- I have a question raised my hand, are you writing that? Yes or no? - Mr. Bowles, I have a hard time calling you Jack for some reason, but you're my financial hero, and in your book you talked about the irresponsibility of board of directors giving bonuses and paying the CEOs and managing the company to write in bankruptcy, why doesn't Vanguard withhold proving the board of directors and send the message out to the company?

- Well, first of all, I can't speak for great expertise on that. My understanding is there are some cases where we have withheld votes for compensation from the investors. How widespread that is, how ripe it is, my guess is it's not very much so. And by so-and-so's grade, we didn't look as good about it as most of our competitors.

And I find that a little embarrassing, and somebody may find it a little absurd, and I don't know. But that has to come, and there's a very, that's a funny... This has always been a funny mix of a perfection and a business. And if Vanguard is going to hang, it showed it as far as I was able to.

The board, though that implementation may have been a monopoly, to get over to the professional side and out to the business side, you're always on the business side, but minimized, and most companies in the industry are exactly the opposite, go over to the business side and then out to the professional side.

It's all bringing in money, it's building assets under management, it's making a lot of revenues. Most of these companies are publicly held. The big companies are financial institutions, banks, insurance companies, and so on, foreign and domestic. And they're in to make a return on their capital, not your capital.

So, of course, the governance either subtracts from that cause, they offend clients, for example, or they vote on an issue that half their shareholders don't like, and it's in this controversy that we have here. You know, the difference between winning and losing. A landslide is 55% of the spending, so let's be generous and say you get another side of that, and you're taking 45% of your shareholders.

You just don't want to do that. It's better to keep a low profile, stick your head up and get a shot off. And it's a controversial issue, so we can't do that. So those weren't very satisfactory. I always thought that the Vanguard, in large measure, I think, got where we were at the beginning, through the beginning years, of being outspoken and critical, you know, raising hell.

And I think a lot of people have denigrated that. They say, "Well, I was raising hell because I like to raise hell. I do like to raise hell." But the fact of the matter is, when I was asked to comment on something, I was always commenting on what a certain act meant, what a certain event meant, in terms of, was it a good or bad for mutual fund shareholders.

And so when the press called, that's what I said, and when they called everybody else in the industry, they were thinking it was a good or bad for our company, and it was going to make the stock go up, and make us more money or less money. So they always could get a negative answer.

Now, if you look at those interests like this, they're just slamming into each other. So I would hope, sooner rather than later, Vanguard would say, "Oh, damn it. We're going to be…we're going to raise a lot of corporate dividends. And we're going to put these proxy proposals in and say, "No corporate dividends." And he knew, maybe he won't ask about that this evening, but I know that they know how I feel.

And I should tell you, by the way, that a lot of my autographs go to him. I don't think I've ever had a complaint when he said anything, I would imagine, about, quote, "Bernie, correct," about, you know, "Can't you stop saying things?" And I heard him say that, you know, "I publicly disagree with Daniel." I don't think that's ever been the case.

I say what I think, I don't know what the position is at all. I haven't seen him in a long time. I don't know. Do you know what I have to do about late shows? He was always very well-prepared. He always had his little, you know, the rest of us didn't, but he had his little telemarketer right there.

You couldn't see it, but I could see it. And this was in the middle of, actually, a corporate governance thing. And I think we were talking, you know, he had a chair with a voice and everything like that. And, you know, Lou was a man who was well-read for that, in the papers.

And he said, "Jack, I understand you disagree with Maynard on that point." And I said, "No." And he wasn't astonished. I mean, you should have seen the look on his face. And I paused a minute and said, "It's not that I disagree with him here. I disagree with Maynard.

It's that Maynard disagrees with me." And we've got three more questions, and the panel will stop laughing. Very exciting. But then, I mean, I know what our market world is. I know you can't give up on marketing. I believe deeply that we have to minimize doing things for marketing reasons.

But you can't ignore them, because they're part of our world. And so, you know, it's fragile, it's flawed. But, you know, I guess sometimes you don't know. I think they're going to say they're doing something. And there's also a thing that I find difficult to deal with. I guess they're working behind the scenes.

Well, I'm sure they're talking truth. But if nothing's happening, maybe we should work in front of the scenes. I don't know. We have a question from a good friend of both of our, Mr. Taylor, who's with us in spirit. He says, "Dear Jack, could you please give us your thoughts about rebalancing portfolios?" Okay, well, I'll say a couple of my thoughts about what I've heard.

I don't have an uncritical answer about rebalancing portfolios. I do know that the facts say not rebalancing. Two things, the facts say it. Not rebalancing your portfolio is a better strategy than rebalancing. Simply because stocks have a higher momentum in the long run over your lifetime. And therefore, whenever you rebalance, you're going to have a higher yielding asset, a lower yielding asset.

Not complicated. And so, that's what the data says. It also says something else, too, that's interesting. And that is, when rebalancing, when not rebalancing, loses rebalancing, and that would be errors. I mean, it does lose. The loss is pretty small, maybe a percentage point a year. Not systematic. And so, on the other hand, so then that says, don't bother.

And I guess I'd say, for most investors, don't worry about that. If you feel like rebalancing, do it. It's not going to be devastating to you. It's intelligent to do it. It just may not be the best long-term strategy. But on the other hand, it may be a good short-term strategy.

And again, every stock is different depending on what you do. And so, I'd say, if you want to rebalance, just follow a couple of rules. Don't do it very often. I mean, if you want to rebalance every month, I just don't know which rule to follow. That would usually be consumed by later 52% of stocks, or 49%, or 53%, or 44%.

I don't know what stocks you want to go. Index, if you don't, or bond, if you don't. I don't know what to do. So, you know, maybe rebalance once a year. I would say only for the significant parts of it. If you want to be at 50-50, and you get it at the end of the year, 52-48.

Honestly, I don't know if it's worth worrying about. On the other hand, corporate recruiting time, you want to be at 50-50, and you get up to 50-60, and you want to rebalance. Then rebalance on that basis. So, I don't have an easy answer. I think what will make investors feel better, maybe, will be those non-investment problems, behavioral problems.

So, it's pretty much, as I mentioned, I don't do it. On the other hand, I rebalance. For me, in the last 15 years, bonds did about 67% a year. Stocks did, for 15 years, very hard. 102% every three years, I don't know. And so, all of a sudden, I'm at 80 bonds.

And I'm happy with that. Short intermediate duties. Short photobond market. Short invest in photobond. Short invest in my retirement budget. And so, it's kind of free to them all, I think. Okay, if you have a question, raise your hand. And then Jack will answer it. I'll be right back.

Hi, Jack. Great to see you so well. Thank you. I had a look at that chart. I'm sure you're right. On the chart, I have like 59, 35, 27, 23. Yeah. I want to know what you do. Who do you consider you? You're right. It's a free rider kind of thing.

You make the company better. And you risk 98% of what you're doing. There's no easy answer to that. So one thing is it shouldn't be that expensive. So you have the resources to do it. But even more importantly, I'm trying to organize. This is a funny story. I tried to organize.

I had this foundation for long-term investors. Coalition for long-term investors. Trying to get together. To get together and do something together. So that was a attempt to fail. But what made it kind of amusing is this meeting came to this conclusion. Chris Davis is also in New York. So those are issues that I don't think is a cause of issue.

Yes, sir. Do you have any comments about that right now? And that is certainly true. Think about that. It's awful. But it's vicious. It's nasty. It's self-serving. And you can't get any more on it. I don't know. It's a bad system. It didn't used to be a bad system.

And so we need a lot of work there on the financial reform. I think I touched on it. And that is first, we don't really know how much progress we're making until we get the regulations. As you mentioned earlier in the day, that's a shield there. We're really going to be talking about banning capital requirements.

And providing some capital for non-depositors who belong to your capital. Any of them. And if we get that done, it will have a huge impact on the financial system. I just don't get that. So we won't know how much the regulations get done. But of course, the lobbyists will probably have even more power.

Really? And so it remains to be seen. I think the act probably is better than nothing. Not a lot. I would go a lot further. I would have gotten back side of the investment banking business. Bring back Glass-Steagall. I don't care. Just use your common sense. Jack, here's a question that was asked by a lot of foreign people.

It's one of the most controversial discussions on this forum in the last year. It's about Mr. Vogel's suggestion to include pensions and Social Security as part of the bond obligation. It would be enlightening to have him elaborate on this. This question could be illustrated with a simple example. Should a 50-year-old with a $300,000 portfolio with 300,000 Social Security vendors be 100% bankers?

Okay. Let me say a couple things. One, I don't think they want to get into the 50-year-old. They may not want to get into the 62-year-old. Let's take the 62-year-old. And the answer is statistically and arithmetically, if you want to be able to keep that people, and you're 62 years old, and you have a value in Social Security, as long as it's good and will be good, because we're fixing Social Security.

And eventually something has to happen. Nobody's going to let the thing go down. But let's consider Social Security for the purpose of money-making. He's going to pay you an extra turn year after year. It's amazing. I feel a little guilty about it, but I paid for it. I invested.

So the idea of retirement to me is having not to spend an overwhelming amount of time on capital value, but to spend a lot of time on income. What income can be produced? That's why I like the event-paying spots. We have the biggest cut in dividends, 23% of the state.

And the second biggest cut in the history of the index, going way back to giving back to where the S&P index existed. I think somebody takes those figures back. Maybe Bob Schiller. Maybe the guys at Yale. Back to 100 years, anyway. So, you know, an income stream. And Social Security takes care of that.

So, from an arithmetic standpoint, if you want to be 50/50, I see no reason you shouldn't be 50%. 100% stocks, 50% of your assets. 100% stocks, therefore 50% of your total assets. Now, it's not just an arithmetic matter. It's behavioral matter. Because your stocks can add 57%. And your income may not even be changed.

But you're going to have to get out of stocks to do that. This is an interesting -- I don't have much work on it. I've got a lot of things I need to work on before I do this. But why is it we think in terms of performance? Think of that, for example, there's going to be a balance fund.

There's going to be 50/50 in stocks and bonds. So we have that fund that goes kind of like this. And then we also have alternately 50% bond index fund, 50% stock index fund, two separate funds, where the performance is just the same. But it's not that the stocks are going to add anything.

And one thing about your net demand curve is that you didn't get all of it here in a balance fund. You got all of it here in the stock account. So we have to fix these or at least ameliorate these behavioral problems. But I don't think people are going to actually do that.

I'm not sure I'd recommend doing it. Because we have a lot of money for it to take. But I mean that one. I wouldn't say social security has a zero property for that. In fact, the way the question reads, I'm saying you should value security, social security, 100%. What do you think it's worth?

Let's say $300,000. Maybe you should say, well, social security is half of my net income. So you rebalance over 3/4 of the total. You have 50/50 on that. I think 65-70% of the stock. But there aren't easy answers. Particularly when you get to the major. But the math is clear.

And that is, if you want 50/50 social security or good corporate pensions, it's very much the same thing. Although somebody's going to say, can you name a good corporate pension? They're deeply in danger. We're also worried pretty much. And then they go into the and you get half the income you expected.

So our whole benefit system, our pension system is a mess. And so I say, think about that as a kind of a rule of thumb. And not something that, quote, "great" unquote says. Do this, do that. No, you should do that. No, I don't think it works at all, really.

But do you think that you had mentioned several times about the dividends and the reduction in dividends. Couldn't that be attributed to the lower capital gains tax rate situation? Couldn't that be attributed to the lower dividend distribution? It shouldn't be. And it shouldn't be for maybe an obvious reason.

And that is, most of the dividends would never get taxed. Think about that. 70% of all money is managed by institutions. College endowments aren't taxed. State and local government pensions aren't taxed. Corporate pensions aren't taxed. So don't let that little bit of the brains overwhelm your common sense. It's a long exercise.

I mean, I think the Lord, I quote, "Confess your name to the soul." I'm not bragging. I think the Lord did do me a healthy amount of common sense. And it didn't do me a great brain. And it didn't do me a sophisticated brain. But the more I think about it, the more I'm just happy about my common sense.

I look through conventional wisdom and say, "Why should that be?" "What more do I need to know?" "What's going on out there?" "Not a lot of people sit." "What's going on out there that isn't spoken or written about?" "What do you mean by out of speech?" "Why do you do that?" And so it shouldn't be a big deterrent.

And then you should also realize that the remainder of mutual funding is free. Not the 401(k), not the tax-deferred half. These funds are run--first of all, I don't want to get away with it. Tax-deferred investors is a crazy thing. And I don't want to hear from you tax-deferred investors about tax-deferred funds.

And that's why, quote, "I have tax-managed funds." And we did it in 1993, I think. And it's the way to run money. You go to a trust officer somewhere who he's going to want to know, "Well, how much do you tax that?" It gets into this 401(k). It gets into gross costs versus income stocks.

And so it shouldn't be a big deterrent. It's never taxed under any circumstance. And the fund managers run the remainder of the portfolio. They don't care about taxes. They get paid on pre-tax returns, not after-tax returns that you get. And so they're running those portfolios as if there's no difference.

And then there's this. As those people--I don't read my Wall Street Journal. It's just a Wall Street outlet. Usually I don't have to worry much about taxes. Because they're taking 4% of the dividend income themselves, consuming it. Consuming it before you get it. So there's only 160% of it.

There's not a hundred. And obviously they don't care at all. So when you put all that together, I don't think taxes are the reason. I think taxes on the dividend income are probably what throws you down the lane. But we'll see. We now have--you know, it's a funny question.

It's sort of dumb. I don't do it. We now have a situation where, whatever you believe, if nothing happens by the end of the year, taxes on the dividend income go up 39%. They do nothing. It's a good thing that some people want to do something about that. It's important.

But I think probably Democrats would be willing to do it. Then you get no inheritance taxes, which I should say is a paradox. There's no profit in the inheritance tax. I think we should have. I do that a lot. When I was supporting Andrew Carnegie, he brought up inheritance taxes.

When I was talking to him in Boston about counting religious values. And Dan Gross talked about that. Andrew Carnegie wanted basically an inviscidory tax on the state. So it was a 90% tax. What good is it? You're ruining children. It's bad for society. And he'd done okay. But he left all the young people in libraries all over America.

You can't go into a small town in America. Okay, what do you mean? That's the only party you can operate in. He ended out. He got an egg in his rack to start. Did all kinds of useful things. Maybe there wasn't enough money left in the market to support it.

But that's the kind of attitude that's pretty rare today. Mr. Gates, Sr. doesn't have much money. Mr. Gates, Jr. doesn't at all. And Warren Buffett. And I think David Rockefeller was in this group. And a few others. And the small way I am too. And we benefited from this great society.

This great market. This great economy. This great country. Do we really own nothing? Do we really own nothing? Why? Where will we be? We've been born in America. We're supposed to be this country. And someone told me that he didn't know himself. I said, I think that's wonderful. I don't need too many people.

I'm a very successful person. And so are all successful people. My father is successful. And then I said, he said, I didn't know myself. And I said, I didn't know myself. How to arrange to be born in the United States of America. And that's the way I feel. I'm lucky to be here.

I'm lucky to have the opportunity to pay insurance tax. Related to that. Yes, sir. What are your thoughts on the future of the U.S. dollar and the federal debt? And the impact on us as investors? And is there high correlation? There are some questions that are too big for me.

Believe it or not. You know, there are so many financial forces out there. And so many different opinions about what should happen. You know, the dollar is clearly weakening. We should be lightening it. Because we want the renminbi. We want the Chinese currency to be strengthening. And, you know, you say we want a weak dollar.

We have one at the moment. I guess the dollar came out here in the euro. I think it was around $1.70 or $1.10. It came around to $1.15. It went up to about $1.60. And then back to about $1.20. And now it's about $1.35 or $1.40. I'm not sure exactly.

And I don't see how you can predict with anybody. It's hard to believe that a strong dollar, when we have a federal and state culture, that kind of fiscal mess that we have. You know, we're going to need to be doing a lot of work to get home on time.

And I don't think that's consistent with a strong dollar. And I don't think anybody can do anything about it. I mean, just go out and have another meeting at the Plaza Hotel. James Avery was Secretary of the Treasury in probably 1998 or so. And then they seem to bring a little reality to the world market, currency markets.

But it's a very different economy. We are not the strong hand in the world. The Treasury is not the strong hand in the world. We're weak financially. And eventually, we'll be weak in a lot of other ways. So, you know, it must be obvious that you can only run so much debt so far for the interest cost of the Treasury.

And if I was in charge of the Treasury, man, right after I've been finance everything for the next 30 years, creating 400%, that's going to seem like a bargain. So, I don't know if those interest rates happen a lot. And yet, the Chinese are basically the 11th. They own, I don't know, 2 trillion more debt.

Debt's around 12 trillion. In China, I don't know if the brand number is 2 trillion. I'm not sure. But it's a big number, certainly in the trading range. And imagine those loans are going to go down if interest rates go up. So they're riding what they fell tiger to.

So, you know, I wish I had the answers. I don't think even the great economists really have the answers. And, you know, it's very unpredictable. The actions of the nations are unpredictable. I wasn't surprised that the euro crisis didn't get even worse. And I think it might get worse again in Britain.

It's not going to go out in much better shape. Greece, some of it, but not a lot. Or Spain. What are they calling the pigs? Portugal, Italy, Ireland. Where's Ireland? Greece. And Spain. Aren't we great in acronyms? Is this a great country or what? So I really don't know.

I think you need to try and protect yourself. But the answer is by the table. What would you do? And I guess you go short. Not short selling. Short maturity. I don't believe in short selling. It might be a good idea. But I just think whatever. I don't know.

I don't know any of the losses. And it doesn't intimidate. It's a timing strategy. And timing is what it is. And you know what you do consistently. So, you know, you go short. You're worried about that kind of thing. You go into gold. You get argument in commodities. And I wish you well.

But I wouldn't do it. I have to go buy some gold. You know, just the ultimate protection. But I haven't done it. And I probably won't do it. I have to do other things. Okay. Next question. When you lie down at night and you think about today, do you ever spend time thinking about all the millions of people that you have provided value to in terms of setting up Vanguard for the benefit of the investment?

Do you ever think about that? And if so, how does it make you feel? Well, first of all, there's a classic. And that is that last thing I think about when I go to bed is when I finish "The New York Times" while I sleep. Do you do it in the evening?

Yes, I do it in the evening. But I guess on Friday we kind of fight for the first four days. What do we do? I have a daughter that's very good at it. She won't be sitting here yet. Maybe beyond that. But I don't see a lot. I mean, I know what you think about that.

I'm sorry to tell you. There's too much in front of me. And I worry about what's behind me. People say you must appear to be very proud of your company. I'm very proud of it. I guess in a certain peculiar sense I am. I don't know. The idea that I think about a lot.

I've just got too much on my mind. As you can see, I've got a much neater job that I don't know what I'm going to do. But, you know, there's this. I think it's always good to be looking out. Are we looking at new ideas? Are we concerned with the affairs of the world?

Or will we stay at home? I'm just going to tell you. That's kind of so chunky. I'm not even going to watch anything. Except for the police things. I don't know. I guess it will be a time for introspection. And in some ways, some of the things you'll read in the new book are probably introspective.

But I don't seem to use them. I don't want to sell off my past. And, you know, if I had a college name, Howard Einstein, let's say, which I'm not. I can see how he would be very proud of the theory of relativity. But I look at myself and I think, and what have I done that wasn't obvious?

And I can't come up with anything. I can't come up with nothing. And he was talking about this a lot, whether it was in an academic structure, tax-managed funds, or whatever it might be, animals, all those things, just common sense. And I don't know how much applause you should get for using your head.

It was pretty easy to guess it. In "The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism," you talk about the true cost of owning expensive funds. Am I right in understanding it that the expense ratio doesn't count? Things like transaction costs and shelf space and bid-ask spreads and all those things there, they're not?

You know, that's a good question. The question is whether you're buying on top of that cost of performance. And the points are also, we're all using the expense ratio, simple and short. And it wouldn't include any expense ratio. If you're buying shelf space or facility, you're paying for it out of your management savings.

And therefore, that isn't the expense ratio. And any management company spends is in the expense ratio. All your fund services are in the expense ratio. What is not in the expense ratio are basically two things. Two additional costs, and actually we should be talking about three additional costs. One is portfolio transaction costs.

And since we don't know exactly what they are in this industry, I don't want to guess precisely what they are. But I use a rule of thumb about 1% of your turnover. So, turnover across you, you're 100% turnover across your 1% here. So, through a rule of thumb, maybe more like 3/4 of your 1%.

If you turn over 50%, it'll be about 35 days, and once in 50 days, it'll be something like that. We don't know that. But I would use it. But I'd rather be generally right rather than precisely wrong. And so, that's a big cost that's going on. And the other is sales charges.

If they're in 12B, 1B, that will be in the expense ratio. But if they're not, because it's run in sales charges, and they're outside of that, then that will not be covered. And then, of course, taxes are not covered. And that's a huge thing. You're going to be fined every day if you pay taxes.

But you're going to run your money in tax evasion. One of the single most important things you do. Tax evasion bank run. But it's all the same thing. Capture as much of the market return as you possibly can. So, that's why I use a number about 2 to 2.5% of the overall cost.

And in fact, the average equity run, yeah, the average unweighted equity run is about 1.4. But in fairness, what we're beginning to see as a whole is about 1% for unweighted run assets. But again, that comes vanguard. We're getting big enough for 15% or 6 in the mutual fund industry.

So, you know, all these averages you've got. Well, I'm going to prove your point. But I use a number about 2.5% and 2%. Easily better run than 1% and 2%. We'll take one more question over here, sir. It's an honor to ask you a question on a new book that I'm very much impressed with.

You had talked about corporate governance in the United States. Essentially, you concurred that it was a bit of a mess. When one goes overseas to invest, it's probably somewhat worse than maybe the transparency of some developing nations. It's lousy. Having said all that, what do you see the role of institutions in the United States being?

I remember it as a vanguard in how we reduce the risk of those kinds of information failures in their investments? You're talking about that abroad or here in the U.S.? Sure. I mean, we have an engineering group. It's not a member of another agency. But it's trying to do a lot in improving governance abroad.

As far as I know, no U.S. interest in that group because it takes a lot of work. They're just so short-term folks. They have to understand that governance matters nothing. Zero. Daily fluctuation or monthly fluctuation or even yearly fluctuation. It just doesn't count. But it's everything. In the long run, the idea of governance is, to me, a very simple one.

Is this corporation being run, a big corporation that does their own interests, isn't being run in the interest of shareholders? That's what governance is about. So we should be saying, we vanguard with the mutual fund industry and with the institutional investment. We should be saying, we want to be damn sure that we come first for our executive pay, for stacking the board with our friends, for getting in on mergers.

If we think our company is bigger and I'm going to get paid more than they pay, I think 63% of those mergers do fail. We should be thinking more about what's the right amount of dividends to be given. I've often said, this is about the governance issue generally, I don't see why we don't have higher dividends to pay to institutional investors who've held the stock for over three years.

So if the dividend is $2, give them $2.25, $2.20, $2.50, once you get to that volume period. And the dividends matter a lot in institutional decisions. Not as much as they should in the fund industry, because we consume so much of them. We don't want to talk about dividends.

In the ICF I have never, if I said it, never even hinted on the idea that such a thing as a dividend is a percentage of the income. Expenses is a percentage of the dividend income. And I didn't get any nice letters from them. And I didn't get any nice letters from Mr.

Hans either. Well, I hate that kind of street fighting stuff. The only letter I really love is 105%. I probably also have some of these out there. And I should tell you this, sort of anecdotally, I didn't know it was going to write the letter, but I talked to the manager of the op-ed.

I talked to him every week for about an hour on Friday morning. And he said, I love your op-ed. And actually, I agreed with 75% of it. And I said, which I was standing in line with him for, I said, you know, that's great. You're more than 75%. I'm going to feel like I haven't done my job.

So, but then I see things. He said he wasn't talking about his company. He was talking about the industry. He better believe he wasn't talking about his company. And that big fund got huge. It had a high performance record. And four years since, five years since, it's in the 100th percentile.

It's the first performing fund in the entire category. So I guess it's not a big fund. And, you know, it's very boring to be in the throat for a title five years in a row. It really is. If you tried to be there, I guarantee you, you could not get there.

And what would you do? And someone said, I think it was Michael Ransom, works at Apple, good guy, very analytical, said there was a piece on skill versus luck. And he said one of the differences is if you decide you want to fail, if it's all luck, you can't do it.

Right? If it's all skill, it's pretty easy to fail. You know, that heart surgeon who put my new pump in, he wanted to fail. I can't tell you how easy it would have been. But if you want to fail in the investment business, it's just as difficult, really, when you think about it, it's just as difficult to fail as to succeed, except you make the failure easier because of all your costs.

And then that turns out to be the differentiator. So I don't know. I want skill. And there's some. And skill and luck, you can't have a good fund director without skill and luck. A lot of students in the economy, when you think about Bill Miller, everybody's here, all that good money manager, nothing to do with Bill Miller.

But he was at the bottom of the day. He was working 5 to 70 years in a row, and then was 100% at the bottom three, just after all the money came in. I mean, it's a vicious business. It's a hard business. And I respect money managers who are trying to do a good, honest job, because it is such a hard business.

And I know that, and I respect them for trying, but they're going to do that by investing in the wrong people. OK, we're going to have anybody go to the locker room. Before we do, Jack, go ahead. We got him. I'd like to give you this memento of this occasion, Jack.

And Mr. William Dow, I wonder if you all synchronized Philadelphia, synchronized Derby, synchronized Freedman. And of course, our investment being out here in Philadelphia, and your nice work has liberated millions and millions of investors from high cost, and given us And we all thank you so much for that.

I'd like to read the inscription that says, "To Jack Vogel, our friend and mentor, over your vocal heads." Philadelphia, 2010. Thank you. Thank you all. A little bit of ringing already cracked the bell. Yeah, well, that hangs right above a painting of the American flag that I have, or at least a very nice one, has come to be written right on the flag.

And that's over at my fireplace. And so we'll put this right in the mail. I love that. And I thank you all very, very much.