but it's still a product of evolution. It's still ultimately going to be a product of evolution, even though the super intelligent people of the future have created our world, and you and I are just a simulation, and this table is a simulation, and so on.

I don't actually, in my heart of hearts, believe it, but I like his argument. - Well, so the interesting thing is, I agree with you, but the interesting thing to me, if I were to say, if we're living in a simulation, that in that simulation, to make it work, you still have to do everything gradually, just like you said.

That even though it's programmed, I don't think there could be miracles. Otherwise, it's-- - Well, no, I mean, the programmer, the higher, the upper ones have to have evolved gradually. However, the simulation they create could be instantaneous. I mean, it could be switched on, and we come into the world with fabricated memories.

- True, but what I'm trying to convey, so you're saying the broader statement, but I'm saying from an engineering perspective, both the programmer has to be slowly evolved and the simulation, because it's like-- - Oh, yeah. - From an engineering perspective-- - Oh, yeah, it takes a long time to write a program.

No, like, just, I don't think you can create the universe in a snap. I think you have to grow it. - Okay, well, that's a good point. That's an arguable point. By the way, I have thought about using the Nick Bostrom idea to solve the riddle of how, we were talking earlier about why the human brain can achieve so much.

I thought of this when my then 100-year-old mother was marveling at what I could do with a smartphone, and I could call, look up anything in the encyclopedia, or I could play her music that she liked, and so on. She said, "It's all in that tiny little phone." No, it's out there.

It's in the cloud. And maybe most of what we do is in a cloud. So maybe if we are a simulation, then all the power that we think is in our skull, it actually may be like the power that we think is in the iPhone, but is that actually out there?

- It's an interface to something else. I mean, that's what people, including Roger Penrose with panpsychism, that consciousness is somehow a fundamental part of physics, that it doesn't have to actually all reside inside a brain. - But Roger thinks it does reside in the skull, whereas I'm suggesting that it doesn't, that there's a cloud.

- That'd be a fascinating notion. On a small tangent, are you familiar with the work of Donald Hoffman, I guess? Maybe not saying his name correctly, but just forget the name, the idea that there's a difference between reality and perception. So like we biological organisms perceive the world in order for the natural selection process to be able to survive and so on, but that doesn't mean that our perception actually reflects the fundamental reality, the physical reality underneath.

- Well, I do think that although it reflects the fundamental reality, I do believe there is a fundamental reality, I do think that our perception is constructive in the sense that we construct in our minds a model of what we're seeing. And so this is really the view of people who work on visual illusions like Richard Gregory, who point out that things like a Necker cube, which flip from, it's a two-dimensional picture of a cube on a sheet of paper, but we see it as a three-dimensional cube, and it flips from one orientation to another at regular intervals.

What's going on is that the brain is constructing a cube, but the sense data are compatible with two alternative cubes. And so rather than stick with one of them, it alternates between them. I think that's just a model for what we do all the time when we see a table, when we see a person, when we see anything, we're using the sense data to construct or make use of a perhaps previously constructed model.

I noticed this when I meet somebody who actually is, say, a friend of mine, but until I kind of realized that it is him, he looks different. And then when I finally clock that it's him, his features switch like a Necker cube into the familiar form. As it were, I've taken his face out of the filing cabinet inside and grafted it onto, or used the sense data to invoke it.

Yeah, we do some kind of miraculous compression on this whole thing to be able to filter out most of the sense data and make sense of it. That's just the magical thing that we do. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music)