- That's a good point. No, no, it's a good point. - Now, some people accuse me of speaking very slowly and they're advised on YouTube to turn up the speed twice to three times whenever I'm on. One of the reasons I speak slowly is because I attach value to every word I say.

- Normal say this all over and over and over again. I only deal in facts, I don't deal in hypotheticals. I only deal in facts, I only deal in facts. And that seems to be the case, except for when the facts are completely and totally contrary to the particular point you're trying to push.

The idea that Jews would have out of hand rejected any state that had Arabs on it or always had a plan of expulsion is just betrayed by the acceptance of the 47 partition plan. - I don't think you understand politics. - They forced the British to prevent emigration of Jews from Europe and reaching safe shores in Palestine.

That's what they did. - Well, again, was Palestine-- - And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe at the time. - Was Palestine the only spot of land on earth? - Yes, basically that was the problem. The Jews couldn't emigrate anywhere else. - What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?

- By the late 1930s, they weren't happy to take in Jews and the Americans weren't happy to take in Jews. - And why are Palestinians who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this, why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe and uniquely culpable?

- They were helping to close the only safe haven for Jews. - Professor Morris, because of your logic, and I'm not disputing it, that's why October 7th happened. - Oh my God. - Because there was no options left for those people. - The Hamas guys who attacked the kibbutzim, apart from the attacks on the military sites, when they attacked the kibbutzim, were out to kill civilians, and they killed family after family, house after house.

- Talk fast, people think that you're coherent. - I'm just reading from the UN. - Yeah, but you see, you got, you got the money. - I know you like them sometimes, only when they agree with you, though, that you've lied about this particular instance in the past. Those kids weren't just on the beach as is often stated in articles, those kids were literally coming out of a previously identified Hamas compound that they had operated from.

- Yeah, yeah, Mr. Borelli, Mr. Borelli, with all due respect, with all due respect, you're such a fantastic moron, it's terrifying. - The following is a debate on the topic of Israel and Palestine with Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Muin Rabbani, and Stephen Bunnell, also known online as Destiny. Norm and Benny are historians, Muin is a Middle East analyst, and Stephen is a political commentator and streamer.

All four have spoken and debated extensively on this topic. The goal for this debate was not for anyone to win or to score points. It wasn't to get views or likes. I never care about those. And I think there are probably much easier ways to get those things if I did care.

The goal was to explore together the history, present and future of Israel and Palestine in a free-flowing conversation, no time limits, no rules. There was a lot of tension in the room from the very beginning, and it only got more intense as we went along. And I quickly realized that this very conversation in a very real human way was a microcosm of the tensions and distance and perspectives on the topic of Israel and Palestine.

For some debates, I will step in and moderate strictly to prevent emotion from boiling. For this, I saw the value in not interfering with the passion of the exchanges because that emotion in itself spoke volumes. We did talk about the history and the future, but the anger, the frustration, the biting wit, and at times, respect and camaraderie were all there.

Like I said, we did it in a perhaps all too human way. I will do more debates and conversations on these difficult topics, and I will continue to search for hope in the midst of death and destruction, to search for our common humanity in the midst of division and hate.

This thing we have going on, human civilization, the whole of it, is beautiful. And it's worth figuring out how we can help it flourish together. I love you all. This is "Alex Friedman Podcast." To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here's Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Moyin Rabbani, and Stephen Bunnell.

First question is about 1948. For Israelis, 1948 is the establishment of the State of Israel and the War of Independence. For Palestinians, 1948 is the Nakba, which means catastrophe, or the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes as a consequence of the war. What to you is important to understand about the events of 1948 and the period around there, '47, '49, that helps us understand what's going on today?

And maybe helps us understand the roots of all of this that started even before 1948? I was hoping that Norm could speak first, and Benny, then Moyin, and then Stephen. Norm? - After World War II, the British decided that they didn't want to deal with the Palestine question anymore, and the ball was thrown into the court of the United Nations.

Now, as I read the record, the UN was not attempting to arbitrate or adjudicate rights and wrongs. It was confronting a very practical problem. There were two national communities in Palestine, and there were irreconcilable differences on fundamental questions, most importantly, looking at the historic record on the question of immigration, and associated with the question of immigration, the question of land.

The UN Special Committee on Palestine, which came into being before the UN 181 Partition Resolution, the UN Special Committee recommended two states in Palestine. There was a minority position represented by Iran, India, Yugoslavia. They supported one state, but they believed that if forced to, the two communities would figure out some sort of modus vivendi and live together.

The United Nations General Assembly supported partition between what it called a Jewish state and an Arab state. Now, in my reading of the record, and I understand there's new scholarship on the subject, which I've not read, but so far as I've read the record, there's no clarity on what the United Nations General Assembly meant by a Jewish state and an Arab state, except for the fact that the Jewish state would be demographically, the majority would be Jewish, and the Arab state demographically would be Arab.

The UNSCOP, the UN Special Committee on Palestine, it was very clear, and it was reiterated many times, that in recommending two states, each state, the Arab state and the Jewish state, would have to guarantee full equality of all citizens with regard to political, civil, and religious matters. Now, that does raise the question, if there is absolute full equality of all citizens, both in the Jewish state and the Arab state, with regard to political rights, civil rights, and religious rights, apart from the demographic majority, it's very unclear what it meant to call a state Jewish or call the state Arab.

In my view, the partition resolution was the correct decision. I do not believe that the Arab and Jewish communities could, at that point, be made to live together. I disagree with the minority position of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, and that not being a practical option, two states, was the only other option.

In this regard, I would want to pay tribute to what was probably the most moving speech at the UN General Assembly proceedings by the Soviet foreign minister, Gromyko. I was very tempted to quote it at length, but I recognized that would be taking too much time. So I asked a young friend, Jamie Stern-Weiner, to edit it and just get the essence of what Foreign Minister Gromyko had to say.

"During the last war," Gromyko said, "the Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow "and suffering without any exaggeration, "this sorrow and suffering are indescribable. "Hundreds of thousands of Jews are wandering about "in various countries of Europe "in search of means of existence and in search of shelter. "The United Nations cannot and must not regard "this situation with indifference.

"Past experience, particularly during the Second World War, "shows that no Western European state "was able to provide adequate assistance "for the Jewish people in defending its rights "and its very existence from the violence "of the Hitlerites and their allies. "This is an unpleasant fact, but unfortunately, "like all other facts, it must be admitted." Gromyko went on to say, "In principle, "he supports one state," or the Soviet Union supports one state, "but," he said, "if relations between the Jewish and Arab populations "of Palestine proved to be so bad "that it would be impossible to reconcile them "and to ensure the peaceful coexistence "of the Arabs and the Jews, "the Soviet Union would support two states.

"I personally am not convinced "that the two states would have been unsustainable "in the long term if," and this is a big if, "the Zionist movement had been faithful "to the position it proclaimed "during the UNSCOP public hearings." At the time, Ben-Gurion testified, "I want to express what we mean by a Jewish state.

"We mean by a Jewish state simply a state "where the majority of the people are Jews, "not a state where a Jew has in any way, "any privilege more than anyone else. "A Jewish state means a state based on absolute equality "of all her citizens and on democracy. "Alas, this was not to be.

"As Professor Morris has written, "quote, Zionist ideology and practice "were necessarily and elementally expansionist." And then he wrote in another book, "Transfer," the euphemism for expulsion, "Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism "because it sought to transform a land "which was Arab into a Jewish state. "And a Jewish state could not have arisen "without a major displacement of Arab population.

"And because this aim automatically produced resistance "among the Arabs, which in turn, "persuaded the Yishuv's leaders," the Yishuv being the Jewish community, "the Yishuv's leaders that a hostile Arab majority "or a large minority could not remain in place "if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure. "Or as Professor Morris retrospectively put it, "quote, a removing of a population was needed.

"Without a population expulsion, "a Jewish state would not have been established." Unquote. "The Arab side rejected outright the partition resolution." I won't play games with that. I know a lot of people tried to prove it's not true. It clearly, in my view, is true. "The Arab side rejected outright the partition resolution.

"While Israeli leaders, acting on the compulsions, "inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism, "found the pretext in the course "of the first Arab-Israeli war "to expel the indigenous population "and expand its borders. "I therefore conclude that neither side "was committed to the letter of the partition resolution "and both sides aborted it." - Thank you, Norm.

Norm asked that we make a lengthy statement in the beginning. Benny, I hope it's okay to call everybody by their first name in the name of camaraderie. Norm has quoted several things you said. Perhaps you can comment broadly on the question of 1948 and maybe respond to the things that Norm said.

- Yeah, UNSCOP, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, recommended partition, the majority of UNSCOP, recommended partition, which was accepted by the UN General Assembly in November 1947. Essentially, looking back to the Peel Commission in 1937, 10 years earlier, a British commission had looked at the problem of Palestine, the two warring national groups who refused to live together, if you like, or consolidate a unitary state between them.

And Peel said there should be two states. That's the principle. The country must be partitioned into two states. This would give a modicum of justice to both sides, if not all their demands, of course. And the United Nations followed suit. The United Nations, UNSCOP, and then the UN General Assembly representing the will of the international community said two states is the just solution in this complex situation.

The problem was that immediately with the passage of the resolution, the Arab states and the Arabs of Palestine said no, as Norman Finkelstein said. They said no, they rejected the partition idea, the principle of partition, not just the idea of what percentage which side should get, but the principle of partition they said no to.

The Jews should not have any part of Palestine for their sovereign territory. Maybe Jews could live as a minority in Palestine. That also was problematic in the eyes of the Palestinian Arab leadership. Husseini had said only Jews who were there before 1917 could actually get citizenship and continue to live there.

But the Arabs rejected partition, and the Arabs of Palestine launched in very disorganized fashion war against the resolution, against the implementation of the resolution, against the Jewish community in Palestine. And this was their defeat in that civil war between the two communities while the British were withdrawing from Palestine, led to the Arab invasion, the invasion by the Arab states in May 1948 of the country.

Again, basically with the idea of eradicating or preventing the emergence of a Jewish state in line with the United Nations decision and the will of the international community. Norman said that the Zionist enterprise, and he quoted me, meant from the beginning to transfer or expel the Arabs of Palestine or some of the Arabs of Palestine.

And I think he's sort of quoting out of context. The context in which the statements were made that the Jewish state could only emerge if there was a transfer of Arab population was preceded in the way I wrote it and the way it actually happened by Arab resistance and hostilities towards the Jewish community.

Had the Arabs accepted partition, there would have been a large Arab minority in the Jewish state which emerged in '47. And in fact, Jewish economists and state builders took into account that there would be a large Arab minority and its needs would be cared for, et cetera. But this was not to be because the Arabs attacked.

And had they not attacked, perhaps a Jewish state with a large Arab minority could have emerged, but this didn't happen. They went to war, the Jews resisted, and in the course of that war, Arab populations were driven out. Some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave or ordered them to leave.

And at the end of the war, Israel said they can't return 'cause they just tried to destroy the Jewish state. And that's the basic reality of what happened in '48. The Jews created a state. The Palestinian Arabs never bothered to even try to create a state before '48 and in the course of the 1948 war.

And for that reason, they have no state to this day. The Jews do have a state 'cause they prepared to establish a state, fought for it, and established it hopefully lastingly. - When you say hostility, in case people are not familiar, there was a full-on war where Arab states invaded and Israel won that war.

- Let me just add to clarify. The war had two parts to it. The first part was the Arab community in Palestine, its militiamen, attacked the Jews from November 1947. In other words, from the day after the UN partition resolution was passed, Arab gunmen were busy shooting up Jews, and that snowballed into a full-scale civil war between the two communities in Palestine.

In May 1948, a second stage began in the war in which the Arab states invaded the new state, attacked the new state, and they too were defeated, and thus a state of Israel emerged. In the course of this two-stage war, a vast Palestinian refugee problem occurred. - And so after that, the transfer, the expulsion, the thing that people call the Nakba happened.

William, could you speak to 1948 and the historical significance of it? - Sure, there's a lot to unpack here. I'll try to limit myself to just a few points. Regarding Zionism and transfer, I think Chaim Weizmann, the head of the World Zionist Organization, had it exactly right when he said that the objective of Zionism is to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English, or France is French.

In other words, as Norman explained, a Jewish state requires Jewish political, demographic, and territorial supremacy. Without those three elements, the state would be Jewish in name only. And I think what distinguishes Zionism is its insistence, supremacy, and exclusivity. That would be my first point. The second point is I think what the Soviet foreign minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, said is exactly right with one reservation.

Gromyko was describing a European savagery unleashed against Europe's Jews. At the time, it wasn't Palestinians or Arabs. The savages and the barbarians were European to the core. It had nothing to do with developments in Palestine or the Middle East. Secondly, at the time that Gromyko was speaking, those Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and others who were in need of safe haven were still overwhelmingly on the European continent and not on Palestine, not in Palestine.

And I think given the scale of the savagery, I don't think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility for addressing this crisis. I think it should have been an international responsibility. The Soviet Union could have contributed. Germany certainly could and should have contributed. The United Kingdom and the United States, which slammed their doors shut to the persecuted Jews of Europe as the Nazis were rising to power, they certainly should have played a role.

But instead, what passed for the international community at the time decided to partition Palestine. And here, I think we need to judge the partition resolution against the realities that obtained at the time. 2/3 of the population of Palestine was Arab. The Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, constituted about 1/3 of the total population and controlled even less of the land within Palestine as a preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid Al-Khalidi has pointed out.

The partition resolution in giving roughly 55% of Palestine to the Jewish community and I think 41, 42% to the Arab community, to the Palestinians, did not preserve the position of each community or even favor one community at the expense of the others. Rather, it thoroughly inverted and revolutionized the relationship between the two communities.

And as many have written, the Nakba was the inevitable consequence of partition given the nature of Zionism, given the territorial disposition, given the weakness of the Palestinian community whose leadership had been largely decimated during a major revolt at the end of the 1930s, given that the Arab states were still very much under French and British influence.

The Nakba was inevitable, the inevitable product of the partition resolution. And one last point also about the UN's partition resolution is yes, formally that is what the international community decided on the 29th of November, 1947. It's not a resolution that could ever have gotten through the UN General Assembly today for a very simple reason.

It was a very different General Assembly. Most African, most Asian states were not yet independent. Were the resolution to be placed before the international community today, and I find it telling that the minority opinion was led by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, I think they would have represented the clear majority.

So partition, given what we know about Zionism, given that it was entirely predictable what would happen, given the realities on the ground in Palestine was deeply unjust. And the idea that either the Palestinians or the Arab states could have accepted such a resolution is, I think, an illusion. That was in 1947.

We saw what happened in '48 and '49. Palestinian society was essentially destroyed over 80%, I believe, of Palestinians resident in the territory that became the state of Israel were either expelled or fled, and ultimately were ethnically cleansed because ethnic cleansing consists of two components. It's not just forcing people into refuge or expelling them.

It's just, as importantly, preventing their return. And here, and Benny Morris has written, I think, an article about Yosef Weiz and the transfer committees. There was a very detailed initiative to prevent their return and it consisted of raising hundreds of Palestinian villages to the ground, which was systematically implemented, and so on.

And so Palestinians became a stateless people. Now, what is the most important reason that no Arab state was established in Palestine? Well, since the 1930s, the Zionist leadership and the Hashemite leadership of Jordan, as has been thoroughly researched and written about by the Israeli-British historian Avi Shleim, essentially colluded to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the late 1940s.

There's much more here, but I think those are the key points. I would make about 1948. - We may talk about Zionism, Britain, UN assemblies, and all the things you mentioned, there's a lot to dig into. So again, if we can keep it to just one statement moving forward after Stephen, if you wanna go a little longer.

Also, we should acknowledge the fact that the speaking speeds of people here are different. Stephen speaks about 10 times faster than me. Stephen, do you want to comment on 1948? - Yeah, I think it's interesting where people choose to start the history. I noticed a lot of people like to start at either '47 or '48 because it's the first time where they can clearly point to a catastrophe that occurs on the Arab side that they want to ascribe 100% of the blame to the newly emergent Israeli state to.

But I feel like when you have this type of reading of history, it feels like the goal is to moralize everything first, and then to pick and choose facts that kind of support the statements of your initial moral statement afterwards. Whenever people are talking about '48 or the establishment of the Arab state, I never hear about the fact that a civil war started in '47.

That was largely instigated because of the Arab rejectionism of the '47 partition plan. I never hear about the fact that the majority of the land that was acquired happened by purchases from Jewish organizations of Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman Empire before the mandatory period in 1920 even started. Funnily enough, King Abdullah of Jordan was quoted as saying the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in weeping about it.

I never hear about the multiple times that Arabs rejected partition, rejected living with Jews, rejected any sort of state that would have even had any sort of Jewish exclusivity. It's funny because it was brought up before that the partition plan was unfair, and that's why the Arabs rejected it, as though they rejected it because it was unfair, because of the amount of land that Jews were given, and not just due to the fact that Jews were given land at all, as though a 30% partition or a 25% partition would have been accepted when I don't think that was the reality of the circumstances.

I feel like most of the other stuff has been said, but I noticed that whenever people talk about '48 or the years preceding '48, I think the worst thing that happens is there's a cherry picking of the facts where basically all of the blame is ascribed to this built-in idea of Zionism that because of a handful of quotes or because of an ideology, we can say that transfer or population expulsion or basically the mandate of all of these Arabs being kicked off the land was always going to happen when I think there's a refusal sometimes as well to acknowledge that regardless of the ideas of some of the Zionist leaders, there is a political, social, and military reality on the ground that they're forced to contend with.

And unfortunately, the Arabs, because of their inability to engage in diplomacy and only to use tools of war to try to negotiate everything going on in mandatory Palestine, basically always gave the Jews a reason or an excuse to fight and acquire land through that way because of their refusal to negotiate on anything else, whether it was the partition plan in '47, whether it was the Lusanne Peace Conference afterwards where Israel even offered to annex Gaza in '51 where they offered to take in 100,000 refugees.

Every single deal is just rejected out of hand because the Arabs don't want a Jewish state anywhere in this region of the world. - I would like to engage Professor Morris. If you don't mind, I'm not with the first name. It's just not my way of relating. - You can just call me Morris.

You don't need the professor. - Okay. (laughing) There's a real problem here. And it's been the problem I've had over many years of reading your work, apart perhaps from as grandchild, I suspect nobody knows your work better than I do. I've read it many times, not once, not twice, at least three times, everything you've written.

And the problem is it's a kind of quicksilver. It's very hard to grasp a point and hold you to it. So we're gonna try here to see whether we can hold you to a point. And then you argue with me the point. I have no problem with that. Your name, please?

- Stephen Bunnell. - Okay. Mr. Bunnell referred to cherry picking and handful of quotes. Now, it's true that when you wrote your first book on the Palestinian refugee question, you only had a few lines on this issue of transfer. - Four pages. - In the first book. - In the first book, four pages.

- Maybe four, I'm not gonna quarrel. My memory is not clear. We're talking about 40 years ago. I read it, I read it, but then I read other things by you. Okay. And you were taken to task, if my memory is correct, that you hadn't adequately documented the claims of transfer.

Allow me to finish. And I thought that was a reasonable challenge because it was an unusual claim for a mainstream Israeli historian to say, as you did in that first book, that from the very beginning, transfer figured prominently in Zionist thinking. That was an unusual, if you read Anita Shapira, you read Shabtai Tevitt, that was an unusual acknowledgement by you.

And then I found it very impressive that in that revised version of your first book, you devoted 25 pages to copiously documenting the salience of transfer in Zionist thinking. And in fact, you used a very provocative and resonant phrase. You said that transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism.

We're not talking about circumstantial factors, a war, Arab hostility. You said it's inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism. Now, as I said, so we won't be accused of cherry picking, those were 25 very densely argued pages. And then in an interview, and I could cite several quotes, but I'll choose one.

You said, "Removing a population was needed." Let's look at the words. "Without a population expulsion, "a Jewish state would not have been established." Now, you're the one, again, I was very surprised when I read your book. Here I'm referring to Righteous Victims. I was very surprised when I came to that page 37, where you wrote that territorial displacement and dispossession was the chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism.

Territorial displacement and dispossession were the chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism. So you then went on to say, "Because the Arab population rationally feared "territorial displacement and dispossession, "it of course opposed Zionism." That's as normal as Native Americans opposing the Euro-American manifest destiny in the history of our own country, because they understood it would be at their expense.

It was inbuilt and inevitable. And so now for you to come along and say that it all happened just because of the war, that otherwise the Zionists made all these plans for a happy minority to live there, that simply does not gel. It does not cohere. It is not reconcilable with what you yourself have written.

It was inevitable and inbuilt. Now, in other situations you've said that's true, but I think it was a greater good to establish a Jewish state at the expense of the indigenous population. That's another kind of argument. That was Theodore Roosevelt's argument in our own country. He said, "We don't want the whole of North America "to remain a squalid refuge for these wigwams and teepees.

"We have to get rid of them and make this a great country." But he didn't deny that it was inbuilt and inevitable. - I think you've made your point. First, I'll take up something that Muin said. He said that the Nakba was inevitable. - As have you. - And predictable.

No, no, no, I've never said that. It was inevitable and predictable only because the Arabs assaulted the Jewish community and state in 1947, '48. Had there been no assault, there probably wouldn't have been a refugee problem. There's no reason for a refugee problem to have occurred, expulsions to have occurred, a dispossession, massive dispossession to occur.

These occurred as a result of war. Now, Norman has said that, I said that transfer was inbuilt into Zionism in one way or another. And this is certainly true. In order to buy land, they had the Jews bought tracts of land on which some Arabs sometimes lived. Sometimes they bought tracts of land on which there weren't Arab villages, but sometimes they bought land on which there were Arabs.

And according to Ottoman law and the British, at least in the initial years of the British mandate, the law said that the people who bought the land could do what they liked with the people who didn't own the land, who were basically squatting on the land, which is the Arab tenant farmers, which is, we're talking about a very small number, actually, of Arabs who were displaced as a result of land purchases in the Ottoman period or the mandate period.

But there was dispossession in one way. They didn't possess the land, they didn't own it, but they were removed from the land. And this did happen in Zionism. And there's, if you like, an inevitability in Zionist ideology of buying tracts of land and starting to work it yourself and settle it with your own people and so on.

That made sense. But what we're really talking about is what happened in 47, 48. And in 47, 48, the Arabs started a war. And actually, people pay for their mistakes. And the Palestinians have never actually agreed to pay for their mistakes. They make mistakes. They attack. They suffer as a result.

And we see something similar going on today in the Gaza Strip. They do something terrible. They kill 1,200 Jews. They abduct 250 women and children and babies and old people and whatever. And then they start screaming, "Please save us from what we did "because the Jews are counterattacking." And this is what happened then.

And this is what's happening now. There's something fairly similar in the situation here. Expulsion, and this is important. Norman, you should pay attention to this. You didn't raise that. Expulsion, transfer were never policy of the Zionist movement before 47. It doesn't exist in Zionist platforms of the various political parties, of the Zionist organization, of the Israeli state, of the Jewish agency.

Nobody would have actually made it into policy because it was always a large minority. If there were people who wanted it, always a large minority of Jewish politicians and leaders would have said, "No, this is immoral. "We cannot start a state on the basis of an expulsion." So it was never adopted, and actually was never adopted as policy even in 48, even though Ben-Gurion wanted as few Arabs in the course of the war staying in the Jewish state after they attacked it.

He didn't want disloyal citizens staying there 'cause they wouldn't have been loyal citizens. But this made sense in the war itself. But the movement itself and its political parties never accepted it. It's true that in 1937, when the British as part of the proposal by the Peel Commission to divide the country into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, which the Arabs of course rejected, Peel also recommended that the Arabs, most of the Arabs in the Jewish state to be should be transferred because otherwise if they stayed and were disloyal to the emergent Jewish state, this would cause endless disturbances, warfare, killing, and so on.

So Ben-Gurion and Weizmann latched onto this proposal by the most famous democracy in the world, the British democracy, when they proposed the idea of transfer side by side with the idea of partition 'cause it made sense. And they said, "Well, if the British say so, "we should also advocate it." But they never actually tried to pass it as Zionist policy.

And they fairly quickly stopped even talking about transfer after 1938. - So just to clarify, what you're saying is that '47 was an offensive war, not a defensive war. - By the Arabs, yes. - By the Arabs? - Yeah. - And you're also saying that there was never a top-down policy of expulsion.

- Yes. - Just to clarify the point. - If I understood you correctly, you're making the claim that transfer, expulsion, and so on was, in fact, a very localized phenomenon resulting from individual land purchases. And that, if I understand you correctly, you're also making the claim that the idea that a Jewish state requires a removal or overwhelming reduction of the non-Jewish population was-- - If the Arabs are attacking you, yes.

- But let's say prior to 1947, it would be your claim that the idea that a significant reduction or wholesale removal of the Arab population was not part of Zionist thinking. Well, I think there's two problems with that. I think what you're saying about localized disputes is correct, but I also think that there is a whole literature that demonstrates that transfer was envisioned by Zionist leaders on a much broader scale than simply individual land purchases.

In other words, it went way beyond, we need to remove these tenants so that we can farm this land. The idea was we can't have a state where all these Arabs remain, and we have to get rid of them. And the second, I think, impediment to that view is that long before the UN General Assembly convened to address the question of Palestine, Palestinian and Arab, and other leaders as well, had been warning ad infinitum that the purpose of the Zionist movement is not just to establish a Jewish state, but to establish an exclusivist Jewish state, and that transfer, forced displacement, was fundamental to that project.

And just responding to, sorry, was it? - Yeah, Stephen. - Bonnell or Donnell? - Or Bonnell, yeah. - With a B. - Yeah. - Yeah. You made the point that the problem here is that people don't recognize is that the first and last result for the Arabs is always war.

I think there's a problem with that. I think you might do well to recall the 1936 general strike conducted by Palestinians at the beginning of the revolt, which at the time was the longest recorded general strike in history. You may want to consult the book published last year by Laurie Allen, A History of False Hope, which discusses in great detail the consistent engagement by Palestinians, their leaders, their elites, their diplomats, and so on, with all these international committees.

If we look at today, the Palestinians are once again going to the International Court of Justice. They're consistently trying to persuade the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to do his job. They have launched widespread boycott campaigns. So, of course, the Palestinians have engaged in military resistance. But I think the suggestion that this has always been their first and last resort, and that they have somehow spurned civic action, spurned diplomacy, I think really has no basis in reality.

- I'll respond to that, and then a question for Norm to take into account, I think, when he answers Benny, 'cause I am curious. Obviously, I have fresher eyes on this, and I'm a newcomer to this arena versus the three of you guys, for sure. A claim that gets brought up a lot has to do with the inevitability of transfer in Zionism, or the idea that as soon as the Jews envisioned a state in Palestine, they knew that it would involve some mass transfer of population, perhaps a mass expulsion.

I'm sure we'll talk about Plan Dalit or Plan D at some point. The issue that I run into is, while you can find quotes from leaders, while you can find maybe desires expressed in diaries, I feel like it's hard to truly ever know if there would have been mass transfer in the face of Arab peace, because I feel like every time there was a huge deal on the table that would have had a sizable Jewish and Arab population living together, the Arabs would reject it out of hand.

So, for instance, when we say that transfer was inevitable, when we say that Zionists would have never accepted a sizable Arab population, how do you explain the acceptance of the '47 Partition Plan that would have had a huge Arab population living in the Jewish state? Is your contention that after the acceptance of that, after the establishment of that state, that Jews would have slowly started to expel all of these Arab citizens from their country?

Or how do you explain that in Lusan, a couple years later, that Israel was willing to formally annex the Gaza Strip and make 200,000 or so people those citizens? But I'm just curious, how do we get this idea of Zionism always means mass transfer when there were times, at least early on in the history of Israel and a little bit before it, where Israel would have accepted a state that would have had a massive Arab population in it?

Is your, yeah, is your idea that they would have just slowly expelled them afterwards, or? - Is that a question to me or Norm? - Either one, I'm just curious for the incorporation of the answer, yeah. - There's some misunderstandings here. So let's try to clarify that. Number one, it was the old historians who would point to the fact, in Professor Morris's terminology, the old historians, what he called not real historians, he called them chroniclers, not real historians.

It was the old Israeli historians who denied the centrality of transfer in Zionist thinking. It was then Professor Morris, who, contrary to Israel's historian establishment, who said, now you remind me it's four pages, but it came at the end of the book, it was-- - No, no, it's at the beginning of the book.

- Transfer. - Transfer is dealt with in four pages at the beginning of my first book on the Palestinian refugee problem. - It's a fault of my memory, but the point still stands. It was Professor Morris who introduced this idea in what you might call a big way. - Yeah, but I didn't say it was central to the Zionist-- - Okay, allow me, okay, allow me-- - You're saying centrality.

I never said it was centrality, I said it was their idea. - By the way, it's okay to respond back and forth, this is great. And also, just a quick question, if I may. You're using quotes from Benny, from Professor Morris. It's also okay to say those quotes do not reflect the full context of the-- - That would be fine.

- So if we go back to quotes we've said in the past, and you both here have written, the three of you have written on this topic a lot, is we should be careful and just admit like, well, yeah, well, that's-- - Just real quick, just to be clear, the contention is that Norm is quoting a part and saying that this was the entire reason for this, whereas Benny's saying it's a part of the-- - I'm not quoting a part.

I'm quoting 25 pages where Professor Morris was at great pains to document the claim that appeared in those early four pages of his book. Now, you say it never became part of the official Zionist platform. - Never became part of policy. - Fine, fine, fine, fine, fine, okay. We're also asked, well, if this is true, why did that happen, why did that happen?

It's because, it's a very simple fact which everybody understands. Ideology doesn't operate in a vacuum. There are real world practical problems. You can't just take an ideology and superimpose it on a political reality and turn it into a fact. It was the British mandate. There was significant Arab resistance to Zionism and that resistance was based on the fact, as you said, the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession.

So you couldn't very well expect the Zionist movement to come out in neon lights and announce, "Hey, we're going to be expelling you "the first chance we get." That's not realistic. Now, okay. - Let me respond. Look, you've said it a number of times that the Arabs, from fairly early on in the conflict from the 1890s or the early 1900s said, "The Jews intend to expel us." This doesn't mean that it's true.

It means that some Arabs said this, maybe believing it was true, maybe using it as a political instrument to gain support to mobilize Arabs against the Zionist experiment. But the fact is transfer did not occur before 1947. And Arabs later said, and since then, have said that the Jews want to build a third temple on the Temple Mount, as if that's what really the mainstream of Zionism has always wanted and always strived for.

But this is nonsense. It's something that Husseini used to use as a way to mobilize masses for the cause, using religion as the way to get them to join him. The fact that Arabs said that the Zionists wanted to dispossess us doesn't mean it's true. It just means that some Arabs thought that, maybe said it sincerely and maybe insincerely.

- Professor Morris. - Later, it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is true, because the Arabs attacked the Jews. - Professor Morris, I read through your stuff. Even yesterday, I was looking through "Righteous Victim." - You should read other things, you're wasting your time. - No, no, actually, no. I do read other things, but I don't consider it a waste of time to read you, not at all.

You say that this wasn't inherent in Zionism. Now, would you agree that David Ben-Gurion was a Zionist? - A major Zionist leader. - Would you agree Chaim Weizmann was a Zionist? - Yeah. - Okay. I believe they were. I believe they took their ideology seriously. It was the first generation.

Just like with the Bolsheviks, the first generation was committed to an idea. By the 1930s, it was just pure Realpolitik. The ideology went out the window. The first generation, I have no doubt about their convictions, okay? They were Zionists. Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt in Zionism. - You keep repeating the same thing.

- Yeah, because I have, as I said then, Mr. Morris, I have a problem reconciling what you're saying. It either was incidental or it was deeply entrenched. Here, I read it's deeply entrenched. Two very resonant words, inevitable and inbuilt. - Deeply entrenched, I never wrote that. - Well, I'm not sure.

- It's something you just invented. - Okay, inevitable and inbuilt. - The idea, let me concede something. The idea of transfer was there. Israel Zangvil, a British Zionist, talked about it early on in the century. Even Herzl, in some way, talked about transferring population. - According to your 25 pages, everybody talked about it.

- We keep bringing up this line in the 25 pages and the four pages. We're lucky to have Benny in front of us right now. We don't need to go to the quotes. We can legitimately ask how central is expulsion to Zionism in its early version of Zionism and whatever Zionism is today, and how much power, influence does Zionism and ideology have in Israel and influence the philosophy, the ideology of Zionism have on Israel today.

- The Zionist movement up to 1948, Zionist ideology was central to the whole Zionist experience, the whole enterprise up to 1948. And I think Zionist ideology was also important in the first decades of Israel's existence. Slowly, the hold of Zionism, like, if you like, like Bolshevism, held the Soviet Union, gradually faded.

And a lot of Israelis today think in terms of individual success and then the capitalism and all sorts of things which are nothing to do with the Zionism. But Zionism was very important. But what I'm saying is that the idea of transfer wasn't the core of Zionism. The idea of Zionism was to save the Jews who had been vastly persecuted in Eastern Europe and incidentally in the Arab world, the Muslim world for centuries, and eventually ending up with the Holocaust.

The idea of Zionism was to save the Jewish people by establishing a state or reestablishing a Jewish state on the ancient Jewish homeland, which is something the Arabs today even deny that there were Jews in Palestine or the land of Israel. 2,000 years ago, Arafat famously said, "What temple was there on Temple Mount?" Maybe it was in Nablus, which of course is nonsense.

But they had a strong connection for thousands of years to the land to which they wanted to return and returned there. They found that on the land lived hundreds of thousands of Arabs. And the question was how to accommodate the vision of a Jewish state in Palestine alongside the existence of these Arab masses living on, who were indigenous in fact, to the land by that stage.

And the idea of partition, because they couldn't live together because the Arabs didn't want to live together with the Jews. And I think the Jews also didn't want to live together in one state with Arabs in general. The idea of partition was the thing which the Zionists accepted. Okay, we can only get a small part of Palestine.

The Arabs will get in '37, most of Palestine. In 1947, the ratios were changed, but we can live side by side with each other in a partitioned Palestine. And this was the essence of it. The idea of transfer was there, but it was never adopted as policy. But in 1947, '48, the Arabs attacked trying to destroy essentially the Jewish, the Zionist enterprise and the emerging Jewish state.

And the reaction was a transfer in some way. Not as policy, but this is what happened on the battlefield. And this is also what Ben-Gurion at some point began to want as well. - Well, one of the first books on this issue I read when I was still in high school, because my late father had it, was the diaries of Theodor Herzl.

And I think Theodor Herzl, of course, was the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement. And I think if you read that, it's very clear. For Herzl, the model upon which the Zionist movement would proceed, his model was Cecil Rhodes. I think Rhodes, from what I recall, correct me if I'm wrong, has quite a prominent place in Herzl's diaries.

I think Herzl was also corresponding with him and seeking his support. Cecil Rhodes, of course, was the British colonialist after whom the former white minority regime in Rhodesia was named. And Herzl also says explicitly in his diaries that it is essential to remove the existing population from Palestine. - Can I respond to this?

- In a moment, please. He says we shall have to spirit the penniless population across the borders and procure employment for them elsewhere or something. And Israel Zangwill, who you mentioned, a land without a people for a people without a land. They knew damn well it wasn't a people, a land without a people.

I'll continue, but please, go ahead. - Just to this, there is one small diary entry in Herzl's vast-- - It's five volumes. - Yeah, five volumes, there's one paragraph which actually mentions the idea of transfer. There are people who I think that Herzl was actually pointing to South America when he was talking about that.

The Jews were going to move to Argentina and then they would try and buy out or buy off or spirit the penniless natives to make way for Jewish settlement. Maybe he wasn't even talking about the Arabs in that particular passage. That's the argument of some people. Maybe he was, but the point is it has only 1/100th of a, 1% of the diary which is devoted to this subject.

It's not a central idea-- - Well, I'll defer. - In Herzl's thinking. What Herzl wanted, and this is what's important, not Rhodes, I don't think he was the model. Herzl wanted to create a liberal, democratic, Western state in Palestine for the Jews. That was the idea, not some imperial enterprise serving some imperial master, which is what Rhodes was about, but to have a Jewish state which was modeled on the Western democracies in Palestine.

And this incidentally was more or less what Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, Ben-Gurion was more of a socialist, Weizmann was more of a liberal Westerner, but they wanted to establish a social democratic or liberal state in Palestine. And they both envisioned through most of the years of their activity that there would be an Arab minority in that Jewish state.

It's true that Ben-Gurion strived to have as small as possible an Arab minority in the Jewish state because he knew that if you want a Jewish majority state, that would be necessary, but it's not something which they were willing to translate into actual policy. - Just a quick pause to mention that for people who are not familiar, Theodor Herzl we're talking about over a century ago, and everything we've been talking about has been mostly 1948 and before.

- Yes, just one clarification on Herzl's diaries. I mean, the other thing that I recall from those diaries is he was very preoccupied with, in fact, getting great power patronage, seeing Palestine, the Jewish state in Palestine, I think his words, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. In other words, very much seeing his project as a proxy for Western imperialism in the Middle East.

- No, no, I don't think that's the right word, not proxy. He wanted to establish a Jewish state which would be independent. To get that, he hoped that he would be able to garner support from major imperial powers. - Including the Ottoman Sultan, who he tried to cultivate. I just want to respond to a point you made earlier, which was that people expressed their rejection of the partition resolution on the grounds that it gave the majority of Palestine to the Jewish community, which formed only a third.

Whereas, in fact, if I understood you correctly, you're saying the Palestinians and the Arabs would have rejected any partition resolution. - Yeah, a couple things. That one, they would have rejected any. Two, a lot of that land given was in the Negev. It was pretty terrible land at the time.

And then three, the land that would have been partitioned to Jews, I think would have been, I think I saw it was like 500,000, it would have been 500,000 Jews, 400,000 Arabs, and I think like 80,000 Bedouin would have been there. So the state would have been divided pretty closely.

- I think you raise a valid point. Because I think the Palestinians did reject the partition of their homeland, in principle. And I think the fact that the United Nations General Assembly then awarded the majority of their homeland to the Zionist movement only added insult to injury. I mean, one doesn't have to sympathize with the Palestinians to recognize that they have now been a stateless people for 75 years.

Can you name any country, yours, for example, or yours, that would be prepared to give 55%, 25%, 10% of your country to the Palestinians? Of course not. And so the issue was not the existence of Jews in Palestine. They had been there for centuries. And of course they had ties to Palestine, and particularly to Jerusalem and other places, going back centuries, if not millennia.

But the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state at the expense of those who are already living there, I think it was right to reject that. And I don't think we can look back now, 75 years later, and say, "Well, you should have accepted "losing 55% of your homeland because you ended up "losing 78% of it, and the remaining 22% "was occupied in 1967." That's not how things work.

And I can imagine an American rejecting, giving 10% of the United States to the Palestinians, and if that rejection leads to war and you lose half your country, I doubt that 50 years from now you're going to say, "Well, maybe I should have accepted that." - Sure, so I like this answer more than what I usually feel like I'm hearing when it comes to the Palestinian rejection of the 47 Partition Plan.

'Cause sometimes I feel like a weird switch happens to where the Arabs in the area are actually presented as entirely pragmatic people who are simply doing a calculation and saying, "Well, we're losing 55% "of our land, Jews are only maybe 1/3 of the people here, "and we've got 45," and nah, the math doesn't work, basically, but it wasn't a math problem.

I think, like you said-- - It was a matter of principle. - It was an ideology problem. - No, it was a matter of principle. - Yeah, ideologically driven, that they, as a people, have a right to, or are entitled to, this land that they've never actually had an independent state on, that they've never had even a guarantee of an independent state on, that they've never actually ruled a government of their own.

- That last point is actually not correct, because for all its injustice, the mandate system recognized Palestine as a Class A mandate, which provisionally recognized the independence of that territory. - Of what would emerge from that territory, but not of the Palestinians. - It was provisionally recognized. - But the territory itself was, but not of the Palestinian people to have a right or a guarantee to a government that would emerge from it.

- Well, it was a British mandate of Palestine, not the British mandate of Israel. - The word exclusive, which you keep using, is nonsense. The state which Ben-Gurion envisioned would be a Jewish-majority state, as they accepted the 1947 partition resolution, as Stephen said, that included 400,000-plus Arabs in a state which would have 500,000 Jews.

So the idea of exclusivity wasn't anywhere in the air at all among the Zionist leaders in '47, '48. They wanted a Jewish-majority state, but were willing to accept a state which had 40% Arabs. That's one point. The second thing is the Palestinians may have regarded the land of Palestine as their homeland, but so did the Jews.

It was the homeland of the Jews as well. The problem was the Arabs were unable and remain, to this day, unable to recognize that for the Jews, that is their homeland as well. And the problem then is how do you share this homeland? Either with one binational state, or partitioned into two states.

The problem is that the Arabs have always rejected both of these ideas. The homeland belongs to the Jews, as Jews feel, as much as it does, if not more, than for the Arabs. I would say for the Jews. It's the Jewish people's homeland. - Real quick, I just want, for both of you guys, 'cause I haven't heard these questions answered, I really want these questions to be, I'm just so curious how to make sense of them.

It was correctly brought up that I believe that Ben-Gurion had, I think Shlomo Ben-Amin describes it as an obsession with getting validation or support from Western states. Great Britain, and then a couple decades later-- - That explains the Suez War, the Suez Crisis. - Yeah, exactly, correct. That was one of the major motivators, the idea to work with Britain and France on a military operation against Arabs.

- Imperial stooge. - But then the question, again, I go back to, if that is true, if Ben-Gurion, if the early Israel saw themselves as a Western-fashioned nation, how could we possibly imagine that they would have engaged in the transfer of some 400,000 Arabs after accepting the partition plan?

Would that not have completely and totally destroyed their legitimacy in the eyes of the entire Western world? Would there not have been, how not? - Well, first of all, I think that the Zionist leadership's acceptance of the partition resolution, and I think you may have written about this, that they accepted it because it provided international endorsement of the legitimacy of the principle of Jewish statehood, and they didn't accept the borders, and in fact later expanded the borders.

Second of all-- - No, they didn't accept the borders. The borders were expanded at war. - They accepted the UN partition resolution, borders and all. That's how they accepted it. You can say that some of the Zionists, deep in their hearts, had the idea that maybe at some point-- - Including their most-- - They would be able to get more.

- Including their most senior leaders who said so, and I think you've quoted them saying so. - But they grudgingly accepted what the United Nations, the world community, had said, this is what you're going to get. - And second of all, I mean, removing dark people, darker people, it's intrinsic.

It's intrinsic. - In Israel, Jews are as dark as Arabs. - It's intrinsic to Western history, so the idea that Americans or Brits or the French would have an issue with, I mean, the French had been doing it in Algeria for decades. The Americans have been doing it in North America for centuries, so how would Israel forcibly displacing Palestinians somehow besmirch Israel in the eyes of the West?

- In the 1944 resolution of the Labor Party, and at the time, even Bertrand Russell was a member of the Labor Party, it endorsed transfer of Arabs out of Palestine as Moines pointed out. That was a deeply entrenched idea in Western thinking that there was nothing, it doesn't in any way contradict or violate or breach any moral values to displace the Palestinian population.

Now, I do believe there's a legitimate question. Had it been the case, as you said, Professor Morris, that the Zionists wanted to create a happy state with a Jewish majority, but a large Jewish minority, and if by virtue of immigration, like in our own country, in our own country, given the current trajectories, non-whites will become the majority population in the United States quite soon, and according to democratic principles, we have to accept that.

So if that were the case, I would say maybe there's an argument that had there been mass Jewish immigration, change the demographic balance in Palestine, and therefore Jews became the majority, it can make an argument in the abstract that the indigenous Arab population should have been accepting of that, just as whites in the United States, quote-unquote whites, have to be accepting of the fact that the demographic majority is shifting to non-whites in our own country.

But that's not what Zionism was about. I did write my doctoral dissertation on Zionism, and I don't want to get now bogged down in abstract ideas, but as I suspect you know, most theorists of nationalism say there are two kinds of nationalism. One is a nationalism based on citizenship.

You become a citizen, you're integral to the country. That's sometimes called political nationalism. And then there's another kind of nationalism, and that says the state should not belong to its citizens, it should belong to an ethnic group. Each ethnic group should have its own state. It's usually called the German Romantic idea of nationalism.

Zionism is squarely in the German Romantic idea. That was the whole point of Zionism. We don't want to be Bundists and be one more ethnic minority in Russia. We don't want to become citizens and just become a Jewish people in Russia. In England, or France, we want our own state.

- Like the Arab 23 states. - No, wait, before we get to the Arabs, let's stick to the Jews for a moment, or the Zionists. We want our own state. And in that concept of wanting your own state, the minority, at best, lives on sufferance, and at worst, gets expelled.

That's the logic of the German Romantic Zionist idea of a state. That's why they're Zionists. Now, I personally have shied away from using the word Zionism ever since I finished my doctoral dissertation. - Was that painful? - Because, as I said, I don't believe it's the operative ideology today.

It's like talking about Bolshevism and referring to Khrushchev. I doubt Khrushchev could have spelled Bolshevik. But for the period we're talking about, they were Zionists. They were committed to their exclusive state with a minority living on sufferance, or, at worst, expelled. That was their ideology. And I really feel there's a problem with your happy vision of these Western Democrats like Weizmann, and they wanted to live peacefully with the Arabs.

Weizmann described the expulsion in 1948 as, quote, "the miraculous clearing of the land." That doesn't sound like somebody shedding too many tears at the loss of the indigenous population. - Let me just respond to the word of one of our respondents. - The unsufferance, I don't agree with. I think that's wrong.

The Jewish state came into being in 1948. It had a population which was 20% Arab when it came into being, after Arab refugees, many of them had become refugees, but 20% remained in the country. 20% of Israel's population at inception in 1949 was Arab. - 80% went missing. - No, no, no, no.

I was talking about what remained in Palestine, Israel, after it was created. The 20% who lived in Israel received citizenship and all the rights of Israelis, except, of course, the right to serve in the army, which they didn't want to. And they have Supreme Court justices. They have Knesset members.

They enjoyed basically-- - I think they lived under emergency laws until 1966. - For a period, sure. They lived under a-- - So they didn't immediately have citizenship. - No, no, no, wait a second. At the beginning-- - This is just fantasy. - At the beginning, it's not fantasy.

At the beginning, they received citizenship, could vote in elections for their own people, and they were put into parliament. But in the first years, the Israeli, the Jewish majority, suspected that maybe the Arabs would be disloyal 'cause they had just tried to destroy the Jewish state. Then they dropped the military government and they became fully equal citizens.

So if the whole idea was they must have a state without Arabs, this didn't happen in '49. - Then why-- - And it didn't happen in the subsequent decades. - Then why did you say, Professor Morris? - Yes. - Then why did you say without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established?

- Because you're missing the first section of that paragraph, which was they were being assaulted by the Arabs, and as a result, a Jewish state could not have come into being unless there had also been an expulsion of the population which was trying to kill the Arabs. - Norm, I'm officially forbidding you referencing that.

Again, we've responded-- - I think-- - Hold on a second, wait. We've responded to it, so the main point you're making, we'll have to take Benyetta's word, is there was a war, and that's the reason why he made that statement. I think just one last point on this. I remember reading your book when it first came out, and reading one incident after the other, and one example after the other, and then getting to the conclusion where you said the Nakba was a product of war, not design.

I think we were, and I remember reacting almost in shock to that, that I felt you had mobilized overwhelming evidence that it was a product of design, not war, and I think our discussion today very much reflects, let's say, the dissonance between the evidence and the conclusion. You don't feel that the research that you have conducted and published demonstrates that it was in fact inherent and inbuilt and inevitable, and I think the point that Norm and I are making is that your own historical research, together with that of others, indisputably demonstrates that it does.

I think that's a fundamental disagreement we're having here. - Can I, well, yeah, can I actually respond to that, 'cause this is actually, I think this is emblematic of the entire conversation. I watched a lot of Norm's interviews and conversations in preparation for this, and I hear Norm will say this over and over and over again.

I only deal in facts. I don't deal in hypotheticals. I only deal in facts. I only deal in facts, and that seems to be the case, except for when the facts are completely and totally contrary to the particular point you're trying to push. The idea that Jews would have out of hand rejected any state that had Arabs on it or always had a plan of expulsion is just betrayed by the acceptance of the '47 partition plan.

- I don't think you understand politics. Did I just say that there is a chasm that separates your ideology from the limits and constraints imposed by politics and reality? Now, Professor Morris, I suspect would agree that the Zionist movement from fairly early on was committed to the idea of a Jewish state.

I am aware of only one major study probably written 40 years ago, the "Binational Idea in Mandatory Palestine" by a woman, I forgot her name now. You remember her. - I'm trying to. - Yeah, okay, but you know the book. - I think so. - Yeah, she is the only one who tried to persuasively argue that the Zionist movement was actually, not formally, actually committed to the binational idea.

But most historians of the subject agree the Zionist movement was committed to the idea of a Jewish state. Having written my doctoral dissertation on the topic, I was confirmed in that idea because Professor Chomsky, who was my closest friend for about 40 years, was very committed to the idea that binationalism was the dominant trend in Zionism.

I could not agree with, I couldn't go with him there. But Professor Morris, you are aware that until the Biltmore Resolution in 1942, the Zionist movement never declared it was for a Jewish state. Why? Because it was politically impossible at the moment until 1942. There is your ideology, there are your convictions, there are your operative plans, and there's also separately what you say in public.

The Zionist movement couldn't say in public, "We're expelling all the Arabs." They can't say that. And they couldn't even say, "We support a Jewish state until 1942." - You're conflating two things. The Zionists wanted a Jewish state, correct? That didn't mean expulsion of the Arabs. It's not the same thing.

They wanted a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, but they were willing, as it turned out, both in '37 and in '47, and subsequently, to have an Arab minority, a large Arab minority. They were willing to have a large Arab minority in the country, and they ended up with a large Arab minority in the country.

20% of the population in '49 was Arab, and it still is 21%. - They ended up for about five minutes before they were expelled. They agreed to it until '47, and then they were gone by March 1949. - What happened in between the rejection of the partition plan and the expulsion of the Arabs?

- The Arabs launched the war. - Well, yeah, I mean, it wasn't random. There's a potential that- - I agree, it wasn't random. I totally agree with that. It was by design. It wasn't random. - You can say that, but in this case, the facts betray you. There was no Arab acceptance of anything that would have allowed for a Jewish state to exist.

- Of course not. - Number one. And number two, I think that it's entirely possible, given how things happen after war, that this exact same conflict could have played out, and an expulsion would have happened without any ideology at play, that there was a people that disagreed on who had territorial rights to a land, there was a massive war afterwards, and then a bunch of their friends invaded after to reinforce the idea that the Jewish people, in this case, couldn't have a state.

There could have been a transfer regardless. - Anything could have been, but that's not what history is about. - History is about Palestinian rejectionism to any peace deal over and over and over again. - As I said, when the war was thrown into the court of the United Nations, they were faced with a practical problem.

And I, for one, am not going to try to adjudicate the rights and wrongs from the beginning. I do not believe that if territorial displacement and dispossession was inherent in the Zionist project, I do not believe it can be a legitimate political enterprise. Now, you might say that's speaking from 2022 or 2020.

Where are we now? - Four now, I think. - Okay, but we have to recognize that from nearly the beginning, for perfectly obvious reasons, having nothing to do with anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism, anti-Europeanism, but because no people that I am aware of would voluntarily cede its country. - Except for all the people that sold land voluntarily.

- You can perfectly understand Native American resistance to Eurocolonialism. You can perfectly well understand it without any anti-Europeanism, anti-whitism, anti-Christianism. They didn't want to cede their country to invaders. - I think you're-- - That's completely understandable. - You're minimizing the anti-Semitic element-- - You minimized it. - In Arab nationalism.

- In all your books, you minimized it. - No, no, no. Husseini was an anti-Semite. The leader of the Palestinian National Movement in the '30s and '40s was an anti-Semite. This was one of the things which drove him and also drove him in the end to work in Berlin for Hitler for four years, giving Nazi propaganda to the Arab world, calling on the Arabs to murder the Jews.

That's what he did in World War II. That's the leader of the Palestinian Arab National Movement. - Why is it-- - And he wasn't alone. He wasn't alone. - Professor, why is it that if you read your book, Righteous Victims, you can read it and read it and read it and read it, as I have, you will find barely a word about the Arabs being motivated by anti-Semitism.

- It exists, though. - I didn't say it doesn't exist. - You agree that it exists. - Hey, I don't know a single non-Jew who doesn't harbor anti-Semitic sentiment. - We're talking about Arabs now. - Yeah, but I don't know anybody that's just part of the human condition. - Anti-Semitism.

- Yes, I do. - Husseini was a-- - And among the Arabs. - So, Professor Mars, here's my problem. I didn't see that in your Righteous Victims. Even when you talked about the first intifada and you talked about the second intifada and you talked about how there was a lot of influence by Hamas, the Islamic movement, you even stated that there was a lot of anti-Semitism in those movements, but then you went on to say, but of course, at bottom, it was about the occupation.

It wasn't about, and I've read it. - Yeah, but you're moving from different-- - No, I'm not moving. - Ages, across the ages. - I'm talking about your whole book. - The occupation began in '67, the one you're talking about. - I looked and looked and looked for evidence of this anti-Semitism as being a chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism.

I didn't see it. - You like the-- - Did he make that claim? - I don't remember the word chief. - Yeah. - It's one of the elements. - I'm very binary thinking when it comes to-- - Binary? - Yeah, it's binary. - Please, don't give me this post-modernism binary.

You're the one-- - No, but you are thinking in terms of black and white. - You're the one that said the chief motor. - No, Stephen has a point. - Do you have your book here? - You do talk about black-- - Page 137. - You talk in black and white-- - To page 37.

- You're talking in black and white concepts when history is much grayer. Lots of things happen because of lots of reasons, not one or the other, and you don't seem to see that. - Can I ask you a question? 'Cause it's for them to talk to. Just a very quick question.

What was, what do you think the ideal solution was on the Arab side from '47? What would they have preferred? And what would have happened-- - Well, they were explicit. - And then the second one, what would have happened if Jews would have lost the war in '48? What do you think would have happened to the Israeli population or Jewish population?

- I think the Palestinians and the Arabs were explicit that they wanted a unitary, I think, federal state, and they made their submissions to UNSCOP. They made their appeals at the UN General Assembly. - What do you mean by unitary and federal? I don't get that. They wanted an Arab state.

They wanted Palestine to be an Arab state. - Yes, yes. - Put it simply. Without the word unitary, federal, they wanted Palestine as an Arab and exclusively Arab state. - No, it wasn't an exclusively Arab state. I think we have to distinguish between Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on the one hand, and Palestinian and Arab attitudes to Jewish existence in Palestine.

There's a fundamental difference. - Well, Husseini, the leader of the movement, said that all the Jews who had come since 1917, and that's the majority of the Jews in Palestine in 1947, shouldn't be there. - Well, he did say-- - They shouldn't be citizens, and they shouldn't be there.

- He did say that. - The PLO tried to say that in '64. I'm not going to deny it. Of course, it's true. I can understand the sentiment, but I think it's wrong. - But also, you guys are the ones-- - I agree on this, and I also-- - I want to answer your question.

- You guys are like, 'cause you had used the words earlier that it was supremacy and exclusivity that the Zionist state was built on. - Well, I want to answer your question. Husseini did say that, and I'm sure there was a very substantial body of Palestinian-Arab public opinion that endorsed that, but by the same token, I think a unitary Arab state, as you call it, or a Palestinian state, could have been established with arrangements, with guarantees, to ensure the security and rights of both communities.

How that would work in detail had been discussed and proposed, but never resolved. And again, I think Jewish fears about what would have-- - A second Holocaust, that's what-- - Well, no, I think-- - That was the Jewish fear, a second Holocaust. - That may well have been the Jewish fear.

- It was an unfounded Jewish fear. - It was unfounded? - Of course it was unfounded. - What about like in '48 and '56? - You really think that the Palestinians, had they won the war, were going to import ovens and crematoria from Germany? - I don't know if it would have been that bad, but there were pogroms across, in almost every single Arab state where there were Jews living, after '48, after '56, after '67, there were always pogroms, there were always flights from Jews from those countries to Israel afterwards.

I don't think it would be-- - I wouldn't say there were always pogroms in every Arab state. I think there was flight of Arab Jews for multiple reasons, in some cases, for precisely the reasons you say. If you look at the Jewish community in Algeria, for example, their flight had virtually nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The issue of Algerian Jews was that the French gave them citizenship during their colonial rule of Algeria, and they increasingly became identified with French rule, and when Algeria became independent and all the French ended up leaving out of fear or out of disappointment or out of whatever, the Jews were identified as French rather than Algerian.

- This is a bit of a red herring. There were pogroms in the Arab countries, in Bahrain even, where there's almost no Jews. There was a pogrom in 1947. There was a pogrom in Aleppo in 1947. - I'm not denying any of that history. - There were killings of Jews in Iraq and Egypt in 1948, '49.

- I'm not denying any-- - So the Jews basically fled the Arab states, not for multiple reasons. They fled because they felt that the governments there and the societies amid which they had lived for hundreds of years no longer wanted them. - Look, without getting into the details, I think we can both agree that ultimately a clear majority of Arab Jews who believed that after having lived in these countries for-- - Way before the Arabs, way before the Arabs arrived there.

- For centuries, if not millennia, came to the unfortunate conclusion that their situation had become untenable. - Yes. - I also think that we can both agree that this had never been an issue prior to Zionism and the emergence of the State of Israel. Look, I'm not-- - Pogroms didn't begin with Zionism in the Arab world.

- The issue is the point I raised, which is whether these communities had ever come to a collective conclusion that their position had become untenable in this part of the world. No, they were Arab Jews. - Well, because untenable meant there was no alternative, but with the creation of Israel, there was an alternative, right?

A place where they could go and not be discriminated against or live as second-class citizens or be subject to Arab-majority states. I also think it's interesting that when you analyze the flight of Jewish people, and I've seen this, it wasn't just, I agree with you, it wasn't just a mass expulsion from all the Arab states.

There were definitely push factors. There were also pull factors. Now, I don't know how you guys feel about the Nakba, but when the analysis of the Nakba comes in, again, it's back to that, well, that was actually just a top-down expulsion. The retreat of wealthy Arab people in the '30s didn't matter.

Any of the messaging from the surrounding Arab states didn't matter. It was just an expulsion from Jewish people or people running from their lives from Jewish massacres. Again, I feel like it's that selective, it's a selective critical analysis of the- - Again, I'm a little uncomfortable always using the term Jewish here, because it wasn't the Jews of England or the Soviet Jews.

- Well, I say Jewish because prior to '48, it's saying Israeli, the Yishuv, I guess, or whatever. - I think we should, I think it's useful to say, refer to Zionists before 1948 and Israelis after '48. We don't need to implicate Jews elsewhere. - Sure, but the Jewish people that were being attacked in Arab states weren't Zionists, they were just Jews living there, right?

- Okay, allow me to just comment on that. I was rereading Shlomo Ben-Ami's last book, and he does, at the end, discuss at some length the whole issue of the refugee question bearing on the so-called peace process. And on the question of '48 and the Arab emigration, if you'll allow me, let me just quote him.

"Israel is particularly fond "of the awkwardly false symmetry she makes "between the Palestinian refugee crisis "and the forced emigration of 600,000 Jews "from Arab countries following the creation "of the state of Israel, as if it were, quote, "an unplanned exchange of populations," unquote. And then Mr. Ben-Ami, for those of you who are listening, he was Israel's former foreign minister, and he's an influential historian in his own right.

He says, "In fact, envoys from the Mossad "and the Jewish agency worked underground "in Arab countries and Iran "to encourage Jews to go to Israel. "More importantly, for many Jews in Arab states, "the very possibility of emigrating to Israel "was the culmination of millennial aspirations. "It represented the consummation of a dream "to take part in Israel's resurgence as a nation." So this idea that they were all expelled after 1948, that's one area, Professor Morris, I defer to expertise.

That's one of my credos in life. I don't know the Israeli literature, but as it's been translated in English, there's very little solid scholarship on what happened in 1948 in the Arab countries and which caused the Jews to leave. - Arab Jews. - The Arab Jews, right. But Shlomo Ben-Ami knows the literature.

He knows the scholarship. He knows the history. - He also comes from the Tangiers. - Yeah, so-- - He's from Morocco. - Right, so he knows-- - Avi Shleim from Iraq has written on this issue as well. - And they wrote that the Jews in the Arab lands were not pro-Zionist.

They weren't Zionists at all. Certainly, Avi Shleim's family was anti-Zionist. - And Avi Shleim, when he was interviewed by Merrin Rappaport on this question, he said, "You simply cannot say that the Iraqi Jews were expelled. "It's just not true." And he was speaking as an Iraqi Jew who left with his father and family in 1948.

- They were pushed out. They weren't expelled. That's probably the right phrase. - I think it's-- - They were pushed out. - I think it's more complex than that. I think it was, sorry, I interrupted you. - No, you're not interrupting me 'cause I don't know. I only know what's been translated into English and the English literature on the subject is very small and not scholarly.

Now, there may be a Hebrew literature, I don't know, but I was surprised that even Shlomo Ben-Ami, a stoward of his state, fair enough, on this particular point, he called it false symmetry. - No, no, Stephen is right. There was a pull and a push mechanism in the departure of the Jews from the Arab lands post '48, but there was also a lot of push, a lot of push.

- That's indisputable. There was push. And on the point of agreement, on this one brief light of agreement, let us wrap up with this topic of history and move on to modern day, but before that, I'm wondering if we could just say a couple of last words on this topic, Stephen.

- Yeah, I think that when you look at the behaviors of both parties in the time period around '48, or especially '48 and earlier, there's this assumption that there was this huge built-in mechanism of Zionism and that it was going to be inevitable from the inception of the first Zionist thought, I guess, that appeared in Herzl's mind that there would be a mass violent population transfer of Arab Palestinians out of what would become the Israeli state.

I understand that there are some quotes that we can find that maybe seem to possibly support an idea that looks close to that, but I think when you actually consult the record of what happened, when you look at the populations, the massive populations that Israel was willing to accept within what would become their state borders, their nation borders, I just don't think that the historical record agrees with the idea that Zionists would have just never been okay living alongside Arab Palestinians.

But when you look at the other side, Arabs would out of hand reject literally any deal that apportioned any amount of that land for any state relating to Jewish people or the Israeli people. I think it was said even on the other end of the table that Arab Palestinians would have never accepted, the Arabs would have never accepted any Jewish state whatsoever.

So it's interesting that on the ideology part where it's claimed that Zionists are people of exclusion and supremacy and expulsion, we can find that in diary entries, but we can find that expressed in very real terms on the Arab side, I think in all of their behavior around 48 and earlier, where the goal was the destruction of the Israeli state.

It would have been the dispossession of many Jewish people. It probably would have been the expulsion of a lot of them back to Europe. And I think that very clearly plays out in the difference between the actions of the Arabs versus some diary entries of some Jewish leaders. - Benny?

- Well, one thing which stood out and I think Muin made this point is that the Arabs had nothing to do with the Holocaust, but then the world community forced the Arabs to pay the price for the Holocaust. That's the traditional Arab argument. This is slightly distorting the reality.

The Arabs in the 1930s did their utmost to prevent Jewish immigration from Europe and reaching Palestine, which was the only safe haven available 'cause America, Britain, France, nobody wanted Jews anywhere and they were being persecuted in central Europe and eventually would be massacred in large numbers. So the Arab effort to pressure the British to prevent Jews reaching Palestine's safe shores contributed indirectly to the slaughter of many Jews in Europe 'cause they couldn't get to anywhere and they couldn't get to Palestine 'cause the Arabs were busy attacking Jews in Palestine and attacking the British to make sure they didn't allow Jews to reach this safe haven.

That's important. The second thing is, of course, there's no point in belittling the fact that the Palestinian Arab National Movement's leader, Husseini, worked for the Nazis in the 1940s. He got a salary from the German Foreign Ministry. He raised troops among Muslims in Bosnia for the SS and he broadcast to the Arab world calling for the murder of the Jews in the Middle East.

This is what he did. And the Arabs, since then, have been trying to whitewash Husseini's role. I'm not saying he was the instigator of the Holocaust, but he helped the Germans along in doing what they were doing and supported them in doing that. So this can't be removed from the fact that the Arabs, as you say, paid a price for the Holocaust, but they also participated in various ways in helping it happen.

- I'll make two points. The first is, you mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini and his collaboration with the Nazis, entirely legitimate point to raise, but I think one can also say definitively had Haj Amin al-Husseini never existed, the Holocaust would have played out precisely as it did. As far as Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the 1930s is concerned, it was of a different character than, for example, British and American rejection of Jewish immigration.

They just didn't want Jews on their soil. - Objectively, it helped the Germans kill the Jews. - In the Palestinian case, their opposition to Jewish immigration was to prevent the transformation of their homeland into a Jewish state that would dispossess them. And I think that's an important distinction to make.

The other point I wanted to make is we've spent the past several hours talking about Zionism, transfer, and so on, but I think there's a more fundamental aspect to this, which is that Zionism, I think, would have emerged and disappeared as yet one more utopian political project had it not been for the British, what the preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid Khaledi, has termed the British shield, because I think without the British sponsorship, we wouldn't be having this discussion today.

The British sponsored Zionism for a very simple reason, which is that during World War I, the Ottoman armies attempted to march on the Suez Canal. Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the British Empire between Europe and India, and the British came to the conclusion that they needed to secure the Suez Canal from any threat.

And as the British have done so often in so many places, how do you deal with this? Well, you bring in a foreign minority, implant them amongst a hostile population, and establish a protectorate over them. I don't think a Jewish state in Palestine had been part of British intentions, and the Balfour Declaration very specifically speaks about a Jewish national home in Palestine, in other words, a British protectorate.

Things ended up taking a different course, and I think the most important development was World War II, and I think this had maybe less to do with the Holocaust, and more to do with the effective bankruptcy of the United Kingdom during that war, and its inability to sustain its global empire.

It ended up giving up India, ended up giving up Palestine, and it's in that context, I think, that we need to see the emergence of a Jewish state in Palestine. And again, a Jewish state means a state in which the Jewish community enjoys not only a demographic majority, but an uncontestable demographic majority, an uncontestable territorial hegemony, and an uncontestable political supremacy.

And that is also why, after 1948, the nascent Israeli state confiscated, I believe, up to 90% of lands that had been previously owned by Palestinians who became citizens of Israel. It is why the new Israeli state imposed a military government on its population of Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966.

It is why the Israeli state effectively reduced the Palestinians living within the Israeli state as citizens of the Israeli state to second-class citizens, on the one hand, promoting Jewish nationalism and Jewish nationalist parties, on the other hand, doing everything within its power to suppress and eliminate Palestinian or Arab nationalist movements.

And that's why today there's a consensus among all major human rights organizations that Israel is an apartheid state. With the Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem describes a regime of Jewish supremacy between the river and the sea. - You're really tempting a response from the other side on the last few sentences.

- Propaganda, yeah, okay. We'll talk about the claims of apartheid and so on. It's a fascinating discussion, we need to have it. Norm? - On the question of the responsibility of the Palestinian Arabs for the Nazi holocaust, direct or indirect, I consider that an absurd claim. As Gromyko said, and I quoted him, the entire Western world turned its back on the Jews to somehow focus on the Palestinians strikes me as completely ridiculous.

Number two, as Muin said, there's a perfectly understandable reason why Palestinian Arabs wouldn't want Jews, because in their minds and not irrationally, these Jews intended to create a Jewish state which would quite likely have resulted in their expulsion. I'm a very generous person. I've actually taken in a homeless person for two and a half years.

But if I knew in advance that that homeless person was going to try to turn me out of my apartment, I would think 10,000 times before I took him in, okay? As far as the actual complicity of the Palestinian Arabs, if you look at Raoul Hilberg's three volume classic work, "The Destruction of the European Jewry", he has in those thousand plus pages, one sentence on the role of the Mufti of Jerusalem.

And that I think is probably an overstatement, but we'll leave it aside. The only two points I would make aside from the holocaust point is, number one, I do think the transfer discussion is useful because it indicates that there was a rational reason behind the Arab resistance to Jewish or Zionist immigration to Palestine, the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession.

And number two, there are two issues. One is the history, and the second is being responsible for your words. Now, some people accuse me of speaking very slowly, and they're advised on YouTube to turn up the speed twice to three times whenever I'm on. One of the reasons I speak slowly is because I attach value to every word I say.

And it is discomforting, disorienting, where you have a person who's produced a voluminous corpus rich in insights and rich in archival sources, who seems to disown each and every word that you pluck from that corpus by claiming that it's either out of context or it's cherry picking. Words count.

And I agree with Lex. Everybody has the right to rescind what they've said in the past. But what you cannot claim is that you didn't say what you said. - I'll stick to the history, not the current propaganda. 1917, the British, the Zionist movement began way before the British supported the Zionist movement for decades.

In 1917, the British jumped in and issued the Balfour Declaration supporting the emergence of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which most people understood to mean eventual Jewish statehood in Palestine. Most people understood that in Britain and among the Zionists and among the Arabs. But the British declared the Balfour Declaration or issued the Balfour Declaration not only because of imperial self-interest.

And this is what you're basically saying. They had the imperial interests, a buffer state, which would protect the Suez Canal from the east. The British also were motivated by idealism. And this incidentally is how Balfour described the reasoning behind issuing the declaration. And he said, the Western world, Western Christendom owes the Jews a great debt, both for giving the world and the West, if you like, values, social values, as embodied in the Bible, social justice and all sorts of other things.

And the Christian world owes the Jews because it persecuted them for 2000 years. This debt we're now beginning to repay with the 1917 declaration favoring Zionism. But it's also worth remembering that the Jews weren't proxies or attached to the British imperial endeavor. They were happy to receive British support in 1917.

And then subsequently when the British ruled Palestine for 20, 30 years, but they weren't part of the British imperial design or mission. They wanted a state for themselves. The Jews happy to have the British support them, happy today to have the Americans support Israel. But it's not because we're stooges or extensions of American imperial interests.

The British incidentally always described in Arab narratives of propaganda as consistent supporters of Zionism. They weren't. The first British rulers in Palestine, 1917, 1920-- - Herbert Samuel. - No, before Herbert Samuel. Samuel came in 1920. The British ruled there for three years previously. And most of the leaders, the British generals and so on who were in Palestine were anti-Zionist.

And subsequently in the 20s and 30s, the British occasionally curbed Zionist immigration to Palestine. And in 1939 switched horses and supported the Arab national movement and not Zionism. They turned anti-Zionist and basically said, "You Arabs will rule Palestine within the next 10 years. This is what we're giving you by limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine." But the Arabs didn't actually understand what they were being given on the silver platter, Husseini again.

And he said, "No, no, we can't accept the British white paper of May 1939," which had given the Arabs everything they wanted basically, self-determination in an Arab majority state. So what I'm saying is the British at some point did support the Zionist enterprise, but at other points were less consistent in the support.

And in 1939 until 1948, when they didn't vote even for partition for Jewish statehood in Palestine in the UN resolution, they didn't support Zionism during the last decade of the mandate. It's worth remembering that. - I'd like to respond to that. I mean, speaking of propaganda, I find it simply impossible to accept that Balfour, who as British prime minister in 1905 was a chief sponsor of the Aliens Act, which was specifically-- - He changed his mind.

- Which was specifically designed-- - To keep out Jews. - To keep persecuted Eastern European Jews out of the streets of the UK, and who was denounced as an anti-Semite by the entire British Jewish establishment. A decade later, all of a sudden-- - Changed his mind. - People change their minds.

But when the changing of the mind just coincidentally happens to coincide with the British imperial interest, I think perhaps the transformation is a little more superficial than he's being given credit for. It was clearly a British imperial venture, and if there had been no threat to the Suez Canal during World War I, regardless of what Balfour would have thought about the Jews and their contribution to history and their persecution and so on, there would have been no Balfour Declaration.

- Can I ask you real quick a question on that? Why did the British ever cap immigration then from Jews to that area at all? - Well, we're talking now about-- - '20s, '30s. - '19, '17. - Sure, but I'm saying that if the whole goal was just to be an imperialist project, there were terrorist attacks from Jewish-- - Yes, but I'll answer you.

- Yeah, in the '40s, yeah. - And we're talking now about 1917, and as I mentioned earlier, I don't think the British had a Jewish state in mind. That's why they used the term Jewish national home. I think what they wanted was a British protectorate, loyal to and dependent upon the British.

I think an outstanding review of British policy towards these issues during the Mandate has been done by Martin Bunton of the University of Victoria, and he basically makes the argument that once the British realized the mess they were in, certainly by the late '20s, early '30s, they recognized the mess they were in, the irreconcilable differences, and basically pursued a policy of just muddling on.

And muddling on in the context of British rule in Palestine, whose overall purpose was to serve for the development of Zionist institutions, Yeshuv's economy, and so on, meant, even if the British were not self-consciously doing this, preparing the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. I don't know if that answers your question.

- Except they did turn anti-Zionist in 1939. - Yes, of course. - And maintained that anti-- - They were being shot off by the Kurds. - And maintained that Zionist, no, no, before they were being shot off, but maintained that anti-Zionist posture until 1948. - Okay. - And if I may, just also one point.

You mentioned Haj Amin al-Husseini during, well, entirely legitimate. But what I would also point out is that you had a Zionist organization, the Lehi. - 300 people. - 300 people, one of whom happened to become an Israeli prime minister, an Israeli foreign minister, a speaker of Israeli parliament. - Maybe you should give his name.

- Yitzhak Shamir, proposing an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941. - Shamir proposed the-- - Shamir, well, no, the Lehi proposed. - Some people in the Lehi proposed-- - Of which Shamir was a prominent leader. - Yeah, but this is a red herring also. - No, no, okay, well, if he's a red herring, Haj Amin al-Husseini is a red whale.

I'm sorry. - The Lehi was an unimportant organization in the Yishuv. 300 people versus 30,000 belonged to the Haganah. So it was not a very important organization. It's true, before the Holocaust actually began, they wanted allies against the British, where they could find them. - We're talking 1941 here, not 1931.

- We're talking 1940. - '41, from what I recall. - 1940, they approached the German emissary in Istanbul or something. - In Ankara, yes. - And if I may, proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany on what the Lehi described as on the basis of shared ideological principles. - No, they didn't share ideological principles.

- Well, they said they did. - No, they didn't. - They did revile-- - Why are you doing these things? Of course they said it, you know the state, but you know what the statement said on the basis of a shared ideology. Why do you say no? - You think that the-- - Wait, wait, wait, the Lehi people were Nazis.

Is that what you're saying? - I'm saying that-- - Did you say that? No, are you saying that? Forget statements. You like to quote things. But were they Nazis? Were the Lehi Nazis? That's what I'm asking. - What did he say? - Some of them supported Stalin incidentally. - Did he say that the basis of the pact was their agreement on ideology?

- There wasn't any pact. They suggested, they proposed an agreement. - And what did the agreement say? - They wanted arms against the British. That's what they wanted. - What did the agreement say? - Khashamina Hosseini wanted also. That's what-- - No, no, but they didn't-- - Others in India-- - The Lehi people didn't work in Berlin helping the Nazi regime.

- I mean, it's what the IRA wanted also. - No, but this is what Khashamina Hosseini did. You know that he was an anti-Semite. You've probably read some of his works. - Yeah. - He wasn't just anti-British. - Yes, and-- - He was also anti-Semitic. - And-- - So he had a common ground with Hitler.

- I think-- - It's a simple fact. - I think we can agree. - Not every anti-Semite is a Hitlerite. I think we can-- - But that part-- - He literally worked with the Nazis to recruit people. He wasn't just a guy posting or-- - Yes, and he was an absolutely revolting, disgusting human being.

- This I'm happy to hear. - I have no-- - But the problem is you're saying-- - If you think-- - I don't believe that. - You're saying that Hosseini was his influence, you're saying the Mufti was-- - But I don't even understand of all the crimes you want to ascribe to the Palestinian people, trying to blame them directly, indirectly, indirectly, or indirectly three times to move for the Nazi Holocaust is completely lunatic.

- Hold on, wait, there's not a, he's not blaming them for the Holocaust. He's saying that from the perspective-- - No, no, no. - Wait, wait, wait, no. He's saying that from the perspective of Jews in the region, Palestinians would have been part of the region. That is exactly-- - That's not what he's saying.

You have not read him. - That is exactly what he said. - I've read him. - You've read him and you don't understand him. - You've read Wikipedia. - He says right here. - Believe me, I'm a lot more literate than you, Mr. Borrelli. - I'm gonna believe the guy that wrote the stuff.

- You read what Wikipedia says. - That's great. - I read Danny Morris. - And you don't even speak Hebrew and you call yourself an Israeli historian. We're all here on different grounds. - I just want, if I can just respond to-- - Well, no, no, I'm just saying that there were two tricks.

That's fine. There were two tricks that are being played here that I think is interesting. One is you guys claim that the Leahy was trying to forge an alliance with Nazi Germany because of a shared ideology. - That's what they said. - Yeah, but hold on. No, no, no, no, no, wait, wait, wait.

No, no, it's about what you said. You brought that up to imply that Zionism must be inexorably linked to-- - No, I'm sorry. - No, you're putting words in my mouth. - Okay, wait, well, then what was the purpose of saying that the Leahy claimed that they, the Leahy who were a small group of people that were reviled by many in Israel.

- Not many, by everybody practically. They were called terrorists. - So reviled. - The Zionist movement called them terrorists. - Yes, yes, and Shamir called himself a terrorist. They were so irrelevant that their leader ended up being kicked upstairs to the leader of the Israeli parliament. - That's Israeli parliament.

- To the Israeli, to Israeli foreign minister. - And Begin was also-- - Yes, you wanna characterize him as irrelevant as well? Go ahead. - No, no, no, characterize him as relevant or irrelevant based on what happens decades later. The timeline matters. - Well-- - The question is, what is the point of saying that the Leahy tried to forge an alliance-- - Why is, why is, why is-- - Relevant is bringing up the Mufti of Jerusalem and trying to blame the Holocaust indirectly.

- No, no, no, the Mufti was the leader of the Palestine Arab National Movement. The Leahy was 300 people. - And he had as much to do with the Nazi Holocaust as I did. - No, he recruited people for the SS. How can you get away from that? - No, he recruited soldiers-- - People for the SS.

- He recruited soldiers in the Balkans, mostly Kosovars, which was disgusting. I have no doubt about that. But he had one-- - He also wrote letters to foreign ministers-- - He got one sentence-- - Saying, "Don't let the Jews out." - I knew Rahul Hilberg. - Can I say, the Israeli foreign minister-- - I knew Rahul Hilberg.

- The Italian foreign minister-- - I knew Rahul Hilberg. - Received letters from Husseini during the Holocaust. - One sentence-- - "Don't let the Jews out, don't let the Jews out." I'm not saying he was a major architect of the Holocaust. - He wasn't even minor. - But if we're agreed-- - One sentence-- - If we're agreed that Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and actively sought their sponsorship, why is it irrelevant-- - And probably wanted the destruction of European Jewry.

- He probably wanted a lot of things. - Okay. - Okay? - If that's relevant, why is it irrelevant that a prime minister of Israel-- - Not prime minister. In 1941, he wasn't prime minister of Israel. He was a leader of a very small terrorist group. - So do you consider-- - The Nazis' terrorists by the mainstream of Zionism.

- Do you consider it irrelevant that many years ago, Mahmoud Abbas wrote a doctoral thesis, which is basically tantamount-- - It showed something about Mahmoud Abbas. - Okay, but-- - But I didn't bring it up. You're the one who's bringing it up. - Yes, but you consider that relevant-- - Belittling the Holocaust, that's what you're saying.

The president of the Palestinian National Authority belittled the Holocaust and it didn't happen, or only a few Jews died. - I think that's a fair characterization of Mahmoud Abbas. - But I didn't bring it up. - I brought it up. - Yeah. - Okay, because my question is, then why is Shamir's antecedency relevant?

- He was a terrorist leader of a very small marginal group. - Who became Israel-- - Khadjam Min al-Husseini was the head of the movement at the time. - Also, but the point I'm bringing-- - There's no comparison. - The point of bringing up Husseini's stuff wasn't to say that he was a great further of the Holocaust.

It's that he might have been a great further in the prevention of Jews fleeing to go to Palestine to escape the Holocaust. - Yes, but the point I make-- - That was the point. - And I explained why I think that's not an entirely accurate characterization, but then I wanted to make another point.

If it's legitimate to bring up his role during World War II, why is it illegitimate to bring up a man who would become Israel's Speaker of Parliament, Foreign Minister-- - 40 years hence, 40 years hence. - Why is it, and also-- - He was a young terrorist. - And was also responsible for the murder of the United Nations' first international envoy, Bernadotte, Foki Bernadotte.

Why is all that irrelevant? - I don't think anybody-- - I don't understand. - I think that the reason why he was brought up was because Jewish people in this time period would have viewed it as there was a prevention of Jews leaving Europe because of the Palestinians pressuring the British to put a curb that 75,000 immigration limit, yes.

But it's not about them furthering the Holocaust or being an architect, major or minor play in the Holocaust. - Well, actually-- - We use a major play in that region. So if you wanted to bring up-- - Actually, Eddie Morris made the specific claim that the Palestinians played an indirect role in the Holocaust.

- The indirect role would have been the prevention of people escaping from-- - Yes, and my response to that is, first of all, I disagree with that characterization. But second of all-- - How can you disagree with that? They prevented, they forced the British to prevent emigration of Jews from Europe and reaching safe shores in Palestine.

That's what they did. - Again, was-- - And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe at the time. - Was Palestine the only spot of land on earth? - Yes, basically that was the problem. The Jews couldn't emigrate anywhere else. - What about your great friends in Britain, the architects of the Balfour Declaration?

- By the late 1930s-- - What about the United States? - They weren't happy to take in Jews, and the Americans weren't happy to take in Jews. - And why are Palestinians, who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this, why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe and uniquely culpable?

- They were helping to close the only safe haven for Jews. That's all. - Oh, really, the United States wasn't a potential safe haven. - The only one was Palestine. - At the time-- - The United States had no room-- - No, it did have room. - From the Atlantic to the Pacific for Jews.

- It did have room, but it didn't want Jews. - So that wasn't the only safe haven. - This is something-- - But shouldn't you be focusing your anger and outrage? - America should be blamed for not letting Jews in during the '30s and '40s. - They are blamed, but nobody blames them for the Holocaust.

- Well, indirectly. - Indirectly. - I've never heard it said that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was indirectly responsible for the Holocaust. I never heard that. Now, maybe it's in Israeli literature because the Israelis have gone mad. Yes, your prime minister said the whole idea of the gas chambers came from the Mufti of Jerusalem.

- That's nonsense. - Yeah, but he said it-- - We all know that's nonsense. - But we also know that Netanyahu said it, correct? - Netanyahu says so many things which are absurd or simple lies. - And he happens to be the prime minister's longest-serving prime minister of Israel.

- I cannot be responsible for them. I cannot be responsible for them. - You're not responsible for them, but it is relevant that he's the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. - Unfortunately, it says something about the Israeli public. - Yes, and he gets selected, not despite saying such things, but because he says such things.

- His voters don't care about Khadim al-Husseini or Hitler. They know nothing about his voters. - You may well be right. - His base know nothing about anything, and he can say what he likes, and they'll say yes, or they don't care if he says these things. - You may well be right, but anyway, not to beat a dead horse, but I still don't understand.

- That's not beating a dead horse, you're right. - I'll just conclude by saying I don't understand why the Mufti of Jerusalem is relevant. - He is relevant, he is relevant. - But Yishak Shamir is not relevant. - Because Shamir wasn't the head of the national movement. He represented 100 or 200 or 300 gunmen who were considered terrorists by the Zionist movement at the time.

The fact that 30 years later, he becomes prime minister, that's the crux of history. - And his history is not-- - But Khadim al-Husseini was the head of the Palestine Arab National Movement at the time. - Anyway, I-- - What can you do? - We're speaking past each other.

- We're not, I'm talking facts. - Let's move to the modern day and we'll return to history, maybe '67 and other important moments, but let's look to today, in the recent months. October 7th, let me ask sort of a pointed question. Was October 7th attacks by Hamas on Israel genocidal?

Was it an act of ethnic cleansing? Just so we lay out the moral calculus that we are engaged in. I don't know, maybe you was-- - The problem with October 7th is this. The Hamas fighters who invaded southern Israel were sent, ordered to murder, rape, and do all the nasty things that they did, and they killed some 1,200 Israelis that day and abducted, as we know, something like 250 civilian, mostly civilians, also some soldiers, took them back to Gaza, dungeons in Gaza.

But they were motivated, not just by the words of their current leader in the Gaza Strip, but by their ideology, which is embedded in their charter from 1988, if I remember correctly. And that charter is genocidal. It says that the Jews must be eradicated, basically, from the land of Israel, from Palestine.

The Jews are described there as sons of apes and pigs. The Jews are a base people, killers of prophets, and they should not exist in Palestine. It doesn't say that they necessarily should be murdered all around the world, the Hamas charter, but certainly the Jews should be eliminated from Palestine.

And this is the driving ideology behind the massacre of the Jews on October 7th, which brought down on the Gaza Strip. And I think with the intention by the Hamas of the Israeli counter-offensive, 'cause they knew that that counter-offensive would result in many Palestinian dead because the Hamas fighters and their weaponry and so on were embedded in the population in Gaza.

And they hoped to benefit from this in the eyes of world public opinion, as Israel chased these Hamas people and their ammunition dumps and so on, and killed lots of Palestinian civilians in the process. All of this was understood by Sinwar, by the head of the Hamas, and he strived for that.

But initially, he wanted to kill as many Jews as he could in the border areas around the Gaza Strip. - I'll respond directly to the points you made, and then I'll leave it to Norm to bring in the historical context. That Hamas charter is from the '90s, I think.

- 1988. - 1988. So it's from the '80s. - Um, I think your characterization of that charter as antisemitic is indisputable. I think your characterization of that charter as genocidal is off the mark. - It's implicit. - And more importantly, that charter has been superseded by a new charter.

It in fact has been, well, there is a-- - There is no new charter. - There is a charter. - There is an explanation, a statement they made-- - 2018, a political statement. - In 2000 and something. - '18. - 2018. Supposedly clarifying things which are in the charter, but it doesn't actually step back from what the charter says.

Eliminate Israel, eliminate the Jews from the land of Israel. - And 2018, the Hamas charter, if we look at the current version of the charter-- - It's not a called-to-charter. - Whether you-- - You're calling it a charter. It wasn't. The only thing called-to-charter is what was issued in 1988 by Yassin himself.

- Anyway, it makes a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists in 2018. Now, you can choose to dismiss it, believe it, it's sincere, it's insincere, whatever. - Insincere is probably the right word. - Secondly, I'm really unfamiliar with fighters who consult these kinds of documents before they go on-- - No, they're brought up on this in their education system.

In the kindergarten, they're told, kill the Jews. They practice with make-believe guns and uniforms when they're five years old in the kindergartens of the Hamas in Gaza. - At the instruction of the Commissioner General of UNRWA, right? - I didn't say that. I said the Hamas has kindergartens and summer camps in which they train to kill Jews, children six and five and six.

- Secondly, you keep saying Jews, to which I would respond-- - They use the word Jews. - To which I would respond that Hamas does not have a record of deliberately targeting Jews who are not Israelis. And in fact, it also doesn't have a record of deliberately targeting either Jews or Israelis outside Israel and Palestine.

So all this talk of-- - Unlike the Hezbollah, which has targeted Jews outside-- - We're talking about October 7th in Hamas. If you'd also like to speak about Hezbollah, let's get to that separately, if you don't mind. So again, genocidal, well, if that term is going to be discussed, my first response would be, let's talk about potentially genocidal actions against Israelis rather than against Jews for the reasons that I just mentioned.

And again, I find this constant conflation of Jews-Israel-Zionism to be a bit disturbing. Secondly, I think there are quite a few indications in the factual record that raise serious questions about the accusations of the genocidal intent and genocidal practice of what happened on October 7th. And my final point would be, I don't think I should take your word for it.

I don't think you should take my word for it. I think what we need here is a proper, independent, international investigation. And the reason we need that-- - Of what? - Of genocide during this conflict, whether by Palestinians on October 7th or Israel thereafter. The reason that we need such an investigation is because Hamas is, there won't be any hearings on what Hamas did on October 7th at the International Court of Justice because the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide deals only with states and not with movements.

I think the International Criminal Court and specifically its current prosecutor, Karim Khan, lacks any and all credibility. He's been an absolute failure at his job. He's just been sitting on his backside for years on this file. And I think I would point out that Hamas has called for independent investigations of all these allegations.

Israel has categorically rejected any international investigation, of course fully supported by the United States. And I think what is required is to have credible investigations of these things because I don't think you're going to convince me, I don't think I'm going to convince you. And this is two people sitting across the table from each other.

- No, but there's certain things you don't even have to investigate. You know how many citizens, civilians died in the October 7th assault. - Yes, but that's not-- - You know that there are lots of allegations of rape. I don't know how persuaded you are of those. They did find bodies without heads, which is-- - There were no beheadings.

- Islamic, there were some beheadings apparently. - The Israelis didn't even claim that in the document they submitted before the ICJ. Go read what your government submitted. It never mentioned beheadings. - Well, as far as I know-- - I read it. - There were some people who were beheaded, but then-- - We could bring it up right now.

- You also denied that there were rapes there. - I didn't deny, I said I've not seen convincing evidence that confirms it. I've said that from day one, and I'll say it today four and a half months later. - Do you know that they killed eight or 900 civilians in the assault?

- Absolutely. That seems to me indisputable. - Oh, okay, well, I'm glad that you're questioning something. - I've said that, I've said that from day one. - Well, to be clear, you haven't. You did a debate, I don't remember the talk show, but you seem to imply that there was a lot of crossfire and that it might have been the IDF that had killed a lot of-- - I said that there is no question, because the names were published in Haaretz, there is no question that roughly of the 1,200 people killed, 800 of them were civilians.

I see-- - 850. - 850, fine. So I never said that, but then I said, no, we don't know exactly how they were killed, but 800 civilians killed, 850, no question there. And I also said, on repeated occasions, there cannot be any doubt, in my opinion, as of now, with the available evidence, that Hamas was responsible for significant atrocities, and I made sure to include the plural.

- There's a lot of tricky language being employed here. Do you think of the 800 of 50? - There's nothing tricky, it's called attaching value to words and not talking like a motor mouth. I am very careful about qualifying, because that's what language is about. - That's great, then let me just ask a clarifying question.

Do you firmly believe that the majority of the 850 civilians were killed by Hamas? - My view is, even if it were half, 400 is a huge number, by any reckoning. - Why? - Okay, wait, you didn't-- - I said, even if-- - Wait, wait, wait, wait. - Because Benny, because Professor Morris, I don't know, I agree with Muin Rabbani.

I'm not sure if he concedes the 400. I'll say-- - Why 400? - Because I have-- - Who ever thought up the 400? - Right, as I said-- - 800 of the 850 slaughtered by Hamas. - No, I don't know-- - It may be a couple of individuals were killed in this very action.

- I don't know. - You're saying from day one-- - Professor Morris. - You believe this particular thing-- - Professor Morris. - And you clearly don't. You clearly don't believe this thing. - I said from day one, I-- - You said people died. That's not controversial. - Wait, hold on, hold on.

- That's not controversial. - Mr. Bonnell, Mr. Bonnell, I attach value to words. - Yes, you've said that. If you value them, you talk about people so much. - Mr. Bonnell, please slow down the speech and attempt to listen. When I was explicitly asked by Piers Morgan, I said there can be no question that Hamas committed atrocities-- - I've heard this, yes.

- On October 7th. If you want me to pin down a number, I can't do that. - I didn't ask you to pin down a number. - You can listen to what I'm saying. - You didn't ask me? - No, my question is, I'll ask, I'll ask a very precise-- - Sorry, excuse me.

- It's a very, it's a very easy question. - If I understood your question correctly. - My question is, do you think the majority of the people that were killed on October 7th, the civilians, were killed by Hamas, or are we subscribing to the idea that the IDF killed hundreds, 400 or 500-- - No, but let me explain why that's a difficult question to answer.

The total number of civilians killed was 800, 850. We know that Hamas is responsible probably for the majority of those killings. We also know that there were killings by Islamic Jihad. We also know-- - Oh, we're bunching together the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas. That's splitting hairs now. - His question was specifically about-- - No, but he means, he means the raiders.

- I'm speaking in opposition to the conspiracy theory that people like, do you prefer Norm or Professor Frankelstein, or what do you, I don't know what your, how do you prefer to be addressed? - Well, it's not a conspiracy theory because it's-- - Well, the conspiracy theory is the idea that the IDF killed the majority of them.

- It's not a conspiracy theory. - And then there's also a theory that, as Norm pointed out on the show that he was on, that he thought that it was very strange that given how reputable Israeli services are when it comes to sending ambulances, retrieving bodies, he thought it was very strange that that number was continually being adjusted.

- And do you know why-- - So when you say that in combination with, well, I'm not sure how many were killed by Hamas-- - Well, do you know why the number, do you know why the number went down? The number went down because the Israeli authorities were in possession of 200 corpses that were burned to a crisp that they assumed were Israelis who had been killed on October 7th.

They later determined that these were, in fact, Palestinian fighters. Now, how does a Palestinian fighter get burned to a crisp? - No, you're mixing two things. Some of the bodies they weren't able to identify, and eventually they ruled that some of them were actually Arab marauders rather than Israeli victims.

Some, a few of them also, of the Jews, were burnt to a crisp, and it took them time to work this out, and they came out initially with a slightly higher figure, 1,400 dead, and eventually reduced it to 1,200 dead Israelis. - And the reason is that a proportion of Israeli civilians killed on October 7th, I don't believe it was a majority.

We don't know how many. Some were killed in crossfire. Some were killed by Israeli shell fire, helicopter fire, and so on, and the majority were killed by Palestinians, and of that majority, we don't know. I mean, again, I understood your question as referring specifically to Hamas, which is why I tried to answer it that way, but if you meant generically Palestinians, yes.

If you mean specifically Hamas, we don't have a clear breakdown of how many were-- - No, I don't mean specifically Hamas. - Okay. - But I just think when you use the word some, that's doing a lot of heavy lifting. - Who used some? - That's fine, but some can mean anywhere from 1% to 49%.

- But we don't know. - Who used some? - So the numbers here and the details are interesting and important, almost from a legal perspective, but if we zoom out the moral perspective, are Palestinians from Gaza justified in violent resistance? - Well, Palestinians have the right to resistance. Palestinian, that right includes the right to armed resistance.

At the same time, armed resistance is subject to the laws of war, and there are very clear regulations that separate legitimate acts of armed resistance from acts of armed resistance that are not legitimate. - And the attacks of October 7th, where did they land for you? - There's been almost exclusive focus on the attacks on civilian population centers and the killings of civilians on October 7th.

What is much less discussed to the point of amnesia is that there were very extensive attacks on Israeli military and intelligence facilities on October 7th. I would make a very clear distinction between those two. And secondly, I'm not sure that there was that I would characterize the efforts by Palestinians on October 7th to seize Israeli territory and Israeli population centers as in and of themselves illegitimate.

- You mean attacking Israeli civilians is legitimate? - No, no, no, that's not what I said. - I didn't understand what you said. - I think what you had on October 7th was an effort by Hamas to seize Israeli territory and population centers. - And kill civilians. - That's not what I said.

What I said is I think I would not describe the effort to seize Israeli territory as in and of itself illegitimate, as a separate issue from the killing of Israeli civilians where in those cases where they had been deliberately targeted. That's very clearly illegitimate. - Whole families were slaughtered in Kibbutz.

- But I'm making-- - But many of them left wingers, incidentally, who helped Palestinians go to hospitals in Israel and so on. - Again-- - Even drove Palestinian cancer patients to hospitals in Israeli-- - Again, I'm making a distinction here. - But you don't seem to be very condemnatory of what the Hamas did.

- Well, I don't do selective condemnation. - I'm not talking about selective. - I don't do selective outrage. - I'm talking about specific condemnation of this specific assault on civilians. - Well, you know what it is. - I would, for example, condemn Israeli assaults on civilians, deliberate assaults on civilians.

I would condemn them, but you're not doing that with the Hamas. - You know what the issue is? - What? - I've been speaking in public now, I would say since the late 1980s, and interviewed and so on. I have never on one occasion ever been asked to condemn any Israeli act.

When I've been in group discussions, those supporting the Israeli action or perspective, I have never encountered an example where these individuals are asked to condemn what Israel is doing. The demand and obligation of condemnation is exclusively applied, in my personal experience over decades, is exclusively applied to Palestinians. - No, this is not true.

Israel is condemned day and night on every television channel, and has been for the last decades. - I'm telling you about a personal experience lasting decades. - You said, quote, I'm trying to quote what you just said. - I shouldn't have said anything at any point. - You should say, Professor Morris.

- Yes. - You just said, I would condemn any time Israel deliberately attacks civilians, okay? The problem, Professor Morris, is over and over again, you claim in the face of overwhelming evidence that they didn't attack civilians. - That's not true, I've said Israel has attacked civilians. - Professor Morris.

- In Kyiv, Israel attacked civilians. - Right, right, right, Professor Morris. - And I've written extensively about it. - Okay, I know that. - In Qatar, Qasem, they killed civilians, and I've written about it. - And now let's-- - So you're just eliminating, you're selecting. - Okay. - As Steven says, you cherry-pick.

- If I were you-- - Before you do-- - You cherry-pick. - Okay, let's fast forward. When you were an adult, what did you say about the 1982 Lebanon War? - What did I say? - You don't remember? Okay, allow me. - Uh-oh. - Okay. - So, it happens that I was not at all by any, I had no interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict as a young man until the-- - This is true.

- Until the 1982 Lebanon War. - Yeah, you lost the passage. - I'll find it. - Okay, real quick, while he's searching for that-- - Yeah, allow me, that's good. - You bring up something that's really important that a lot of people don't draw a distinction between, in that there is just causes for war, and there is just ways to act within a war, and these two things, principally, do have a distinction from one another.

However, while I appreciate the recognition of the distinction, the idea that the cause for war that Hamas was engaged in, I don't believe, if we look at their actions in war or the statements that they've made, it doesn't seem like it had to do with territorial acquisition. - No, no, no, no, the point-- - Like taking land back.

- No, the point I was making was, what was Hamas trying to achieve militarily on October 7th? And I was pointing out that the focus has been very much on Hamas attacks on civilians and atrocities and so on, and I'm not saying those things should be ignored. What I'm saying is that what's getting lost in the shuffle is that there were extensive attacks on military and intelligence facilities, and as far as the, let's say, the other aspects are concerned, because I think either you or Lex asked me about the legitimacy of these attacks.

I said, I'm unclear whether efforts by Hamas to seize Israeli population centers in and of themselves are illegitimate, as opposed to actions that either deliberately targeted Israeli civilians, or actions that should reasonably have been expressed expected to result in the killings of Israeli civilians. Those strike me as, by definition, illegitimate, and I want to be very clear about that.

I have-- - Illegitimate means you condemn them. - Illegitimate means they are not legitimate. I have a problem-- - Condemning your side, yes. - No, not condemning my side. I have a problem with selective outrage, and I have a problem with selective condemnation, and as I explained to you a few minutes ago, in my decades of appearing in public and being interviewed, I have never seen, I've never been asked to condemn an Israeli action.

I've never been asked for a moral judgment on an Israeli action. Exclusive request for condemnation has to do with what Palestinians do, and just as importantly, I'm sure if you watch BBC or CNN, when is the last time an Israeli spokesperson has been asked to condemn an Israeli act?

I've never seen it. - I don't think we condemn the Arab side either, though, right? I don't think there was any condemnation. - No, but now that we're talking about Israeli victims, all of a sudden, morality is central. - Well, I think the reason why it comes up is because there's no shortage of international condemnation for Israel.

As Norm will point out a million times, that there are 50 billion UN resolutions, you've got Amnesty International, you've got multiple bodies of the UN, you've got now this case for the ICJ, so there's no question of if there's condemnation for Israel. - But sorry, if I can interrupt you, in 1948, the entire world stood behind the establishment of a Jewish state, and the entire world-- - No, no, except the Arab states and the Muslim states.

- Well-- - Not the entire world. - Okay, but I think you know what I mean by that. - The Western democracies, that's what you're saying. - Well, and then also, just my quick question-- - Western democracies supported the establishment of Israel. - My quick question was, you said that you believe that, this is a very short one, you don't have to, it's just, you think that there's an argument to be made that the people in Gaza, that Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whoever participated, had a just cause for war, maybe they didn't do it in the correct way, but they maybe had a just cause for war.

- I don't think there's a maybe there. The Palestinians-- - Okay, you think they absolutely had a just cause for war. Do you think that Israel has a just cause for Operation Swords of Iron? - No, of course not. - Okay. - All right. - You can say your quote.

- Okay, first of all, on this issue of double standards, which is the one that irks or irritates Muin, you said that you are not a person of double standards, unlike people like Muin. You hold high a single standard and you condemn deliberate Israeli attacks on-- - Civilians. - On civilians.

- When they occurred, yeah. - And I would say that's true for the period up till 1967, and I think it's accurate, your account of the first Intifada. There, it seems to me, you were in conformity with most mainstream accounts, and the case of the first Intifada, you also used, surprisingly, you used Arab human rights sources like Al-Haq, which I think Muin worked for during the first Intifada.

That's true. But then, something very strange happens. So let's illustrate it. - Wait, does something strange which happened is the Arabs rejected-- - Okay, wait. - Peace offers, that's what happened. - By accepting the Oslo Agreement. - Yeah. - By rejecting, he's talking about Camp David and Tata. - If we have time, I know the record very well, I'd be very happy to go through it with you, but let's get to those double standards.

So, this is what you have to say about Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. You said Israel was reluctant to harm civilians, sought to avoid casualties on both sides, and took care not to harm Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. You then went on to acknowledge the massive use of IDF firepower against civilians during the siege of Beirut, which traumatized Israeli society.

Morris quickly answers the caveat that Israel, quote, tried to pinpoint military targets, but inevitably many civilians were hit. That's your description of the Lebanon War. As I say, that's when I first got involved in the conflict. I am a voracious reader. I read everything on the Lebanon War. I would say there's not a single account of the Lebanon War in which the estimates are between 15 and 20,000 Palestinian Lebanese were killed, overwhelmingly civilians, the biggest bloodletting until the current Gaza genocide, biggest bloodletting.

I would say I can't think of a single mainstream account that remotely approximates what you just said. So leaving aside, I can name the books, voluminous, huge volumes. I'll just take one example. Now you will remember, 'cause I think you served in Lebanon in '82. Am I correct on that?

- Yeah. - Yeah. So you will remember that Dov Yarmia kept the war diary. So with your permission, allow me to describe what he wrote during his diary. So he writes, "The war machine of the IDF is galloping and trampling over the conquered territory, demonstrating a total insensitivity to the fate of the Arabs who are found in its path.

A PLO-run hospital suffered a direct hit. Thousands of refugees are returning to the city when they arrive at their homes, many of which have been destroyed or damaged. You hear their cries of pain and their howls over the deaths of their loved ones. The air is permeated with the smell of corpses.

Destruction and death are continuing." - Point made. - Does that-- - The point you're making, actually-- - Does that sound like your description of the Lebanon war? - Forget my descriptions. - Forget it? - The point you're making-- - Words are in print. We can't just forget them. - No, let me just finish my sentence.

The point you're making, which you somehow forget, is that there are Israelis who strongly criticize their own side and describe how Israelis are doing things which they regard as immoral. You don't find that on the Arab side. - I'm talking about you, Mr. Morris. I'm not talking about Dev Jarmiyahu.

I'm talking about you, the historian. How did you depict the Lebanon war? - 'Cause I believe that the Israeli military tried to avoid committing a civilian casualty. - So, Dev Jarmiyahu-- - And I think they've tried to do it in Gaza now. - All the attacks by Robert Fisk in Pity the Nation.

- Robert Fisk is an anti-Zionist journalist. - I know, I know. - Has always been. - So, that's why you can say with such confidence that you don't condemn deliberate Israeli attacks on civilians. - There weren't any. - Because there weren't any. - No, I didn't say there weren't any.

- Yeah, you didn't. - And you agreed that I have condemned Israeli attacks on civilians. - Yes, there are. - I never quarrel with facts. Your description of the 1982 war is so shocking, it makes my innards writhe. And then your description of the second intifada, your description of defensive shield.

- When the Arabs were bombing-- - They are worse, they were worse than apologetics. - When Arab suicide bombers were destroying Jews in masses in buses and in restaurants. That's the second intifada. - You remember that. - You can try-- - Suicide bombers in Jerusalem's buses and restaurants. - I am completely aware of that.

- Yes, you will. - But if you forgot the numbers. - I don't forget. - It was three to one. The number-- - They killed mostly armed Palestinian government. - That's what you say in your book. - That's what I say. That's what I say. - But that's not what Amnesty International said.

That's not what Human Rights Watch said. - I don't remember what they said. - I do. - No, no. - That's not what them. - I don't know whether their figures are right. - My figures are right. - Listen, listen. - In the second intifada-- - Professor Morris. - Some 4,000-- - Professor Morris.

- Palestinians were killed. - Professor Morris. - Most of them armed people and the Israelis-- - That's a complete-- - A thousand Israelis were killed. Almost all of them civilians. - Professor Morris, fantasy, but I'm not gonna argue with here. Here's a simple challenge. You said not to look at the camera.

- Sometimes. - Scares the people. I'll make the open challenge. - You are going to scare them. - No, Professor Morris. - Open challenge. The words are in print. I wrote 50 pages analyzing all of your work. I quote, some will say cherry pick, but I think accurately quote you.

Here's a simple challenge. Answer me in print. Answer what I wrote and show where I'm making things up. Answer me in print. - I'm not familiar. I'm sorry. - Okay. - I'm not familiar with what you wrote. - That's no problem. You're a busy man. You're an important historian.

You don't have to know everything that's in print, especially by modest publishers, but now you know. And so here's the public challenge. You answer and show where I cherry picked, where I misrepresented. - Send me the article. I will respond. - And then we can have a civil scholarly discussion.

- I'm not sure we will agree, even if I- - We don't have to agree. It's for the reader to decide, looking at both sides, where this truth stands. - No, and if I may ask, it's good to discuss ideas that are in the air now, as opposed to citing literature that was written in the past as much as possible, because listeners were not familiar with the literature.

So like whatever was written, just express it, condense the key idea, and then we can debate the ideas. - No, there are two aspects. There's a public debate, but there's also written words. - Yes, I'm just telling you that you, as an academic historian, put a lot of value in the written word, and I think it is valuable, but in this context- - He's incidentally not the only historian who puts value to words.

I also do, actually. - Yes, but in this- - More than just one or two sentences at a time. - But in this context, just for the educational purposes, teaching people- - The educational purpose is why would people commit what I have to acknowledge, because I am faithful to the facts, massive atrocities on October 7th.

Why did that happen? And I think that's the problem. The past is erased, and we suddenly went from 1948 to October 7th, 2023, and there is a problem there. - So first of all, you have complete freedom to backtrack, and we'll go there with you. Obviously, we can't cover every single year, every single event, but there's probably critical moments in time.

- Can I respond to something relating to that, the Lebanon War? I looked at the book that he got this from and what the quote was from. It sounds cold to say it, but war is tragic, and civilians die. There is no war that this has not happened in in the history of all of humankind.

The statement that Israel might take care not to target civilians is not incompatible with a diary entry from someone who said they saw civilians getting killed. I think that sometimes we do a lot of weird games when we talk about international humanitarian law or laws that govern conflict, where we say things like civilians dying is a war crime, or civilian homes or hospitals getting destroyed is necessarily a war crime, or is necessarily somebody intentionally targeting civilians without making distinctions between military targets or civilian ones.

I think that when we analyze different attacks or when we talk about the conduct of the military, I think it's important to understand, like, prospectively from the unit of analysis of the actual military committing the acts, what's happening and what are the decisions being made, rather than just saying, retrospectively, oh, well, a lot of civilians died, not very many military people died, comparatively speaking, so it must have been war crimes, especially when you've got another side, I'll fast forward to Hamas, that intentionally attempts to induce those same civilian numbers, because Hamas is guilty of any war crime that you would potentially accuse, and this is according to Amnesty International, people that Norm loves to cite, Hamas is guilty of all of these same war crimes, of them failing to take care of the civilian population, of them essentially utilizing human shields to try to fire rockets, free from attacks.

- Essentially. - Essentially, yes. I'm just saying that, essentially, as in terms of how international law defines it, not how Amnesty International defines it, but Amnesty International describes times of human shielding, but they don't actually apply the correct international legal standard. - You don't know what's the correct international law.

You haven't the course. - I absolutely know, Norm. - You haven't the course. - I absolutely do. - You can't find it on Wikipedia. - I'm just saying, believe it or not, Norm, the entire Geneva Convention is all on Wikipedia, it's a wonderful website. But I'm just saying that on the Hamas side, if there's an attempt to induce this type of military activity, attempt to induce civilian harm, that it's not just enough to say, well, here's a diary entry where a guy talks about how tragic these attacks are.

- I think the problem with your statement is that if you go back and listen to it, the first part of it is war is hell, civilians die. It's a fact of life. And you state that in a very factual matter. Then when you start talking about Hamas, all of a sudden you've discovered morality, and you've discovered condemnation, and you've discovered intent.

And you are, unfortunately, far from alone in this. I'll give you, you know who for me is a perfect example? - Well, wait, hold on. Just a second, we don't need examples. - No, go ahead. - The false equivalency of the two sides is astounding. When Hamas kills civilians in a surprise attack on October 7th, this isn't because they are attempting to target military targets and they happen to stumble into a giant festival of people that-- - Well, they did happen to stumble into it.

- They did, but-- - And they killed 300 people. - Yeah, but when they stumbled into it, that wasn't an issue of trying to figure out a military target or not. They weren't failing in distinction. There wasn't a proportionality assessment done. It was just to kill civilians. Even the Amnesty International in 2008 and in 2014, and even today will continue to say that it's like the types of attacks-- - I don't think you'll find anyone who will deny that Hamas has targeted civilians.

- Sure. - You gave the example of-- - But there's a difference because-- - Of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. I mean, facts are facts. - Sure. But I'm saying that the Hamas targeting of civilians is different than the incidental loss of life that occurs when Israel does-- - How, you know, genocide is the intentional mass murder.

- Genocide is an entirely separate claim. - Yeah, but the idea that Israel is not in the business of intentionally targeting civilians, I know that's what we're supposed to believe, but the historical record stands very clearly. - I don't believe it does. - You've written about it yourself. - Well, when you say historical, do you mean like in the '40s to the '60s, or do you mean like over the past like-- - I would say from the '30s of the last century to the '20s of this century.

I'd just like to make, you know, the way you characterized it, I think the best example of that I've come across during this specific conflict is John Kirby, the White House spokesman. I've named him Tears Tostarone for a very good reason. When he's talking about Palestinian civilian deaths, war is hell, you know, it's a fact of life, get used to it.

When he was confronted with Israeli civilian deaths on October 7th, he literally broke down in tears-- - But he understood that one is deliberate and one isn't. He understood that. - No, that's what he tried to make us understand. - No, no, he was speaking facts. The Hamas guys who attacked the kibbutzim, apart from the attacks on the military sites, when they attacked the kibbutzim, were out to kill civilians, and they killed family after family, house after house, the Israeli attacks on the Hamas installations-- - You know better.

- I don't know better. No, you don't know Israeli pilots, that's the problem. - Thank God. - You know, you don't know Israeli pilots. They believe that they are killing Hamasniks, they're given certain objectives-- - I'm sure they believe it, I'm sure they believe it. - And if the Hamas is hiding behind civilian, civilians die, it's as simple as that.

- Every time they target a kid, I'm sure they believe it's Hamas. - Yeah, when they killed the four kids on the-- - They believe it. - Yeah, I know they believe it. - Even though they were-- - You know that. - Diminutive size. - You know that. - Even though they were diminutive-- - In that angle, you don't see the size.

- No, they saw the size. - You don't see the size. - Let's leave it at that. - Oh, I know what he's quoting. You've lied about this particular instance in the past. Those kids weren't just on the beaches, as often stated in articles. Those kids were literally coming out of a previously identified Hamas compound that they had operated from.

They literally-- - Mr. Borelli, Mr. Borelli, with all due respect, with all due respect, you're such a fantastic moron. It's terrifying. That wharf was filled with journalists. There were tens scores of journalists. That was an old fisherman's shack. What are you talking about? It's so painful. - Hamas Naval-- - It's so painful to listen to this idiocy.

- And to be clear, on the other side, you're implying that a strike was okayed on the Israeli side, where they said, we're just gonna kill four Palestinian children today for no reason. - Do you believe that? - Do you believe that? Do you believe that? As you said, there was a hotel of journalists.

Do you think that they-- - Here we go, here we go. Here we go. - We'll never answer that question. - I will answer the question. - Pilots will out-kill four children. - And it was a proof, because that was a strike. That was a drone strike. So it was a proof all the way up the chain that we're gonna kill children today.

We're gonna kill Palestinian children today. - You want me to answer, or do you want your motor mouth to go? Okay, answer. In 2018, there was the Great March of Return in Gaza. By all reckonings of human rights organizations and journalists who were there, it was overwhelmingly nonviolent. - But organized by the Hamas.

- With whoever organized it. - It was organized by Satan. Let's start with that. - Yeah, Hamas. - Okay, Satan. I agree. Let's go for the big one. The big Megillah. It's Satan, okay? Overwhelmingly organized, overwhelmingly nonviolent. Resembled at the beginning, the first intifada. - They threw bombs here and there.

- Represent the first-- - They threw bombs here and there, yeah. - Okay, not bombs. But let's-- - They tried to make holes in the fence, obviously. - Let's continue. - Yeah. - So-- - But I'm not sure Israel behaved morally in that respect. - Okay, okay. - No, no, no.

- Okay, wait, wait, wait, wait. - I'm willing to grant you that. - Please, please. - I'm willing to grant you that. - Allow me to-- - You don't have to pursue it, 'cause I'm willing to grant-- - Allow me to finish. - I don't know anything about this, I'd like to-- - Okay.

So, as you know, along the Gaza perimeter, there was Israel's best-trained snipers, correct? - I don't know best-trained, they were snipers. - Fine. - Snipers. - Okay, all right? Because-- - The editorializing-- - Hey, laugh, it's hilarious. The story's so funny. - You're lying about-- - It's so funny.

- It's very much in turn had aspects of violence to it. - Okay, okay. - Look what even the UN says it themselves. - Okay, okay, okay. - But you only collect what the UN says that you like. - The problem, Mr. Morelli, is you don't know the English language.

You don't-- - I can read from the UN website itself. - If you dare, did I say-- - In regards to the Great March of Return, they said-- - Please stop with your idiotic-- - While the vast majority of protesters have acted in a peaceful manner-- - No, listen to what he's saying.

- During most protests, dozens have approached the fence-- - If you just agree with me, Mr. Morelli-- - Attempting to damage it-- - With burning fires-- - Did I say-- - With burning fires, throwing stones-- - Overwhelmingly non-violent-- - And Molotov cocktails towards Israeli forces-- - Okay. - Applying incendiary kites and balloons-- - All right, all right.

- Into Israeli territory. The latter resulted-- - Yeah, but-- - In extensive damage-- - Because you don't-- - To agricultural land-- - Okay. - And nature reserves-- - Okay. - Inside Israel-- - Okay. - And risk the lives-- - Yeah, because-- - Of Israeli civilians-- - Mr. Morelli-- - Some instances-- - Mr.

Morelli-- - Of shooting and throwing-- - Mr. Morelli-- - Of explosives-- - Yeah. - And also-- - Talk fast, talk fast. - I'm just trying to-- - So people think that you're coherent. - I'm just reading from the UN. - Okay, yeah, but you see-- - I know you like them-- - You got, you got-- - Sometimes, only when they-- - You got the months-- - Agree with you, though.

- You got the months wrong, you got the months wrong. We're talking about the beginning in March 30th, 2018. - You just described that March as mostly peaceful. - Okay, okay, allow me to finish. So there were the snipers, okay? Now, you find it so far-fetched, Israelis purposely, deliberately targeting civilians?

That's such a far-fetched idea. An overwhelmingly non-violent march. What did the international-- - It wasn't a march, it was a campaign-- - Yeah, whatever you wanna call it-- - Which went on for months. - Whatever you wanna call it. - For months. - Yeah. What did the UN investigation find?

- Well, he just read a few-- - It found... I read the report. I don't read things off of those machines. I read the report. What did it find? Brace yourself, you thought it was so funny, the idea of IDF targeting civilians. It found, go look this up on your machine.

I already know what you're gonna say. You're gonna say it found that only one or two of them were justified killings. - Targeted children. Targeted journalists, targeted medics, and here's the funniest one of all. It's so hilarious. They targeted disabled people who were 300 meters away from the fence and just standing by trees.

- If this is true, if what you're saying is true-- - If it's true. - By the way, just quick pause. I think everything was fascinating to listen to except the mention of hilarious. Nobody finds any of this hilarious. And if any of us are laughing, it's not at the suffering of civilians or suffering of anyone.

It's at the obvious joyful camaraderie in the room. So I'm enjoying it and also the joy of learning. So thank you. - Can we talk about the targeting civilian thing a little bit? I think there's like an important underlying, not necessarily that, I just, I think it's important to understand.

Yeah, I think it's important to understand that there's like three different things here that we need to think about. So one is a policy of killing civilians. Do we, so I would ask the other side, I'm gonna ask all three 'cause I know there won't be a short answer.

Do you think there is a policy top down from the IDF to target civilians? That's one thing. A second thing is-- - He said yes. - Yeah, sure, okay, yeah. That's fine, okay. But then the second thing is, or there's two distinctions I wanna draw between. I think Benny would say this.

I would say this. I'm sure undoubtedly there have been cases where IDF soldiers for no good reason have targeted and killed Palestinians that they should not have done, that would it be prosecutable as war crimes as defined by the Rome Statute-- - And some have been prosecuted. - Yeah, and I'm absolutely sure-- - According to you-- - Hold on, wait, wait, wait.

- Or practically none. - I'm sure, I'm sure, I'm sure. - According to you and your book, practically none. - I'm sure that we would all agree for soldiers if that happens. But I think that it's important, I think that it's important that when we talk about military strikes, or we talk about things especially involving bombings or drone attacks, these are things that are signed off by multiple different layers of command by multiple people involved in an operation, including intelligence gathering, including weaponeering, and there also have typically lawyers involved.

When you make the claim that an IDF soldier shot a Palestinian, those three people, the three hostages that came up with white flags and something horrible happened, I think that's a fair statement to make. And I think a lot of criticism is deserved. But when you make the statement that four children were killed by a strike, the claim that you're making-- - Deliberately, yeah.

- The claim that you're making, the claim that you're making is that multiple levels of the IDF signed off on just killing-- - I have no idea what-- - That's great, if you don't understand the process, then let me educate you. I can tell you, I do understand the process.

I'm telling you. I'm trying to explain to you right now. - You're in the IDF? - No, it's basic military. You can ask anybody that's talked about-- - Aside from Wikipedia, can you tell me what your knowledge of the IDF is? - Yes, you can talk to people, you can talk to people who work in the military.

- What's your knowledge of the IDF? - Your audience can look this up. Do you think that bombing and strikes are decided by one person in the field? Do you think one person-- - Can I respond to this? - Can I respond to this? - What he's trying to tell you is that strikes themselves have entire apparatuses that are designed to figure out how to strike and who to strike.

So when you say that four children are targeted, you're saying that a whole apparatus is trying to murder four Palestinian children. - You make my argument better than me. - Which is a ridiculous argument. - Or really, that it's impossible at the command level. It's impossible at the command level.

But you said that they couldn't have done it at the bottom if it weren't also at the top. - You don't understand the strength of the claim that you're making. You're saying that from a top-down level that lawyers, multiple commanders-- - With all due respect, Mr. Bernal, do not tell me what I don't understand.

- Or Palestinians. - It's true, it's true. I don't spend my nights on Wikipedia. I read books. I admit that as a signal-- - It's a waste of time. - Yeah, as I know, books are a waste of time. With all due regard, I completely respect the fact, and I'll say it on the air, as much as I find totally disgusting what's come of your politics, a lot of the books are excellent.

And I'll even tell you, because I'm not afraid of saying it, whenever I have to check on a basic fact, the equivalent of going to the Britannica, I go to your books. I know you got a lot of the facts right. - Benny Moore's books for the listener. - I would never say books are a waste of time, and it's regrettable to you that you got strapped with a partner who thinks that all the wisdom, all the wisdom-- - He didn't say they're a waste of time.

- I'd like to respond to what you were saying. I think the question that we're trying to answer, I think-- - I think you don't understand Israel, you know? - Let me finish, please. - Neither really understands Israel. - I think we're all-- - Now it works. - I think we're all agreed that Palestinians have deliberately targeted civilians.

Whether we're talking about Hamas and Islamic Jihad today, or previously-- - I prefer the word murdered and raped rather than targeted. Targeted is too soft for what the Hamas did. - I'm okay with that. - I'm not talking about-- - I'm talking about this now. - Yeah, but I'm trying to answer his question.

- Yeah, yeah, okay. - Historically, there is substantial evidence that Palestinians have targeted civilians. Whether it's been incidental or systematic is a different discussion. I don't want to get into that now. For some reason, there seems to be a huge debate about whether any Israeli has ever sunk so low as to target a civilian.

I don't-- - No, we've agreed, both said that-- - We just agreed-- - We've just said that this has happened here and there. - And I think-- - We've agreed on that. - I think-- - What we're saying is it's not policy, which is what you guys are implying, that they kill civilians deliberately.

- If I understand you correctly, you're basically making the claim that none of these attacks could have happened without going through an entire chain of command. - Strike cells that are involved in like drone attacks-- - Yes. - Or plane attacks or-- - My understanding of the Israeli military, and you could perhaps, you've served in it, you would know better.

It's actually a fairly chaotic organization. - No, no, that's not true, especially not the Air Force. It's extremely, extremely organized. The Air Force works in a very organized fashion, as he says, with lawyers, a chain of command, and ultimately the pilot drops the bomb where he's told to drop it.

- Was it an effective edge? Was that 200 strikes in like 60 seconds, I think? I think at the opening of protective edge? Like the, yeah, the coordination between-- - You're talking about 2008. - I think the protective edge was 2014, but I'm just saying that the coordination in the military is pretty tight.

- Well, my understanding of the Israeli military-- - It's very organized. - Is that it's quite chaotic, and there's also a lot of testimonies from Israel, but be that as it may. Okay, I'm prepared to accept both of your contentions, that it's a highly organized and disciplined force. Air Force, under any scenario, is going to be more organized than the other branches, and you're saying such a strike would have been inconceivable.

- Well, I'm not necessarily saying inconceivable. I'm just saying that like that would have required like murderous intent from somebody below. I don't think good evidence has been presented to say that that's the case. - Your basic claim is that it would be fair to assume that such a strike could have only been carried out with multiple levels of authorization and signing off.

Okay, let's accept that for the sake of argument. We have now seen incident after incident after incident after incident where entire families are vaporized in single strikes. Who is in the families? Who lives in the house? - Family members. - Inside? No, or next to the house. - Family members.

- In which these families are killed. - We have seen incident after- - Do you know that Hamasniks weren't in that house? Do you know that their ammunition dumps weren't in those houses? - Why do I have to prove a negative? - You are saying that they deliberately targeted families.

If Israel wanted to kill civilians in Gaza, they could have killed 500,000 by now with the number of strikes they've done. - And therefore- - And the fact that they've only killed a certain small number- - 30,000 is a small number. - Small number in proportion. - You consider 30,000 a small number.

- Small number in proportion over four months probably is an indication that it's targeted and that there are Hamas targets in these places. - So I've given- - 12,000 children is only. And if that's the case, why is it- - Did I use the word only? - Yeah, you said only.

Only. Though, Professor Maroz, here's a question for you. If we take every combat zone in the world for the past three years, every combat zone in the world- - In Vietnam, the Americans killed a million people. - I'm not talking about Vietnam. - Well, they could have killed 40 million.

- I wasn't, yeah, I was in the anti-war movement. So don't distract me- - The Americans killed a million people in Vietnam. - Fine, fine. And 30 million Russians were killed during World War II, so everything else is irrelevant. Okay. - Not everything's relevant. - Here's a question. - Stick to proportionality.

- Professor Maroz, here's a question, it's very perplexing. If you take every combat zone in the world for the past three years, and you multiply the number of children killed by four, every combat zone in the world, you get Gaza, okay? So when you say- - What is that supposed to prove?

- Okay, I'm gonna tell you- - Wait, wait, firstly, you're relying- - Just shut up. - You're relying on Hamas numbers. - No, I'm not relying- - Hamas numbers are not necessarily true. - I'm relying on the numbers that everybody else, I'm relying on the numbers- - Even though we take the numbers, though, what does that prove?

- Those are Hamas numbers. - Okay, okay, okay. - Which may not be true. - Fine, fine. - They could invent anything, 'cause you know that they are a mendacious organization. - I know mendacious, believe me. - You like words, mendacious. - Mendacious as in- - Mendacious organization. - The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Okay, so here's the thing. You say they could have killed 500,000, but they only killed only, that's your word. - I'm saying that- - They only killed 30,000. - If you believe that they deliberately target civilians, they would have killed many, many more. The fact is that they don't deliberately target civilians.

- Professor Morris, for a historian- - And you don't understand- - For a historian, I don't wanna understand Israeli society. If you wanna know the truth, I don't want to. I don't wanna get inside their heads. - That's the problem. - 90% of Israelis- - A good historian, a good historian tries to get into the heads of the various protagonists.

- There's a limit, there's a limit. When 90% of Israelis think that Israel's using enough or too little force in Gaza, I don't wanna get inside that head. 40% think that Israel's using insufficient force in Gaza. I don't wanna get inside that head. I don't wanna get inside the head of people who think they're using insufficient force- - Historians must understand.

- Against the population, against the population, half of which is children. I don't wanna get inside that head. But here's the point, because your partner wants to know the point. You don't understand political constraints. One of your ministers said, let's drop an atomic bomb on Gaza. - Do you think he really meant that?

- He said it through you. - No, no, no, no. It was said in a sort of a- - Professor Morris. - Questionable way. - He said it the day after. - He didn't say they should drop an atomic bomb. - Professor Morris. - He said it- - The day after the Israeli attack.

- I'm not supporting he's an idiot. - Professor Morris, none other- - This minister is a- - None other- - This minister is a messianic idiot. - None other than Israel's- - But he didn't say drop an atomic bomb on- - None other than Israel's chief historian, the famed, justifiably famed, Benny Morris, thinks we should be dropping nuclear weapons on Iran.

- Iran has for years, its leaders for years have said we should destroy Israel. You agree with that? They've said we should destroy Israel. Israel must be destroyed. Is that correct? This is what the Iranian leaders have been saying since Khomeini. - I would say Iranian leaders have sent mixed messages.

- Okay, okay, but some of them have said, including Khamenei and Khomeini. - If you don't know their evidence, if you don't know their evidence, why are you laughing? - This is like a skepticism, it's very funny. - It's funny because- - Iran doesn't support Hezbollah and the Houthis and Hamas even if they want Israel destroyed.

- Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. - Embrace yourself. - Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. - To the extent- - It's complicated. - That the Houthis are trying- - It's complicated. - To the extent that the Houthis are trying to stop the genocide in Gaza. - There is no genocide.

- I support- - There is no genocide. - I support- - They are the right- - I support- - To attack civilian ships. - I support- - I know you selectively- - I support the Houthis. - Support international law- - There's no genocide. - When it agrees with you.

- I support, okay. - And then when it doesn't, you decide to throw international law to the wind. - There's no genocide in Gaza. - If you like, if you like- - Hold on a second, Norm, Norm. - Let me read what you said. - Norm, Norm, stop, please.

Norm, just for me, please, just give me a second. You said that there's no genocide going on in Gaza. Let me ask that clear question. The same question I asked on the Hamas attacks. Is there, from a legal, philosophical, moral perspective, is there genocide going on in Gaza today?

- Is there a genocide going on in Gaza? Well, in several years, we will have a definitive response- - But at the moment- - To that question. What has happened thus far is that on the 29th of December, the Republic of South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel, pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

South Africa basically accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in the Gaza Strip. On the 26th of January, the court issued its initial ruling. The court, at this stage, is not making a determination on whether Israel has or has not committed genocide. So just as it has not found Israel guilty, it certainly also hasn't found Israel innocent.

What the court had to do at this stage was take one of two decisions. Either South Africa's case was the equivalent of a frivolous lawsuit and dismiss it and close the proceedings, or it had to determine that South Africa presented a plausible case that Israel was violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention, and that it would, on that basis, hold a full hearing.

Now, a lot of people have looked at the court's ruling of the 26th of January and focused on the fact that the court did not order a ceasefire. I actually wasn't expecting it to order a ceasefire, and I wasn't surprised that it didn't because in the other cases that the court has considered, most prominently Bosnia and Myanmar, it also didn't order a ceasefire.

And South Africa, in requesting a ceasefire, also didn't ask the court to render an opinion on the legitimacy or lack thereof of Israel's military operation. From my perspective, the key issue on the 26th of January was whether the court would simply dismiss the case or decide to proceed with it.

- And it decided to proceed. - And it decided to proceed. And I think that's enormously-- - I thought that was-- - I think that's enormously significant. - But you said they committed genocide. You already said they committed genocide. - I also-- - It's committing genocide. - But if I could just-- - Allow me, allow me-- - Use that word.

- That's correct. - Now-- - I don't run away from-- - No, you did say Israel is committing genocide. - Can you let Moyad finish? - Well, the end of the story is you specifically asked whether I think Israel is committing genocide. I explained formally there is no finding.

And as you said, we won't know for a number of years. And I think there's legitimate questions to be raised. I mean, in the Bosnia case, which I think all four of us would agree was clearly a case of genocide, the court determined-- - I mean, by the Serbs.

- Yes. And in the Bosnia case, the court determined that of all the evidence placed before them, only Srebrenica qualified as genocide. And all the other atrocities committed did not qualify as genocide. You know, international law is a developing organism. I don't know how the court is going to respond in this case.

So I wouldn't take it as a foregone conclusion how the court is going to respond. - But Norman has determined already. - I have too, because you're asking my personal opinion. - Personal opinion is also-- - So as a matter of law, I want to state very clearly, it has not been determined and won't be determined for several years.

Based on my observations and the evidence before me, I would say it's indisputable that Israel is engaged in a genocidal assault against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. - Which is the PLO line. - Yeah, with the program, the PLO is long past-- - Okay, the Palestinian Authority.

- As you were saying, genocide is not a body count. Genocide consists of two elements, the destruction of a people in whole or in part. So in other words, you can commit genocide by killing 30,000 people. It doesn't have, well, five probably is below the threshold. - There is a problem of numbers.

- Yes, but I think 30,000 crosses the threshold and not reaching 500,000 is probably relevant. And the second element is there has to be an intent. In other words-- - And you believe there's an intent? - Yes, I think if there is any other plausible reason for why all these people are being murdered, it's not genocide.

And as far as intent is-- - What about hiding behind a human shield? You don't think that's a reason for them being killed? - Well, let's get the intent part out of the way first. South Africa's-- - Forget South Africa, they're not the party. - Well, I'd like to finish.

- They're just pro-Hamas government. That's got nothing to do with anything. - I think they're pro-Satan as well last time I checked. - No, they're pro-Hamas. - You know, for some reason, you don't have a problem with people being pro-Israeli at the time of this. But if they support Palestinians' right to life or self-determination, they get demonized and delegitimized as pro-Hamas.

- Not because of that. Because they supported an organization which murdered 1,200 people deliberately. That's my problem. - They're supporting a state that has murdered 30,000. - But they haven't, because these 30,000 are basically human shields used by the Hamas, in which the Hamas wanted killed. They wanted them killed.

Hamas wanted these people killed. - If I could just get-- - You don't think they wanted them killed? - No, I don't. - They didn't provide them with shelters. They build tunnels for their fighters, but not one shelter for their own civilians. - You asked me about intent. - Of course they want them killed.

- Okay, you asked me about intent. And the reason that I bought in the South African application is because it is actually exceptionally detailed on intent by quoting numerous-- - All sorts of idiotic ministers in Israel. - Well, yeah, including the prime minister, the defense minister-- - I mean, the prime minister didn't say kill-- - The chief of staff-- - Didn't say genocide, the chief of staff-- - No, he said Amalek.

- According to Asa Kasher-- - He said Amalek. - Use the word Amalek-- - According to Asa Kasher-- - Because the Hamas are a really evil organization. - According to Asa Kasher-- - If I may. - According to Asa Kasher, the philosopher of the IDF-- - Asa Kasher, yeah.

- He said that Netanyahu was vowing genocide. Now he's an idiot? - So the point-- - He didn't say he's an idiot, but he just passed it. - So the reason I raised the South African application is twofold, Hamas or no Hamas. It's exceptionally detailed on the question of intent.

And secondly, when the International Court of Justice issues a ruling, individual justices have the right-- - Can give their own opinion. And I found the German one to be the most interesting on this specific question because he was basically saying that he didn't think South Africa presented a persuasive case.

But he said their section on intent was so overpowering that he felt he was left with no choice but to vote with the majority. So I think that answers the intent part of your question. - So for the ICJ case that South Africa's brought, I think there's a couple things that need to be mentioned.

One is, and I saw you two talk at length about this, the plausibility standard is incredibly low. The only thing we're looking for is a basic presentation of facts that make it conceivable, possible, that-- - Plausible. - Plausible, which legally this is obviously below criminal conviction, below-- - Yes, of course.

- Yeah, below-- - Think of it as an indictment. - Sure, possibly, maybe even at a lower level than even an indictment. So plausibility is an incredibly low standard, number one. Number two, if you actually go through and you read the complaint that South Africa filed, I would say that if you go through the quotes and you even follow through to the source of the quotes, the misrepresentation that South Africa does and their case about all of these horrendous quotes, in my opinion, borders on criminal.

- Well, 16 ICJ judges disagree. - That's fine if 16 ICJ judges disagree, but I'm gonna give-- - They must be awful incompetent. - You know, they could be, but-- - They must be, or even the American judge, she must have been awful incompetent if she was unable to see the misrepresentations that Mr.

Burnell, based on his Wikipedia entry, was able to find. - So this is based on the official ICJ report that was released? I'm not sure if you read the entire thing or not. - I read every aspect. - Okay, that's great. Did you go through and actually identify any of the sources for the underlying quotes?

- Actually, brace yourself for this, and Muin could confirm it. Yaniv Kogan, an Israeli, and Jamie Sternweiner, half-Israeli, they checked every single quote in the Hebrew original, and Yaniv Kogan, love the guy, he has terrifying powers of concentration, he checked every single quote. Is that correct, Muin? And Jamie checked every single quote in the English, in the context, and where there were any contextual questions, they told us.

- I think they found one? - Yeah, I think they found one. So I do not believe that those 15 judges, it was 15 to two. - 16 to two, I think. - They're 15 in the court plus two, so it's 17, so it's 15 to two. I don't think those 15 judges were incompetent, and I certainly don't believe the president of the court, an American, would allow herself to be duped.

- Okay, well, let me read it. - You might recall, Mr. Lebreau, Mr. Lebreau. - All right, let him read. - Sure, so this was taken from the South African complaint. There's tons of these, but so here's one. In the complaint for the ICJ, they said that on the 12th of October, 2023, President Isaac Herzog made clear that Israel was not distinguishing between militants and civilians in Gaza, stating in a press conference to foreign media in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, over one million of whom are children, quote, quote, "It's an entire nation out there "that is responsible.

"It is not true, this rhetoric about civilians "not aware, not involved." - I saw that. - It's absolutely not true, and we will fight until we break their backbone, end quote. If you actually go to the news article that they even state, they even link it in their complaint, the full context for the quote was, quote, "It is an entire nation out there "that is responsible.

"It's not true, this rhetoric about civilians "not being aware, not involved. "It's absolutely not true. "They could have risen up. "They could have fought against that evil regime, "which took over Gaza in a coup d'etat, "but we are at war. "We are defending our homes. "We are protecting our homes.

"That's the truth, and when a nation protects its home, "it fights, and we will fight "until we break their backbone." He acknowledged that many Gazans had nothing to do with Hamas, but was adamant that others did. Quote, "I agree there are many innocent Palestinians "who don't agree with this, "but you have a missile in your goddamn kitchen, "and you wanna shoot it at me.

"Am I allowed to defend myself? "We have to defend ourselves. "We have the right to do so." This is not the same as saying there's no distinction between militants and civilians in Gaza. His statement here is actually fully compliant with international law, to the letter, because if you are storing military supplies in civilian areas, these things become military targets, and you're allowed to do proportionality assessments afterwards.

So this is supposed to be one of many quotes that they've shown that is supposed to demonstrate genocidal intent, but it is very easily explained by military intent, or by a conflict between two parties. - I saw that press conference. - Wait, let me just say something. All of this talk is a bit irrelevant, because it may sound to the listeners that the court in The Hague has ruled that Israel is committing genocide.

- No, I think we-- - It hasn't, it hasn't. It's just going in the next few years to look at the whole subject. There has been no determination at all. And as Stephen says, some of the quotes are not exactly accurate quotes, or taken out of context. - Total discharacterization.

- Okay, it is correct, as Muin put it, that it'll be several years before the court makes a determination. - And my guess is that it will determine there was no genocide. - I don't know. - We can only-- - That's my guess. - I can't-- - Yes, no, I'm just giving you my guess.

- I can't predict. I got it all wrong, actually, as Muin will attest. I got it all wrong the first time. I never thought the American judge would vote in favor of plausibility. - So you admit that you were wrong? - Yeah, of course. I think I tell Muin twice a day, I was wrong about this, and I was wrong about that.

I'm not wrong about the facts. I try not to be, but my speculations, they can be wrong. Okay, leaving that aside. First of all, as Muin pointed out, there's a difference between the legal decision by the ruling and an independent judgment. Now, South Africa was not filing a frivolous case.

That was 84 pages. It was single-- - Even 84 pages can be pretty frivolous. - It takes an hour and a half to read. - It was not a massive case. - It was single-spaced, and it had literally hundreds of footnotes. - It can still be frivolous. - With, it's possible.

- Of course, but this one wasn't. - Yeah, I read the report. To tell you the truth, I followed very closely everything that's been happening to October 7th. I was mesmerized. I couldn't believe the comprehensiveness of that particular report. Number two, there are two quite respected judges, excuse me, there were two quite respected experts of international law sitting on the South African panel, John Dugard and Vaughan Lowe.

Vaughan Lowe, as you might know, he argued the war case in 2004 before the International Court of Justice. Now, they were not, they were alleging genocide, which in their view means the evidence in their minds, we're not yet at the court, the evidence in their minds compels the conclusion that genocide is being committed.

I am willing, because I happen to know Mr. Dugard personally and have corresponded with Vaughan Lowe, I've heard their claim, I've read the report, I would say they make a very strong case, but let's agree, plausible. Now, here's a question. If somebody qualifies for an Olympic team, let's say a regional person qualifies for an Olympic team, it doesn't mean they're going to be on the Olympic team, it doesn't mean they're going to win a gold medal, a silver medal, or a bronze medal.

- But they can swim, that's what you're saying. - No, I would say that's a very high bar. - You're saying they can swim. - To even qualify. - They can swim well enough to have a realistic prospect of winning a medal. - So, to even make it to plausible.

- That is not true. That is not what plausible means. It is absolutely not, you're dead wrong. - Mr. Borelli, please don't teach me about the English language. - So, the declaration of Judge Poincare says that the court is not asked in the present phase. The court is not asked at this present phase of the proceedings to determine whether South Africa's allegations of genocide are well-founded.

They're not well-founded. They're not even well-founded. The court is, you said that plausible was a high standard. It is absolutely not. It is a misrepresentation of the strength of the case against Israel, just like the majority of the quotes they have in this case are. And also, you said it was an extremely well-founded case.

They spend like one fourth of all of the quotations, some even pulled from the Goldstone Report, that actually deal with the intent part. Which is, by the way, I think you guys, I don't know if you use the phrase, the dolo specialis, that the intentional part of genocide. - I don't know that term.

- I think it's called dolo specialis. It's the most important part of genocide, which is proving the special, it is a highly special intent to commit genocide. It's possible that Israel could-- - That's mens reum. - No. The mens reum, yes, I understand the state of mind, but for genocide, there is, it's called dolo specialis, it's a highly special intent.

Did you read the case? It is a highly special intent to be convicted of genocide. Yes. - Please stop displaying your imbecility. - Okay, I'm sorry if you think the declaration of the judge is imbecile. - Don't put on public display that you're a moron. At least have the self-possession to shut up.

Did I read the case? - I'm comfortable putting my display on camera, you're comfortable putting yours in books, okay? - I read the case around four times. I read all of the majority opinion, the declarations. I read Aaron Barak's declaration. - Then why are you lying and saying plausibles are by standard?

- Because I said even reaching the benchmark of plausibility is a very high standard in the world. It's the equivalent of a regional player qualifying for an Olympics. It's still two steps removed. You may not be on the team and you may not get a medal, but to get qualified, which in this context is the equivalent of plausible, you must be doing something pretty horrible.

And as it happens-- - The court will rule on this. There was no genital. That's what the court will rule. Remember what I just told you. The court will rule-- - I don't expect to be even around when the court reaches its final decision. - Why? - Why? It'll take a long, long time.

- Two years, three years. - No, I don't think it'll take two or three years. - Bosnia, which was admittedly a special type of case because they were accusing Serbia of sponsoring the Bosnian Serbs. That took, I think, 17 years from 90-- - I assume they'll take two or three years.

- But the point you're making, so this is a legal-- - I'm saying that something horrible must be happening to even achieve-- - It is horrible. It's a war. - Yeah. - It's true, yes. - It's horrible. - They weren't rendering a ruling on the war. They were rendering a ruling on the genocide.

- And I think the suggestion-- - They said it was plausible. They also said it was plausible that Israel is committing a military operation as well. - Yeah, but I think the problem with your characterization is you're saying in so many words that South Africans basically only have to show up in court with a coherent statement.

- Right, that is correct. - In today's atmosphere, that's probably correct. - They needed to do a lot more. - Not much more. - They needed to persuade-- - The American judge? - In today's atmosphere-- - The American judge? - The American judge? - They needed to persuade-- - Judges go according to what the majority want to hear.

- Yeah, but they needed-- - That's why he's the president. - They needed to persuade the court that it was worth investing several years of their time in hearing this case. - They're probably well paid for it. - They're well paid whether they take this case or not. I mean, they have a full docket whether they accept or reject this case.

And I think, I don't think we should-- - Remember what I just said, they won't rule there was genocide. Remember what I said. - Also, I recommend people actually read the case and follow through a lot of the quotes, that they just don't show genocidal intent. - Mr. Perelli, brace yourself.

- The Israeli minister of finance on the 8th of October, 2023. This is taken from the ICJ. This is from South Africa submission. Bezalel Smotrik, I can't read this. Stated-- - Bezalel Smotrik. - There you go. Okay, at a meeting of the Israeli cabinet that quote, "We need to deal a blow that hasn't been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza," end quote.

But again, if you click through and you read the source, their own linked source, it says as per this own source, quote, "The powerful finance minister, settler leader Bezalel Smotrik," I can't pronounce his name, "Demanded at the cabinet meeting late Saturday that the army," quote, "Hit Hamas brutally and not take the matter of the captives into significant consideration," end quote.

Quote, "In war, as in war, you have to be brutal," end quote. He was quoted as saying, quote, "We need to deal a blow that hasn't been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza," end quote. You can't strip the quotation of Hamas, a entity that you have one with, and then-- - I think-- - There's genocidal intent.

- I think take down Gaza. - That's not genocidal intent. - Take down Gaza. - So when the Ukrainians say-- - Take down Gaza. - When the Ukrainians say we need to defeat Russia. - Take down Gaza. - That's not genocidal. - No. - When the Ukrainians say we need to defeat Russia, is that genocidal?

Do they mean killing all Russian citizens? - Professor Morris, here's another one. - It's ridiculous. - When the defense, yeah, ridiculous. - Yes, ridiculous. - The American judge-- - He also doesn't determine policy, but that's-- - The American judge, the American judge read-- - You are holding the American judge to, you know-- - Well, he was the president.

- Yes, he'll appeal his own authority when it agrees with him, and we won't deal with the actual facts of the matter, ever. - The American judge read several of the quotes. - Look at the American-- - Okay. - They may support today. They may support Trump. - Okay, look.

- It shows you how worthy American judges are. - Professor Morris, Professor Morris, without going too far afield, if you heard a statement by the defense minister, the defense minister said we are going to prevent any food, water, fuel, or electricity from entering Gaza. - Did he do that?

He wanted to make-- - Did Israel do that? - Okay, no, I'm wondering. - What he said-- - I'm asking you-- - Isn't Israeli government policy? - Yeah, but we're talking about statements now, intent. How would you interpret that? - After 1,200 of your citizens are murdered the way they were, I would expect extreme statements by lots of politicians.

- But you're-- - By lots of politicians. - But you don't accept extreme Palestinian-- - But that's not Israeli policy. - Wait, but you don't accept-- - What he said isn't Israeli policy. - But you don't believe-- - They let in water, they let in gas. - I'm sure-- - But you don't accept-- - Very true, very true.

- But you don't accept extreme Palestinian statements after they lost their entire country, not just 1,200 people. - That's a good point. No, no, it's a good point. On that, on that moment, brief moment of agreement, let's just take a quick pause. We need a smoke break, we need a water break, we need a bathroom break.

- Take down Gaza is not a genocide. - I don't know what it means. - To defeat Russia is a genocidal statement. - What does take down Gaza mean? - When we went to war with Iraq and we wanted to destroy Iraq, that was a genocidal statement. There's a reason why genocide is so, is such an importantly guarded concept and it's not to condemn every nation that goes to war.

- Mr. Panel. - Wait, you do know how to pronounce my name. Are you mispronouncing it intentionally? - I made you into an Italian all the time. - I'm so touched by your solicitude for international law. - You should try learning it sometime. It would help you sort out a lot of the civilian deaths.

- Unfortunately, 15 judges disagreed. - You could keep citing the judges. You should actually try reading the actual statements. - This is tiring. You've invited us to a tiring session. - Yeah, there you go. How are you guys doing? - Okay, okay. There are major things to discuss here, not just what some court is doing that I'm gonna judge in two years' time.

- Yes, okay. So what you just said is my whole, one of the reasons why I feel so strongly about this particular conflict is because there are really important things to discuss, but they will never be discussed. - They're not really discussed. - We're not gonna talk about like Area A, B, and C or what a transference of territory, instead we're gonna talk about apartheid.

We're not gonna talk about the differences in how do you conduct war in an urban environment where people use, we're just gonna talk about genocide. We're not gonna talk about what's a good solution for the Palestinians. We're just gonna say ethnic cleansing. - Is it possible to talk, be productive over the next two hours and talk about a solution?

- About solutions, I have no idea what to say. I mean, I don't see any solutions. You know, if you wanted a positive end to this discussion, which is what you said at the beginning, I can't contribute to that 'cause I'm pessimistic. I don't see any way forward here.

- But the lack of, the solution is easy. The reason why the solution is hard is because the histories and the myths are completely, there's a different factual record, right? - One of the things it'd be good to talk about solutions with the future is going back in all the times it has failed.

So every time-- - But even at that, we're probably not gonna agree. He's gonna say, you could write that, I can predict the whole line. He's gonna say from '93 to '99, he's gonna say Israel didn't adhere to the Oslo Accords ever. Settlement expansion continued, raids happened into the West Bank, that there was never a legitimate, that Netanyahu came in and violated the Y memorandum, the transparency, he's gonna say all of this, and he's not gonna bring up any of the Palestinian side.

And then for Camp David, he's gonna say that, yeah, that Arafat was trying, that the maps and the territorial exchange wasn't good enough, that they were asking Palestinians to make all the concessions, that Israel would've, yeah. - Well, lay it all out, lay it out. - You do fall quickly, you know?

- Yeah, I know, yeah. - Anyhow, my future book should interest you guys. - Oh, what are you working on? - No, not working on, it's actually going to come out. - Oh. - It deals with Israeli and Arab atrocities, war crimes, I call them, in the '48 war.

- Oh, really? - That's my new book, yeah. Just deals with that subject. - Is this, 'cause I know you've also talked about the closure of the archives and stuff. - Well, it's marginal, it deals with that as well, but they have tried to seal off documents which had already used and seen.

So now they don't let people see them, that's happened. But it's marginal in terms of its effect on-- - Were the British archives useful for you, for this new book? - Well, for this list, it's mostly Israeli archives. The British and the Americans and the UN did deal with these subjects, but not as well as Israeli documents.

- What's your casualty count for Deir Yassin? - It's about 100, I think there's agreement on that by Israelis and Arabs, 100, 105. - 'Cause before they were-- - They used to say 245 or 254, those were the figures the British and the Arabs and the Haganah agreed on at the beginning.

- Because the Red Cross, I think, was the one that first put out that number. - I don't remember, maybe it was, what's his name, Jacques Derainier, or maybe. Yeah, maybe he came up with that number. But it was just, they didn't count, they didn't count bodies. They just threw the number out, and everybody was happy to blame the Irgun and the Lehi for killing more Arabs than actually-- - Well, and they put it to good use as well.

- Well, they said that it helped precipitate more evacuations, so they were happy-- - I think Begin and his memoirs-- - Yeah, yeah, yeah, they also used that number, yeah. - So first of all, thank you for that heated discussion about the present. I would love to go back into history in a way that informs what we can look for by way of hope for the future.

So when has, in Israel and Palestine, have we been closest to something like a peace settlement? To something that, like where both sides would be happy and enable the flourishing of both peoples? - Well, from my knowledge of the 120 years or so of conflict, the closest I think the two sides have been to reaching some sort of settlement appears to have been in the year 2000, when Barack, and then subsequently Clinton, offered a two-state settlement to PLO, Palestinian Authority, chairman Yasser Arafat.

And Arafat seemed to waver. He didn't immediately reject what was being offered, but ultimately came down at the end of Camp David in July 2000, he came down against the proposals, and Clinton, who said he wouldn't blame him later, blamed Arafat for bringing down the summit. And not reaching a solution there.

But I think there on the table, certainly in the Clinton parameters of December 2000, which followed the proposals by Barack in July, the Palestinians were offered the best deal they're ever going to get from Israel, unless Israel is destroyed, and then there'll just be a Palestinian Arab state. But the best deal that Israel could ever offer them, they were offered, which essentially was 95% of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, half of the old city of Jerusalem, some sort of joint control of the Temple Mount, and the Gaza Strip, of course, in full, and the Palestinians said no to this deal.

And nobody really knows why Arafat said no, that is, some people think he was trying to hold out for slightly better terms. But my reading is that he was constitutionally, psychologically incapable of signing off on a two-state deal, meaning acceptance of the existence of a Jewish state. This was really the problem.

- Of Israel or of a Jewish state? - Of a Jewish state, the Jewish state of Israel. He wasn't willing to share Palestine with the Jews and put his name to that, I think he just couldn't do it. That's my reading. But some people say it was because the terms were insufficient and he was willing, but was waiting for slightly better terms.

I don't buy that, I don't think so. But other people disagree with me on this. - What do you think? - Well, just briefly, in response, Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993. I don't think, actually, that in 2000, 2001, a genuine resolution was on offer, because I think the maximum Israel was prepared to offer, admittedly more than it had been prepared to offer in the past, fell short of the minimum that the Palestinians considered to be a reasonable two-state settlement, bearing in mind that as of 1949, Israel controlled 78% of the British mandate of Palestine.

The Palestinians were seeking a stay on the remaining 22%, and this was apparently too much for Israel. My response to your question would be-- - Wait, wait, they were being offered something like 22 or 21%. - They were being offered, I think, less than a withdrawal to the 1967 borders with mutual and minor and reciprocal land swaps and the just resolution of-- - The refugee problem was one of the problems.

- Yes, you know, I worked for a number of years with International Crisis Group, and my boss at the time was Rob Malley, who was one of the American officials present at Camp David. - Was recently thrown out of the State Department or whatever. - The point I wanna make about Rob was, he wrote, I think, a very perceptive article in 2001 in the New York Review of Books.

I know that you and Ehud Barak have had a debate with him, but I think he gives a very compelling reason of why and how Camp David failed, but rather than going into that, I'll-- - He wrote that together with Hussein Ara. - Hussein Ara, yes, who was not at Camp David.

- Yes. - But in response to your question, I think there could have been a real possibility of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid-1970s in the wake of the 1973 October War. I'll recall that in 1971, Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans, stated, "If I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh "without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh," this is referring to the resort in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, "I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh "without peace." Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly, and I think it was in that context that had there been a joint U.S.-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories.

I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons, and ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided, for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace, and I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on.

So you ask when were we closest, and I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.

My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories, I would argue it's more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954, than was the British position in Ireland in 1916, than was the Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990.

And so, as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories remains realistic. I think the question that we now need to ask ourselves, it's one I'm certainly asking myself since October 7th, and looking at Israel's genocidal campaign, but also looking at larger questions, is it desirable?

Can you have peace with what increasingly appears to be an irrational, genocidal state that seeks to confront and resolve each and every political challenge with violence, and that reacts to its failure to achieve solutions to political challenges with violence by applying even more violence, that has an insatiable lust for Palestinian territory, that a genocidal apartheid state that seems increasingly incapable of even conceiving of peaceful coexistence with the other people on that land.

So I'm very pessimistic that a solution is possible. I look at, I grew up in Western Europe in the long shadow of the Second World War. I think we can all agree that there could have been no peace in Europe had certain regimes on that continent not been removed from power.

I look at Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, and I think we're all agreed that there could not have been peace in that region had the Khmer Rouge not been ousted. I look at Southern Africa during the 1990s, and I think we can all be agreed that had the white minority regimes that ruled Zimbabwe and South Africa not been dismantled, there could not have been peace in that region.

And although I think it's worth having a discussion, I do think it's now a legitimate question to ask, can there be peace without dismantling the Zionist regime? And I make a very clear distinction between the Israeli state and its institutions on the one hand, and the Israeli people, who I think regardless of our discussion about the history, I think you can now talk about an Israeli people and a people that have developed rights over time, and a formula for peaceful coexistence with them will need to be found, which is a separate matter from dismantling the Israeli state and its institutions.

And again, I haven't reached clear conclusions about this, except to say as a practical matter, I think a two-state settlement remains feasible, but I think there are very legitimate questions about its desirability, and about whether peace can be achieved in the Middle East with the persistence of an irrational, genocidal, apartheid regime, particularly because Israeli society is beginning to develop many extremely, extremely distasteful, supremacist, dehumanizing aspects that I think also stand in the way of coexistence that are being fed by this regime.

- So if you look back into history, when were we closest to peace, and do you draw any hope from any of them? - Um, I feel like in 2000, I feel like the deal that was present, at least at the end of the Taba summit, I think in terms of what Israel, I think had the appetite to give, and what the Palestinians would have gotten would have definitely been the most agreeable between the two parties.

I don't know if in '73, I'm not sure if the appetite would have ever been there for the Arab states to negotiate alongside the Palestinians. I know that in Jordan, there was no love for the Palestinians after 1970, after Black September. I know that Sadat had no love for the Palestinians due to their association with the Muslim Brotherhoods, attempted assassinations in Egypt.

- Sorry, which? PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood? - Sadat was upset because there were attempted assassinations by people in, oh no, an assassination. It was a personal friend of his, Yusuf al-Sibai, I can't pronounce that. He was assassinated in Cyprus by a Palestinian squad. - He was killed by the Abu Nidal organization, which was not part of the PLO.

- Admittedly, yeah, he says as much. Belongs to a center group, not the PLO directly, but I think that there was a history of the Palestinians sometimes fighting with their neighboring states that were hosting them if they weren't getting the political concessions they wanted. The assassination of the Jordanian king in '51 might be another example of that in Jordan.

It feels like over a long period of time, it feels like the Palestinians have been kind of told from the neighboring Arab states that if they just continue to enact violence, whether in Israel or abroad, that eventually a state will materialize somehow. I don't think it's gotten them any closer to a state.

If anything, I think it's taken them farther and farther and farther away from one. And I think as long as the hyperbolic language is continually employed internationally, the idea that Israel is committing a genocide, the idea that there is an apartheid, the idea that they live in a concentration camp, all of these words, I think, further the narrative for the Palestinians that Israel is an evil state that needs to be dismantled.

I mean, you said as much about the institution, at least, for the Zionist government. Israel's government is probably not going anywhere. All of the other surrounding Arab states have accepted that, or at least most of them down in the Gulf, Egypt and Jordan, have accepted that. The Palestinians need to accept it too.

The Israeli state or the state apparatus is not going anywhere. And at some point, they need to realize like, hey, we need a leader that's gonna come out and represent us, represent all of us, is willing to take political risks, is willing to negotiate some lasting peace for us.

And it's not gonna be the international community or some invocation of international law or some invocation of morality or justice that's going to extricate us from this conflict. It's gonna take some actual difficult political maneuvering on the ground. - Of accepting Israel. - Of accepting Israel, yeah. - Which they formally did in 1993.

- Which they formally did in 1993, yeah, but then no lasting peace came after that in 2000. - No, because 1993 was not a peace agreement. - Sure, the Oslo Accords weren't-- - Were an interim-- - Didn't have a final solution, of course. - Were an interim agreement. And Palestinians actually began clamoring for commencing the permanent status resolutions on schedule.

And the Israelis kept delaying them. In fact, they only began, I believe in '99, under American pressure on the Israelis. - I think you're being a bit one-sided. Both sides didn't fulfill the promise of Oslo and the steps needed for Oslo. There was Palestinian terrorism, which accompanied Israel's expansion of settlements and other things.

The two things fed each other and led to what happened in 2000, which was a breakdown of the talks altogether when the Palestinians said no. But I think there's, I don't agree incidentally with this definition of Israel or the Israeli state as apartheid, it's not. There is some sort of apartheid going on in the West Bank.

The Israeli regime itself is not an apartheid regime. That's just nonsense by any definition of apartheid, which-- - Well, by the formal definition, I think it qualifies. - No, it doesn't qualify. Apartheid is a race-based distinction between different segments of the population, and some of them don't have any representation at all, like the blacks in South Africa.

No rights at all. - That's not a requirement. - In Israel itself, the minority, the Arabs, do have representation, do have rights, and so on. I don't think Israel is also genocidal. I don't think it's been genocidal. It wasn't so in '48, it wasn't so in '67, and it hasn't been recently, in my view.

And talk about dismantling Israel, and that's what you're talking about, is, I think Stephen said it correctly, is counterproductive. It just pushes Israelis further away from willing to give Palestinians anything. - Please, Norm, tell me you have-- - Something optimistic to say. - Optimistic to say. - I, even though I agree, I've thought about it a lot, and I agree with Muin's analysis.

I'm not really in the business of punditry. I'd rather look at the historical record where I feel more comfortable, and I feel on terra firma. So I'd like to just go through that. I don't quite, I agree and I disagree with Muin on the '73 issue. After the 1973 war, it was clear that Israel was surprised by what happened during the war, and it took a big hit.

The estimates are, I don't know what numbers you use, but I hear between 2,000 and 3,000 Israeli soldiers were killed during the 1970s. - It was 2,500. - Yeah, 2,700. - Okay, so I got it right. I read different numbers. That's a very large number of Israelis who were killed.

There were moments at the beginning of the war where there was a fear that this might be it. - No, no, there wasn't, there wasn't, there wasn't. - No, the Israelis-- - This is nonsense. Everybody forgets Israel's atomic weaponry. - I know, but-- - So how could they have been defeated?

- Didn't Dayan talk about the collapse of the Third Temple? - He did, but it was hysterical and silly because Israel had atomic weapons. They wanted to stop the Syrians or the Egyptians. - But we're talking about perceptions here. I'm not saying, I can't tell you if he was hysterical or not.

- No, he was. For a day, he was hysterical. - I wasn't in the same room with him. - For a day, he was hysterical. - But I'm just saying, let's not bog down on that. The war is over, and when President Carter comes into power, Carter was an extremely smart guy, Jimmy Carter, extremely smart guy, and he was very fixed on details, extreme.

He was probably the most impressive of modern American presidents, in my opinion, by a wide margin. And he was determined to resolve the conflict on a big scale, on the Arab-Israeli scale. On the Palestinian issue, he wouldn't go past what he called a Palestinian homeland. He wouldn't accept-- - Palestinian national home.

- On the Palestinian national home, he wouldn't go as far as a Palestinian state. I'm not going to go into the details of that. I don't think realistically, given the political balance of forces, that was going to happen, but that's a separate issue. Let's get to the issue at hand, namely, what is the obstacle, or what has been the obstacle since the early 1970s.

Since roughly 1974, the Palestinians have accepted the two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. Now, as it got, as more pressure was exerted on Israel, because the Palestinians seemed reasonable, the Israelis, to quote the Israeli political scientist, Avner Yaniv, he's since passed from the scene, he said, Yaniv in his book, "Dilemmas of Security," he said that the big Israeli fear was what he called the Palestinian peace offensive.

That was their worry, that the Palestinians were becoming too moderate. And unless you understand that, you can't understand the June 1982 Lebanon War. The purpose of the June 1982 Lebanon War was to liquidate the PLO in Southern Lebanon, because they were too moderate, the Palestinian peace offensive. I'm going to have to fast forward.

There are many events. There was the first Intifada, then there's the Oslo Accord, and let's now go to the heart of the issue, namely, the 2000-2001 negotiations. Well, the negotiations are divided into three parts for the sake of listeners. There's Camp David in July 2000, there are the Clinton parameters in December 2000, and then there are negotiations in Taba in Egypt, Taba in Egypt in 2001.

Those are the three phases. Now, I have studied the record probably to the point of insanity, because there are so many details you have to master. - I'll vouch for that, the insanity part. - Actually, I will vouch for it. I will personally vouch for it. There is one extensive record from that whole period from 2000 to, you could say, 2007, and that is what came to be called the Palestine Papers, which are about 15,000 pages of all the records of the negotiations.

I have read through all of them, every single page, and this is what I find. If you look at Shlomo Ben-Ami's book, which I have with me, "Prophets Without Honor," it's his last book, he says going into Camp David, that means July, going into Camp David, July 2000, he said the Israelis were willing to return about, not return, but will withdraw from 90, relinquish, 92% of the West Bank.

- Ben-Ami was at Camp David. - Yeah, Ben-Ami, he was at Taba. Oh yeah, he was also at Camp David. They wanted, Israel wanted to keep all the major settlement blocks. It wanted to keep roughly 8% of the West Bank, they were allowing for, you put it at 84 to 90% in your books, they put it at roughly 92%.

Israel was willing to give up. - It also depends how you calculate. - Yeah, that was another issue. - It also depends what stage of Camp David, 'cause there were two weeks. - Yeah, I'll get to that. - Proposals changed during those two weeks. - So Israel wants to keep all the major settlement blocks.

- Means the border area of the West Bank. - Well, not the border, we have Ariel, we have Maale Adumim, we have as Condoleezza Rice called Ariel, she said it was a dagger into the heart of the West Bank. So they want to keep 8% of the land, they want to keep the settlement blocks, they want to keep 80% of the settlers, they will not budge an inch on the question of refugees.

To quote Ehud Barak in the article he co-authored with you in the New York Review of Books, we will accept, and I think the quote's accurate, no moral, legal, or historical responsibility for what happened to the refugees. So forget about even allowing refugees to return, we accept no moral, legal, or historical responsibility for the refugees.

And on Jerusalem, they wanted to keep large parts of Jerusalem. Now, how do we judge who is reasonable and who is not? Ben-Ami says, "I think the Israeli offer was reasonable." That's how he sees it. But what is the standard of reasonable? My standard is, what does international law say?

International law says the settlements are illegal. Israel wants to keep all the settlement blocks. 15 judges, all 15, in the Wu decision in 2004, in July 2004, all 15 judges, including the American judge Bergenthal, ruled the settlements are illegal under international law. They want to keep 80% of the settlers.

Under international law, all the settlers are illegal in the West Bank. They want to keep large parts of East Jerusalem. But under international law, East Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory. That's what the international-- - No, not Palestinian, because there was no Palestine. - Okay, under-- - There's never been a Palestinian state.

How could it be Palestinian? - I listened patiently to you. - Sorry. - Under international law, if you read the decision, all territory, the 2004 war decision, all territory beyond the Green Line, which includes East Jerusalem, is occupied Palestinian territory. - Except in the Golan Heights. - The designated unit, according to the International Court of Justice, the designated unit for Palestinian self-determination.

And they deny any right whatsoever on the right of return. The maximum, I don't want to go into the details now, the maximum formal offer was by Ehud Omar in 2008. He offered 5,000 refugees could return under what was called family reunification, 5,000 in the course of five years, and no recognition of any Israeli responsibility.

So if you use as the baseline what the UN General Assembly has said and what the International Court of Justice has said, if you use that baseline, international law, by that baseline, all the concessions came from the Palestinian side. Every single concession came from the Palestinian side. None came from the Israeli side.

They may have accepted less than what they wanted, but it was still beyond what international law allocated to them. Now, you say-- - Allocated to the Palestinians. - Allocated to the Palestinians, yes. Thank you for the clarification. Now, about Arafat, like the mufti, never liked the guy. I think that was one of the only disagreements Muin and I had when Arafat passed.

You were a little sentimental, I was not. Never liked the guy. But politics, you don't have to like the guy. There was no question, nobody argues it, that whenever the negotiations started up, the Palestinians just kept saying the same things. - No. - No. - They kept saying no.

- No. Professor Morris, with due respect, incorrect. They kept saying international legitimacy, international law, UN resolutions. They said, "We already gave you what the law required. "We gave that in 1988, November 1988, "and then ratified again at Oslo in 1993." And they said, "Now we want "what was promised us under international law." And that was the one point where everybody on the other side agreed.

Clinton, "Don't talk to me about international law." Livni, during the Omar administration, she said, "I studied international law. "I don't believe in international law." Every single member on the other side, they didn't want to hear from international law. And to my thinking, that that is the only reasonable baseline for trying to resolve the conflict and Israel has, along with the U.S.

- When has international law been relevant to any conflict, basically, in the world? - Hey, that's why-- - Over the last 150 years. - That's why the Palestinians have to recognize Israel because that's international law. - No, but international laws are meaningless. - That was UN resolution 242. - Conflicts are not solved by international law or in accordance with international law.

- Yeah, but then, Professor Morris, for argument's sake, let's agree on that. Strictly for argument's sake, what's the alternative? Dennis Ross said, "We're going to decide who gets what "on the basis of needs." So he says, "Israel needs this, Israel needs that, "Israel needs that." Dennis Ross decided to be the philosopher king.

He's going to decide on the basis of needs. Well, if you asked me, since Gaza's one of the densest places on Earth, it needs-- - Tel Aviv. - Yes, it needs-- - It needs part of Sinai. - It needs a nice big chunk-- - Of Sinai. - Well, not Sinai.

- That's what it actually needs. - Okay, I don't even wanna go there. It needs a nice big chunk, but I have to accept international law says no, okay? - International law is irrelevant. - Now, Ben-Ami says, "I think the Israeli offer "was reasonable." Okay, that's-- - And he's a reasonable guy.

- That's it. - You know that. - Even though, okay, I don't wanna go there. I've debated him and partly agree with you. But who decides what's reasonable? I think the international community in its political incarnation, the General Assembly, the Security Council, all those UN Security Council resolutions saying the settlements are illegal, annexation of East Jerusalem is null and void, and the International Court of Justice.

That, to me, is a reasonable standard, and by that standard, the Palestinians were asked to make concessions, which I consider unreasonable, or the international community considers unreasonable. - I think that the issue is when you apply international law or international standards, I wouldn't say what Benny Morris says that they're irrelevant, but I think that these have to be seen as informing the conversation.

I don't think these are the final shape of the conversation. I don't think historically Israel has ever negotiated within the strict bounds of whether we're talking Resolution 242, whether we're talking about any General Assembly resolutions. That's just not how these negotiations tend to go. You might consider international opinion on things, but at the end of the day, it's the bilateral negotiations, oftentimes historically started in secret, independent of the international community, that end up shaping what the final agreements look like.

I think the issue with this broad appeal to international law is, again, going back to my earlier point about all of the euphemistic words, all it simply does is drive Palestinian expectations up to a level that is never going to be satisfied. For instance, you can throw that ICJ opinion all you want.

It was an advisory opinion. That came in 2004. Have Palestinians gained more or less land since that 2004 advisory opinion was issued? - So what would your standard be then? Both sides have to have a delegation that confronts each other, and they assess the realistic conditions on the ground, and they try to figure out, within the confines of international law, and then what both sides are reasonable for.

But for instance, this statement of full retreat from the West Bank, what is it, 400,000 settlers? How many settlers live in the West Bank now? - Probably half a million. - Yeah, you're gonna-- - Depends if you include the Jerusalem suburbs or not. - Four or 500,000 people are never-- - I think it's 700,000.

- With the Jerusalem suburbs, perhaps. - Sure. - It is now called-- - Half a million people are-- - Jerusalem, not settlements. - I know that, but that's not what the law. The law calls it null and void. - Let me just-- - We can say whatever we want until we're blue in the face, but like there's half a million Israeli people are not being expelled from the West Bank.

- My response, you're basically saying, if I understand correctly, there's only one way to resolve this, and that is through direct bilateral negotiations. - Probably, yeah. - Okay, so-- - Or ideally, but-- - I've taken over your house, okay? You're not gonna go to the police because the law is only of limited value.

So you come over and sit in what is now my living room that used to be your living room, and we negotiate. The problem there is that you're not gonna get anything unless I agree to it, and standards and norms and law and all the rest of it be damned.

So you need to take into account that when you're advocating bilateral negotiations that effectively that gives each of the parties veto power. And in the current circumstances, the Palestinians have already recognized Israel. They have-- - You keep bringing that up like it's a significant concession. - It's not true, it's not true.

- And even if-- - It's not even true. - It doesn't, but it doesn't, the recognition from Palestine isn't doing anything for-- - Hamas totally rejects-- - I'm not talking about Hamas. - Hamas is the majority among the Palestinian people. They won the elections in 2006. Every opinion-- - They won a majority of the seats.

- Yes, exactly. - They didn't win a majority of the votes. - Every opinion poll today says the majority of Palestinians support the Hamas. - That sounds right. - The Hamas absolutely rejects Israel. So if Arafat, in 1993 or whatever, issued a sort of recognition of Israel-- - It wasn't a sort of recognition.

- Okay, a recognition of Israel, it's meaningless. It's meaningless. - It's meaningless. - And anyhow, I don't believe that Arafat was sincere about it. - Does it matter what you or I think about what you felt? - No, most Israelis do and that does matter. - Okay, so-- - That does matter.

But Hamas says no and Hamas is the majority-- - So for years, the Israeli and U.S. demand was that the Palestinians recognize 24238. They did, but you're saying, okay, we demanded that they do this, but it was meaningless when they did it. Then the demand was that-- - It was a tactical thing, yes.

- Then the demand was that the PLO recognize Israel. - Tactical. They demanded that they did this and they did it, but it's meaningless. - And they never changed their charter, the PLO. You may remember that. - In fact, in 19-- - They supposedly abrogated the old charter, but never came up with a new one.

- No, but-- - So there was no new charter. - But in 1996-- - And Farouk Haddoumi said, of course, the old charter is still in force. - Yes, yes. But the point is, the Palestinians, demands are constantly made of them. And when they-- - And of Israel. - And when they accede to those demands, they're then told, actually, what you did is meaningless.

So here's a new set of demands. I mean, you know, it's like a hamster. - There's no new set of demands. - It's like a hamster. - Let me, let me-- - It's like a hamster stuck in a wheel. - Let me tell you what the bottom line is.

- That will be told, if you run fast enough, you'll get out of the cage. - No, no. The bottom line is that Israel would like a Palestinian Sadat. It wants the Palestinians-- Listen, listen, just let me finish. - This is really a worst-case scenario you're talking about now.

- Okay, let me just, yeah, 'cause they shot Sadat. But anyhow, the Israelis want-- - For good reason? - Want the Palestinians. Israelis want the Palestinians to actually accept the legitimacy of the state of Israel and the Zionist project, and then live side-by-side with them in two states. That's what the Israelis-- I don't even know if it's true.

- And what is the formal position-- - I don't even know if that's true today. - And what is the formal position of this Israeli government? - No, no, I'm saying I don't know if it exists today. - Okay, it's predecessor, and it's predecessor, and it's predecessor. Come on.

- That's what Israelis want. They want a change of psyche among the Palestinians. - Muin has an interesting-- - And if that doesn't happen, there won't be a Palestinian state. - Muin, Muin has an interesting point. - Forget international law. - Because I found, I found, I know you want to forget it, just like you want to forget the genocide charge.

I know you want to forget that. - Well, the Palestinians want to forget it, too, and it doesn't suit them as well, right? - Okay, but here's the problem, and it's exactly the problem that Muin just brought up. Now, I read carefully your book, "One State, Two States." With all due respect, absolutely a disgrace.

Coming from you, coming from you-- - Most reviewers didn't agree with you, though. - Yeah, coming from you was like you wrote it in your sleep. It's nothing compared to what you wrote before. I don't know why you did it. In my opinion, you ruined your reputation. Not totally, but you undermined it with that book.

But let's get to the issue that Muin wrote. Here's what you said. You said, formally, you said, "Yes, it's true. "The Palestinians recognize Israel." But then you said, "Viscerally, in their hearts, "they didn't really recognize Israel." So I thought to myself, how does Professor Morrison know what's in the hearts of Palestinians?

I don't know. I was surprised, as a historian, you would be talking about what's lurking in the hearts of Palestinians. But then you said something which was really interesting. You said, "Even if in their hearts they accepted Israel," you said, quote, "Rationally, they could never accept Israel "because they got nothing.

"They had this beautiful Palestine, "and now they're reduced to just a few pieces, "a few parcels of land." - So they will never accept it. - So yes, so you said there's no way they can accept it. - No, I would say that as well. The two-state solution, as proposed, doesn't make any sense.

- Exactly as Muin said, you keep moving the goalposts until we reach the point where we realize, according to Benny Morris, there can't be a solution. So why don't you just say that outright? Why don't you say it outright, that according to you, the Palestinians can never be reasonable?

Because according to you-- - They want all of Palestine. - According to you, they couldn't possibly agree to a two-state settlement because it's such a lousy settlement. - 'Cause they want all of Palestine. - But you said, "Rationally, they couldn't accept it." Not their feelings. - It's both. - You said, "Rational." You went from formally, viscerally, rationally.

So now we're reaching the point where according to Benny Morris, the Palestinians can't be reasonable because reasonably, they have to reject two states. - They want all of Palestine. - So Muin is absolutely correct. There's no way to resolve the problem according to your logic. - They want all of Palestine.

He said that himself. He said they should dismantle Israel. That's what he's saying. - I'm talking about-- - What I said. - You didn't say that. - Dismantle Israel. - What I said, and I've written-- - I'm glad you didn't deny it. - I've written extensively on this issue, on why a two-state settlement is still feasible.

And I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart, you can see that I was just bullshitting but that's what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago. And just as a matter of historical record, beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate within the Palestinian National Movement about whether to accept or reject.

And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine. There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority on Palestinian soil, which they saw as the beginning-- - As a springboard. - As a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine.

And there was a third school that believed that under current dynamics and so on, that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our friend and correspondent, Gauter Loerse, has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO, already in 1976, came out in open support of a two-state resolution at the Security Council.

PLO accepted it. Israel, of course, rejected it. But the resolution didn't pass because the U.S. and the U.K. vetoed it. It was both of them. - I think it was nine to five. - Ah, okay, yeah. But the fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept a two-state settlement.

Why they did it, I think, is irrelevant. And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement. The reason, I think, and I think, Norm, you've written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get.

If his intention had been, I'm not accepting Israel, I simply want to springboard, he would have accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho. But he didn't. He insisted-- - That's something I've never understood. He should have logically accepted the springboard and then from there launched his next statement. - No, he understood what you don't understand.

He understood that international law would put a real constraint on him. - No, but also-- - Once he accepted, it was over. - I think constitutionally, he was incapable of signing. - Well, I don't know that. If that's-- - You're right. - I'm not his analyst. - He should have accepted it.

- But if you're correct, okay, that he was really out to-- - Eliminate Israel. - Eliminate Israel, then he wouldn't have cared about the borders. He wouldn't have cared about what the thing said about refugees. He would have gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose.

But I think it was precisely because he recognized that he was not negotiating for a springboard. He was negotiating permanent status that he was such a stickler about the details. The second-- - Just as a factual matter, he wasn't such a stickler. When they asked him how many refugees, the numbers-- - It was a principle rather than the numbers.

- It was the principle. - He said I would be pragmatic about it. - Yes, and the numbers that were used at Annapolis were between 100 and 250,000 refugees over 10 years. That was the number. Arafat, when he was asked at Camp David, he kept saying, "I care about the Lebanese, "the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon," which came to about 300,000.

- It was a risk priority. - Which was a large concession from, whether you accept the number or not, that he wasn't talking about six million. He was talking about between 100 and 250,000 over 10 years. Now, the best offer that came from the Palestinians, excuse me, the best offer that came from Israel was the Olmert offer.

- Can we just pretend like we didn't all lay out the exceptionally pessimistic view of a two-state, hold on a second, two-state solution. Let's pretend that in five years, in 10 years, a two-state peace settlement is reached, and as historians, you'll still be here and writing about it 20 years from now.

How would it have happened? - I think that historically, I think that the big issue is, I think that both sides have had their own internal motivations to fight because they feel like they have something to gain from it, but I think as time has gone on, unfortunately, the record proves that the Palestinian side is delusional.

The longer that the conflict endures, the worse position they'll be in, but for some reason, they've never had a leader that convinced them of that as much. That Arafat thought that if he held on, there was always a better deal around the corner. Abbas is more concerned with trying to maintain any legitimacy amongst Palestinians than actually trying to negotiate anything realistic with Israel.

That Palestinians are always incentivized to feel like as long as they keep fighting, either the international community is going to save them with the five millionth UN resolution condemning whatever, that another ICJ advisory opinion is finally going to lead to the expulsion of half a million Jews from the West Bank, or that some other international body, the ICJ and the genocide charge is gonna come and save the Palestinians.

As long as they, in their mind, feel like somebody is coming to save them, then they feel like they're going to have the ability to get something better in the future, but the reality is, is all of the good partners for peace that the Palestinians had have completely and utterly abandoned them.

Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf States, whether you're talking bilateral peace or the Abraham Accords, most of the Arab leaders in negotiating peace with Israel have just not had as much of an interest in maintaining the rights and the representations of what the Palestinian people want, and the only people they have today to draw legitimacy from, or to have on their side to argue with them, are people that, I guess, write books or tweet, or people in the international community that do resolutions or amnesty international reports.

And the reality is, we can scream until we're blue in the face on these things, none of it has gotten any closer to helping the Palestinians in any sense of the word. The condition has only gotten worse. The settlements only continue to expand. The military operations are only to get more brutal.

The blockade is going to continue to have worse effects. As long as we use international law as the basis, and there isn't a strong, a Sadat-like Palestinian leader that's willing to come up and confront Israel with the brave, peaceful negotiations to force them to acquiesce, nothing is going to happen.

And I think that the issue you come up with is, whether it's people like Norm that talk about how brave the October 7th attacks were, or how much respect they have for those fighters, the Israel in a way, and I think people have said as much about Netanyahu, the right wants violence from the Palestinians because it always gives them a perpetual excuse to further the conflict.

Well, we have to go in on October 7th, and we've got to remove Hamas, but we can't trust these people in the West. We have to do the night raids because of, you know, the second Intifada, you know, made us feel like the Palestinian people didn't want trust with us.

I feel like the biggest thing that would force Israel to change its path would be an actual, a real, not for like two weeks, but an actual peaceful Palestinian leader, somebody committed to peace that is able to apply those standards and hold the entire region of Palestine to those standards.

Because I think over time, the mounting pressure from without the international community and the mounting pressure from within, because Israel hosts a lot of its own criticism. If we talk about B'Tselem, we talk about Horetz, like Israel will host a lot of its own criticism. I think that that pressure would force Israel towards an actual peace agreement, but it's never going to come through violence.

Historically, it hasn't. And in the modern day, violence has just hurt the Palestinians more and more. - If you paint a picture of the future, now's a good moment for both Palestine and Israel to get new leadership. Netanyahu's on the way out. Hamas possibly is on the way out.

Who should rise to the top such that a peaceful settlement can be reached? - The problem is like Benny said, yeah, it's difficult because Hamas enjoys so much widespread support amongst the Palestinian people. I think that the, well, I don't know. There's opinions on whether democracy or pushing them towards elections was the right or wrong idea, but with like an Islamic fundamentalist government for Hamas, I don't know if a negotiation with Israel ever happens there.

And then when the international pressure is always, you know, 67 borders, infinite right of return for refugees, and a total withdrawal of Israel from all these lands to even start negotiations, I just don't see realistically that on the Palestinian side, no negotiations are ever going to start in a place that Israel's willing to accept.

- If you want to dismiss international law, that's fine, but then you have to do it consistently. You can't set standards for the Palestinians, but reject applying those standards to Israel. If we're going to have the law of the jungle, then we can all be beasts, and not only some of us.

And I think, so it's either that, or you have certain agreed standards that are intended to regulate our conduct, all of our conduct, not just some of us. So that's a fundamental- - What are the standards you think I'm saying to abandon? - Well, you're saying, you know, international law and the millionth UN resolution, you're being very dismissive about all these things.

And that's fine, but then you have to be dismissive across the board. - That was a chapter six resolution, that's a non-binding. - But 242 is binding, it's absolutely not binding. - What is binding? Do you know anything about how the UN system works? - If you read the language of the resolution, binding is typically if it commits you to upholding a particular international law or if it establishes a new rule.

- What is chapter six? You just throw out words, you hear binding, not binding. - Does 242 mention a Palestinian state norm? - Of course not. - That's part of the problem. - That was the reason why the Palestinians didn't want to recognize 242, 'cause they're only referred at the very end for refugee problems.

- But the PLO recognized 181 and 242. - Yeah, but hold on, hold on. Every United Nations Security Council resolution, irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding. Binding not only on the members of the Security Council, but on every member state of the UN.

That's, read the UN charter, it's black and white. - Sure, people can look that up if they want. - Now regarding, yes. - But the language even of 242 is kept intentionally vague such that it doesn't actually provide, again, the final concord. - It's actually not that vague. - It's incredibly vague.

- Because the term land for peace originates in 242. The idea is-- - Sure, but what about territorial acquisition and Israel's need to give it up was kept vague. That's why in '79, Israel saw that they fulfilled their obligations under 242 in terms of withdrawal. - Allow me points of information.

The first principle in UN resolution 242 is that the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. - Which is meaningless. - It may be meaningless to you, Mr. Bunnell. - It was meaningless to everyone in the region. - Mr. Bunnell, that principle was adopted by the Friendly Nations Resolution, the UN General Assembly in 1970.

That resolution was then reiterated in the International Court of Justice this ruling advisory opinion in 2004. That was the basis of the coalition against Iraq when it acquired Kuwait and then declared it a province of Kuwait. - Yeah, which Eric Patton supported. - That's what's called, that's what's called under-- - That's true, Eric Patton.

- Eric Patton did support it. - Eric Patton did support it. - It's a shady deal with the Oslo Accords. - I'm not gonna go there. I'm not gonna go there. - It's not accurate that Eric Patton endorsed. - Okay, I'm not gonna go there. - Okay. - It's called under international law, use Kogans or peremptory norms of international law, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

That is not controversial. It's not vague. You couldn't put it more succinctly. You cannot acquire territory by force under international law. - Who owned the White Bank before '67? Who owned the Gaza Strip before '67? - Mr. Bonnell, don't change the subject. If you don't know what you're talking about, at least have the, at least have the humility.

You talk about chapter six. You don't know chapter six. You don't know chapter six from tweet five. You have no idea what you're talking about. It's just so embarrassing. At least have some humility. Between us, we've read maybe 10,000 books on the topic, and you've read two Wikipedia entries, and you start talking about chapter six.

Do you know what chapter seven is? - Answer me, answer me a question. - Do you know what chapter seven is? - No, answer me a question. How close has 242 gotten the Palestinians to a state? How close has the 2004 advisory opinion gotten the West Bank settlement? - What's your alternative?

- The alternative is not this, whatever this making money off the conflict is. The actual alternative. The actual alternative. - Destiny should talk about making money off of idiocy. - Yeah, you're a media blitz where you go and talk to 50 million different people about your awesome solution. - But he has a point there.

- The issue is you have to negotiate. - All these resolutions have gotten the Palestinians no closer to a state. - Because they haven't been enforced because of the U.S. veto. - They're not gonna be enforced. - Well, wait, wait, wait, wait. - Okay. - If I may, if I may.

- You know what, you know what, Professor Morris. - We're talking about the case for genocide. - Professor Morris, because of your logic and I'm not disputing it, that's why October 7th happened. - Oh my God. - Because there was no options left for those people. Exactly what Mouin said.

- And now what options are left? After October 7th, what's the options left? - The only option is conflict. - Listen to this. - The only option is combat. - Mr. Bonnell is now an expert on Palestinian mentality. - You're contradicting yourself. - You know much about Palestinian mentality as you know about chapter five.

- I only deal with the facts. I only deal with the facts. - Tell me about chapter five. - Egypt didn't find it necessary to. - Tell me about chapter five. - Egypt didn't find it necessary to. - Tell me about chapter five. - Negotiate peace with the Palestinians.

- Tell me about chapter five. - Jordan didn't find it necessary to negotiate peace with the Palestinians. - Hey, if I may. - The Arabian Accords didn't work. - You're contradicting yourself. - Didn't work for the Palestinians. - You're contradicting yourself. - You're contradicting yourself. - Despite all of the international law.

- Everybody, Mouin. - You're contradicting yourself. On the one hand, you're saying all the Palestinians do is fight and violence and terrorism and all the rest of it. But on the other hand, you're saying they're expecting salvation from UN resolutions and international coordination. Those aren't violent. - It's the law.

- No, but it's part of maintaining. - It's the continual putting off of negotiating. - They've negotiated. - Any solution. - They've negotiated. - As in when Arafat takes 10 days to respond. When Arafat takes 10 days to respond, the President said all over the world they're going to visit their friends.

Yes, that's what putting the conflict off is definitely. - But Mouin said they accepted two states in 1975. Brace yourself. - Why didn't they accept the Congress then? - Brace yourself. - That's 50 years ago. - This is a legend. - That's a half century ago. - No, no, they didn't accept the two-state solution.

- He quoted a very good article. - You can quote Arafat talking about how he's lying and he's just going to use a 94 and a 95 when he's making trips around the world. - But there's a very rich- - He just wanted to use this as the starting ground.

I'm sorry, I get hooked. So you can watch the DVD and slow it down to 0.5 speed if you don't understand what I'm saying. - Let me finish. There's a very lengthy history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. You want to deny that those negotiations took place. - Where it feels like there was a good faith effort.

Where there was a good faith effort. Where it was a good faith effort. - We have a written record. - With all due respect. - We have a written record. - Mr. Pop Historian, I can't even read the written records. I don't know why you're referring to it. - Excuse me?

I just said there are 15,000 pages on Annapolis. - And I'm sure you cherry-quicked your favorite quote from all of them. - I know, cherry-picked. - Okay, that's great. That's great. - Hey, at least I had a quote to cherry-pick. - That's great. - All you have is Wikipedia.

- I gave you quotes. - All you have is Wikipedia. - Do you want quotes? Find me the information. It says the Palestinian cause has been furthered by any international law. You can't do it. - I think the problem is different, okay? You want to say the Palestinians were only fighting, and then when I point out they've also gone to the court and the UN to say, well, all they do then is these things, and they should be negotiating, and I demonstrate that there was a lengthy record of negotiations that said, yeah, but they didn't go in good faith.

Again, you're placing the hamster in the wheel and telling him if he runs fast enough, maybe one day he'll get out of the cage. - What was the best good faith negotiations on the side of the-- - And please, if I could just finish. I think the fundamental problem here is not what the Palestinians have and haven't done, and it's perfectly legitimate to have a discussion about whether they could have been more effective.

Of course they could have been more effective. Everyone could have always been more effective. The fundamental issue here is that Israel has never been prepared to concede the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights in the land of the former British mandate of Palestine. - How do you explain Taba Summit?

How do you explain the Camp David? - No, Barak and Olmert did-- - How do you explain Olbert's offer to the Ba'aths? - Did accept the legitimacy of Palestinian demands. This is-- - Well, those-- - But they just didn't want to give the Palestinians all of Palestine, that's all.

- No, all of Palestine? - All of Palestine. - You mean all of the occupied territories? - No, no, no. You're talking about all of Palestine and the occupied territories. - Wait, what is the occupied? What is the occupied territories? - The occupied territories. - Is that all of Israel?

- The occupied territories are those territories that Israel occupied in June of 1967. - The Palestinians often use that term to define the whole of Palestine, not just the West Bank. - Could you show me, Professor Morris, in all the negotiations, all the negotiations, and all the accounts that have been written, can you show me one where the Palestinians in the negotiations, 'cause that's what we were talking about, wanted all of Israel.

The maximum-- - They can't say that 'cause international community won't accept it. - You know it 'cause you know what-- - So they didn't say it, they didn't ask for it. - But you know what lurks in their heart. - No, Hamas did. Hamas always said all of it.

- Hamas only negotiated with Israel about prisoner exchanges and the blockade. - Yeah, no, I know, but they represent a lot of the Palestinian people, you'll agree. - The only place I saw pieces of Israel were the land swaps, and the land swaps accounted for about 2% to 5% of Israel.

- Nobody asked for all of Israel. Why do you say things like that? - What do you mean, they asked for all of Israel in '48, they asked for all of Israel in '67. What do you think those wars were about? You're not gonna respond to anything I'm saying 'cause you have no answer.

- I'll respond to you. - That's correct. - Okay, Mr. Ben-El, we were talking about the diplomatic negotiations beginning with 2000, 2001. - You can't pretend that the first ask for Israel was in diplomacy. It was through war. - You don't know what you're talking about. - Is the international law argument ever going to get the Palestinians closer to state?

Is the Israeli state ever gonna be dismantled? Do you think that's realistic coming up, ever, in the next 20 years? - Again, I'm posing a question. And the question is, regardless of what's feasible or realistic today, the question I'm posing is, can you have peace in the Middle East with this militant, irrational, genocidal, apartheid state and power?

- I don't think so, no. - Okay, and the question I'm asking is, can you have peace with this regime, or does this regime and its institutions need to be dismantled, similar to what the examples I gave of Europe and Southern Africa? - How do you contend with the fact that most of the surrounding Arab states seem to agree that you can?

- Yeah, you're correct. Several of them, most importantly Egypt, Jordan, have made their peace with Israel. I should add that Israel's conduct since then has placed these relations under strain. I had very little, I didn't take the reports of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement particularly seriously before October 7th, the reason being that it was really a Saudi-Israeli-U.S.

deal, which committed the U.S. to make certain commitments to Saudi Arabia that would probably never get through Congress. - Do you not consider the Egypt-Israeli peace deal legitimate then, since the United States made a great financial contribution to Egypt? - I don't think the question is whether that deal is legitimate or not.

I think that deal exists, but the point is whether the core of this conflict is not between Israel and Egypt. The core of this conflict is between Israel and the Palestinian people, and the reason that Israel agreed to relinquish the occupied Egyptian Sinai, and the reason that Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 is because Israel in 1973 recognized that its military superiority was ultimately no match for Egypt's determination to recover its occupied territories, and that there would come a point when Egypt would find a way to extract an unbearable price.

- Maybe just the Israelis wanted peace. - Well, the Israelis wanted-- - Not just because they were afraid of what Egypt might do at some point. - If you're talking about the average Israeli citizen, I think that's a fair characterization. If you're talking about the Israeli leadership, I think they looked at it in more strategic terms.

How do you remove the most powerful Arab military state from the equation? - Two points, simple points. What was the terms of that Egypt-Israel peace treaty? International law. Egypt demanded every-- - Nobody cared about international law. - Allow me to finish. Every single inch of Egyptian-- - Nobody had talked about international law.

Begin and Carter and Saddam talked about the reality of Israel occupying territory. - Professor Morris, Professor Morris, I know the record. They demanded, as you know, 'cause you've written about it, they demanded every square inch. As you know, they demanded the oil fields be dismantled. - No, that's in the-- - The airfields-- - No, not dismantled, they wanted the oil fields.

- And they wanted the settlements dismantled. - They wanted the settlements dismantled. - The settlements, the oil fields, and the airfield. They demanded all three back. You can't have-- - What do you mean back? The airfields weren't there when the Egyptians were there. - Okay, that's incorrect. - What's incorrect?

- You're incorrect. They built an airfield. - The airfields - The airfield, the Israelis built an airfield in the occupied Sinai. - Yes. - And they wanted it back-- - They didn't want it back. It wasn't theirs. - No, okay. - They wanted the territory in which the airfield-- - Okay, allow, okay.

- Israel had built back. - The oil fields, the airfields, the settlements had to be dismantled. - Yes. - Begin said, "I don't wanna be the first prime minister "to dismantle a settlement." - Then he did. - But he did, why? Because of the law. - No. - No, it was because of peace.

It was normalization-- - Nobody cared about the law. The law had nothing to do with anything. - Was there a negotiation-- - Mr. Morris, Mr. Martin-- - Between two states-- - Mr. Martin, Mr. Morris. - Each of which wanted certain things. - Palestinians wanted-- - The law had nothing to do with anything.

- As I said repeatedly in the negotiations-- - You're not listening. You're not listening. - I know-- - You're missing one point. - I've read the negotiations. - The law has nothing to do with anything. - There are two foreign relations of U.S. volumes on it. - Nobody cared about the law.

- The Palestinians kept saying, "We want exactly--" - Forget the Palestinians, they weren't there. - Allow me to finish. The Palestinians kept saying, "We want what Egypt got. "We want what Egypt got." - Yeah. - Egypt got everything back. - But nothing to do with the law. - Okay.

- Nothing to do with the law. - And number two, I'm not saying it's the whole picture, but as Foreign Minister Moisha Dayan said at the time, he said, "If a car has four wheels "and you remove one wheel, the car can't move." And for them, removing Egypt from the Arab front would then remove any Arab military threat to Israel.

So Muin was, no, the first part did, and that's what the Palestinians kept saying, "We want what Egypt got from the settlement." - Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's true, but forget international law. - And by the way-- - Have nothing to do with the negotiations. - One last thing, one last, on a personal note.

The quote about Sharm el-Sheikh without peace, okay. That's the only thing you ever cited from a book of mine. - I cited it from your book? - Yes. I was absolutely shocked at your betrayal of your people. That was pure treason. It was one-- - I apologize for that.

I apologize, I apologize. - Okay, I accept, I accept. All right, well, let me try once again. For the region and for just entirety of humanity, what gives you hope? We just heard a lot of pessimistic, cynical things. What gives you hope? - People don't like war. That's a good reason, that's hope.

In other words, the fear of war, the disaster of war should give people an impetus to try and seek peace. - When you look at people in Gaza and people in the West Bank, people in Israel-- - They should want-- - Fundamentally, no, but fundamentally, they hate war. - Yes, I think so.

- What gives you hope? - There is no hope, no. It's an extreme, no, I'm, hey, I'm not happy to say that. - Of course you are. - It's a... It's a very bleak moment right now because-- - That I agree with, I agree with that. - Israel believes it has to restore what it calls its deterrence capability.

I think you've written about it, actually, I just realized. Israel has to restore its deterrence capability, and after the catastrophe of October 7th, restoring its deterrence capacity means this part you didn't write about, the annihilation of Gaza and then moving on to the Hezbollah. - No, no, there's-- - So, the Israelis are dead set on restoring that deterrence capability.

On the Arab side, and I know Muin and I have disagreed on it, and we're allowed to disagree, I think the Arab side, the lesson they learned from October 7th is Israelis aren't as strong as we thought they were. And-- - That would be an unfortunate message, 'cause that's really what the Arabs come to believe.

- And they think that there is a military option now. And I think that's, it's a zero-sum game at this point, and it's very, very bleak. And I'm not going to lie about that. Now, I will admit my predictive capacities are not perfect-- - Are limited. - Are limited.

- Yes, yes. - But for the moment, it's a very bleak situation. - That I agree with. - And I don't see right now a way out. However, at the very minimum, permanent ceasefire and the inhuman and illegal blockade of Gaza, and-- - Why is it illegal? They were shooting rockets at Israel for 20 years.

Why is that illegal, to blockade Gaza? - He thinks they're bottle rockets. - Why is it illegal? I'll tell you why. - You don't rocket your neighbor. You rocket your neighbor, expect consequences. - I'll tell you why. - Expect consequences. - But that works both ways. - I know, I know, I've said that.

Professor Morris. - It works both ways. - I'll tell you why. Because every human rights, humanitarian, and UN organization in the world-- - They're all irrelevant. - Has said that the blockade-- - Nobody cares about amnesty. - Is a form of collective punishment-- - Nobody cares about amnesty. - Which is illegal under international law.

- Forget the legal. The word illegal is-- - You think a blockade-- - You don't understand the way the world works. - Yeah, and you think confining, because that's the blockade. - Yes, you don't-- - Confining a million children, confining-- - That's the choice of Hamas. - Confining a million children in what the Economist called a human rubbish sheep.

- The Economist supported Israel in this war and continues to support Israel. - International Committee of the Red Cross called a sinking ship, what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called a toxic slum. You think-- - It's a toxic slum, of course it's a slum. - You think under international law, you think it's legitimate to-- - Forget the law.

- Hey, I know you wanna forget the law. - What about morality? - It's the one thing that every-- - Forget the law, what about morality? - It's what every Israeli fears the most. - What? - The law. - No, no, no. - As Tzipi Litany said, I studied international law, I oppose international law.

Of course you don't wanna hear about the law. - That has got nothing to do with anything. - Okay, so here's the thing. Then don't complain about October 7th. If you don't wanna-- - Did you hear me complain? - If you wanna say, forget about the law. - All I said was they acted like barbarians.

- Then there is no international humanitarian law, there's no distinction between civilians and combatants. - There should be. - And so Hamas-- - There should be, but it's got nothing to do with the law. - Now you're doing what Muin said, you're becoming very selective about the law. If you wanna forget about the law, Hamas had every right to do what it did.

It had every right to do what it did. According to you, not to me, 'cause you want to forget the law. - Do you still support the Houthis shooting random ships? - Absolutely. - Okay, that's a violation of international law, so you play the same game. - Absolutely, and were there a power during World War II who had the courage of the Houthis, were there a power that had that kind of courage?

- So courageous to be bombing merchant ships while tens of thousands of people die of actual starvation. Not the starvation that exists in the Gaza Strip where people, before October, don't die of starvation. Not the concentration camp that exists in the Gaza Strip. - What about starvation in Yemen?

Don't they have something better to do? - Hey, that was the Houthis. - Yes, I know, don't they have anything better to do? - And you know, in three years, they lost 180,000 people. - Shouldn't they be feeding the Yemenis? - You know, 60,000 Yemenis died in starvation. - Why fight the Western powers in Israel when you should be taking care of your problems at home, the Houthis?

- Often, the only allies of the dispossessed are those who experience similar circumstances. - Don't you think that they should take care of the Yemeni problems? - As I said- - I'm very happy. I'm very happy they're helping out the Palestinians. Anyone who helps the people- - It's at the expense of the Yemenis.

- Anybody- - They don't pay for it. - Anybody who comes to the aid of those suffering the genocide, half of whom are- - There's no genocide. - Half of whom are children. Yeah, according to the most current UN reports, as of today- - There's no genocide. - One quarter of the population of Gaza- - Is starving.

- That means 500,000 children- - Are starving. - Are on the verge of famine. - They keep saying on the verge of. - On the verge of. - I have not- - Didn't you call that they said it was unlivable? - I have not seen one Palestinian die of starvation in these last four months, not one.

- There have been documented cases. - They're always on the verge. They're on the verge. - There have been documented cases. - I haven't seen them. - Yesterday, Al Jazeera said six, and the day before that, they said two. So those are the two. - Okay, that number probably dies in Israel of starvation also.

- I don't think there's famine in Israel. - There isn't. There isn't in the Gaza Strip either. - You're so late. - It's something which is produced for the Western- - I haven't seen any children yet. - There are infants dying due to a engineered lack of access to food and nutrition.

- I don't think it's engineered. I think if the Hamas stopped shooting, perhaps- - Unfortunately, unfortunately- - As you said, engineered. - I think Amnesty, excuse me, Human Rights Watch called it using starvation as a weapon. That's called engineering. - Okay. - That's what they did. But you were pushed on this by Coleman Hughes to bring up like an example of why is the Gaza Strip?

Like by what metric are they starving? By what metric is it so behind the rest of the world? - You know, if we're gonna bring up- - I wanna hear an answer to that 'cause he didn't answer it before- - Okay, I'm happy to answer it. - Yeah. - I just called you from the humanitarian organizations.

They said one quarter of the population of Gaza is now verging on famine. - Before October 7th. - Okay. - Before October 7th. - I'm not going before October 7th. - You use that as justification for Hamas fighting. You say the conditions were unlivable. They had to fight. - Yeah, I said to him- - So my question is what made it unlivable prior to October 7th?

What are the metrics that you're using? - Okay, there were about five, six or seven reports issued by UNCTAD, issued by the World Bank, issued by the International Monetary Fund, and they all said, "That's why." That's why- - Why did they say why? Why did they say that? - That's why the economist, not a radical periodical, described Gaza as a human rubbish.

- So tell me by what metrics? If you're a historian- - Okay, okay, okay. - If you do all this work to get into things, tell me what they said- - Here's something, Mr. Bunnell. - Tell me by what metrics? - Mr. Bunnell. - He's not gonna answer again.

- I don't think I've avoided any of your questions, except when they breached, when they breached a threshold of complete imbecility. - So you're about to tell me by what metric the Gaza Strip is a humanitarian crisis? - Okay, I'm going to answer this. You remember what I said a moment ago?

I said to Professor Morris, "I defer to expertise." I look at what the organizations say. I look at what the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights say. - You're saying it by words that you don't know. You don't know or you don't care. - I don't know. - Okay, that's fine.

- Do you know how complicated? Have you ever investigated how complicated is the metric for hunger, starvation, and famine? It is such a complicated metric they figured out. If you asked me to repeat it now, I couldn't do it. - And yet we have a Human Development Index where we rank countries.

Yet we can still measure infant mortality, life expectancy. - Yeah, we can measure all of these things. - Muin, I'm holding out for you here. You still didn't answer the hope question. What gives you a source of hope about the region? - Well, first of all, I would agree with Benny Morris and Norman Finkelstein that the current situation is bleak.

And I think it would be unreasonable to expect it to not get even bleaker in the coming weeks and months. And we now, this conflict really, it originated in the late 19th century. It's been a more or less active conflict since the 1920s, 1930s. And it has produced a tremendous amount of suffering and regional conflict and geopolitical complications and all of that.

But what gives me hope is that throughout their entire ordeal, the Palestinian people have never surrendered. And I believe they never will surrender to overwhelming force and violence. They have taken everything that Israel has thrown at them. They have taken everything that the West has thrown at them. They have taken everything that those who are supposed to be their natural allies have on occasion thrown at them.

But this is a people that never has, and I believe never will surrender. And at a certain point, I think Israel and its leaders will have to come to the realization that by hook or by crook, these people are going to achieve their inalienable and legitimate national rights. And that is going to be a reality.

- What do you mean by that? You mean all of Palestine, is that what you mean? - No, and-- - From the river to the sea. - Well, ideally, of course, yes. - Those inalienable rights. - No, what I was saying earlier, and then the discussion got sidetracked, is that I did believe that a two-state settlement, a partition of Palestine along the 1967 boundaries would have been a reasonable solution because I think it also would have opened pathways to further-- - But now you believe what?

- Further nonviolent engagement between Israel and the Palestinians that could create other forms of coexistence in a federal or binational or other-- - What do you think about refugees in regards to that? Do you think there has to be a resettlement of the five or six million, whoever wants to lay claim to being a sentence of return?

- I think there has to be an explicit acknowledgement of the responsibility and of the rights. I think that in the framework of a two-state settlement, I think a formula would need to be found that does not undermine the foundations of a two-state settlement. And I don't think it would be that difficult because I suspect that there are probably large numbers of Palestinian refugees who, once their rights are acknowledged, will find it exceptionally distasteful-- - Canada.

- Exceptionally distasteful to have to live among the kind of sentiments that we've heard around this table today, to be quite frank. I mean, I heard, I was previously unfamiliar with you, and I watched one of your preparation videos. Very disconcerting stuff, I have to say. You were explaining two days ago in the discussion about apartheid and how absurd it was that, in your view, Jim Crow was not apartheid.

Jim Crow was not apartheid. But Arab states not giving citizenship to Palestinian refugees is apartheid. That's what I meant with my earlier comments about white supremacy. - So my issue, that's great, the white supremacy comment. Well, hold on, let me respond, okay? My issue is that I feel like we have jumped on this euphemistic treadmill, and I think that's part of the reason why this conflict will never get solved, is because on one end, you've got a people who are now convinced internationally that they're victims of apartheid, genocide, concentration camp conditions, ethnic cleansing, they're forced to live in an open-air prison, with all of these things that are stacked against them, all of these terms that are highly specific, that refer to very precise things, and then when people like you say that they should-- - I would expect nothing less from someone who doesn't think Jim Crow was apartheid.

- I don't know if Jim-- - But who does think that Arab states not giving-- - Because the problem is you're morally loading. For you, apartheid is when racists do bad things. - No, no. - Right? - There's a definition of apartheid. - That's great. - There's a very clear definition of apartheid.

- But the specific top-down racial domination enacted through top-down federal legislative policies or whatever, means that I don't know if Jim Crow would have qualified for apartheid. That doesn't make it any less-- - Have you ever heard-- - Excuse me, Finkelstein, I'm talking right now. - Have you ever heard-- - Finkelstein, I'm talking to your friend over here.

I don't know if it would have qualified as the crime of apartheid. Just like if Israel were to literally nuke the Gaza Strip and kill two million people, I don't know if that would qualify for the crime of genocide. - In your eyes, probably not. - I don't, well, yeah, but because genocide requires a special intent.

I think the issue is, instead of, and I think this conversation is actually, is emblematic of the entire conversation. I don't think anything-- - And let me finish answering Benny Morris's question. - Well, sure, but you accused me of supporting racism, so yeah. - Well, you did, and you are.

- I did it, do you think I support Jim Crow laws? - Look, when-- - The fact that you can't even answer that honestly, right? - It doesn't matter what-- - You wouldn't say that 800 civilians were killed by Hamas. You said, well, maybe 400 were killed by Israel.

- No, I didn't say that. - I don't know the number, maybe. - No, I didn't say that. - Yes, you said 400. - No, I didn't say that. - You co-signed the opinion. - No, I didn't. - No, I didn't. - He said majority-- - No, I didn't.

- Well, wait, how many, what do you, I think the word was some, that's what I heard. - No, I think-- - Well, you weren't listening. - How many people do you think approximately, if you had to ballpark it, how many do you think were killed by Hamas on October 7th?

- I think it's pretty clear that the majority of civilians that were killed-- - That's what you said. - 51% or 90%? - Don't ask me to put a number-- - I just want to ballpark. Those are two very different intuitions. - First of all, when you say Hamas, do you mean Palestinians, or do you mean Hamas specifically?

- I mean the invading Palestinian force. I don't like to say Palestinians, because I don't think all Palestinian civilians were involved in attacks. I'll say Hamas, Islamic Jihad, whatever, al-Quds, whatever other-- - But that's how this discussion started. You said Hamas, and I began to answer that, and then Benny Morris said, actually, he means Hamas in addition to Jihad and the others, so.

- So of the invading Palestinian force, how many do you think killed civilians versus the IDF? What do you think, the ballpark, the percentage? - Well, the figures we have are that about a third of the casualties on October 7th were military, and about 2/3 were-- - That's not what I asked at all.

- What's your question? - How many, what percentage of civilians-- - How many of the 2/3? - I think were killed by the invading force, a ballpark. - I think a clear majority, but I can't give you a specific figure. - If you thought it was closer to 51% or 99%, were killed by-- - Why would he know that?

How would he know that? - It's because it's interesting to actually stake out a position. - Yeah, it's interesting-- - If you want to be completely, totally agnostic on it, that's fine. - They start complete ignorance, because we don't know, Professor Morris doesn't know, Muin Rabbani doesn't know-- - And yet you can speak with absolute certainty that the IDF is targeting and murdering Palestinian children intentionally.

Do you see the double standard? - No, I don't, you see-- - I know you don't. - I know, I don't see it, you know why? Because I looked at the UN report. I looked at the UN-- - The Goldstone report? - No, the UN report on the Great March of Return in 2018, and they said that the snipers were targeting children, medics, journalists, and disabled people.

- Just as they are now in this conflict. - Exactly. - No, more journalists have been killed in the last several months in Gaza than in any other conflict. - Do you acknowledge that? - And in all of World War II. - Let me finish. - Do you acknowledge that Hamas-- - And in all of World War II.

- That's great, the comparison is fun. - Hamas is not killing journalists in the Gaza Strip. - Does Hamas, do you agree that they operate in civilian uniforms, that their goal is to induce that confusion, that that's the way that they conduct themselves militarily? - Let me finish my point.

More journalists have been-- - I understand. - More U.S-- - He doesn't wanna hear it. So far, it's fine. - No, because it's virtue-- - It's so far. - You're not having a material, a substantial-- - Virtue signaling. - It is virtue signaling. - Virtue signaling, yeah. - Yes, like when you say children over and over again, that's virtue signaling.

- But talking about, you know, you have this-- - Talking about how many, you have this habit of mocking the dead. - Talking about how many Israelis were killed, that's not virtue signaling, 'cause that's human life. - I don't care about, I don't care if 100 are killed or 1,000 are, I'm curious who you're assigning blame to.

- You just interrogate 51%, 90%, and then-- - I'm curious who you're assigning the question, yes. - And then Muin-- - That's not the number, that's the responsibility norm. - And then Muin, Muin mentions that more journalists were killed in Gaza than in all of World War II. - That doesn't get it, that doesn't further any part of the-- - And more medics were killed in Gaza.

- No, no, that's silly. - And then he says-- - Journalists-- - It's virtue signaling. - Weren't on the area. - But when Israelis get killed, that's serious. - I never said it's serious on both sides. - Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. - I didn't say it's federal. - No, no, no, no, I'm not virtue signaling.

I'm asking a substantive question of who do you assign blame to, or do you play into Norm Finkelstein's conspiracies that the ambulances should have known immediately who was dead, that the numbers were changed 'cause they were fake, or that maybe 51% of the people were killed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but 49% were killed by IED helicopters.

- You asked me a direct question, and you got a direct answer. - I didn't, I got majority, which could be-- - I said a clear, I said a clear majority. - What percent is a clear majority? As opposed to a majority-- - It's always, they live in ambiguity, of course.

- A clear majority, in my view, is well over 50%. Please don't ask me to be more precise, because I can't-- - You could say 80, 90, 95%. - If I knew that, I would say it. - I think it's a reasonable, it's a reasonable-- - Perhaps it is, but I-- - You're not the best person to be asking that question.

You know, I read when you wrote, described Operation Defensive Shield, and you said a few dozen homes were destroyed. - You're talking about what happened in the Jinnian refugee camp. - And you said-- - No, the Arabs said 500. You guys said 500 Palestinians were killed in Jinnian. - No, no, no.

- I never said that. I never said that. - No, but that was the statement of the PLO, the Palestinian Authority. - You said a few dozen homes-- - And that there were massacres there. - There were a few dozen homes ago. - Yes, a few dozen homes. - Yeah.

- That's right. - Well, it turned out 140 buildings were destroyed. 5,000 people, 5,000 people were left homeless. - How many were killed? - You just, 5,000. - How many were killed? - You described it, no, I'm talking about homes destroyed. So you're not the best person to be criticizing what Muin says when he says clear majority, but he can't say more.

You know why he can't say more? - He doesn't know. - He doesn't know. - Yeah, yeah, I understand that. - I hope as a historian-- - If I was trying to belittle, I would give you a very different answer. I would just say, I don't know. I do know that somewhere-- - The right phrase, do you know what the right phrase there would be?

The overwhelming majority were killed by Arab gunmen, and very small number were killed by Israelis by accident or whatever. That's probably true. - You're not speaking as a historian, though. - That's probably true. - That may be, I can state with confidence a clear majority, overwhelming majority. You may be correct, but I can't state that with certainty.

I think there's a very easy way to find out, is to have a independent-- - Forget independent. - I know you don't-- - Well, of course you forget independent. - Forget the law. - Forget, that doesn't mean anything. - Forget the law. - Independent as you want. - Independent as you want.

- Forget independent as you want. - Human rights, Robert. - Not necessarily. - Just repeat the numbers. - They're all barbaric countries. Assyrian was the head of the UN Commission for Human Rights. - But if it wasn't Israeli, it would have been okay. - He certainly would have been more honest than Assyrian.

- Of course, oh yeah, from your perspective. - Well, to disagree with Stephen, I thought this was extremely valuable. At times, really, the view of history, the passion. - I'm really grateful that you would spend your really valuable time, and just one more question, since we have two historians here.

Well, just briefly, from a history perspective, what do you hope your legacy as historians, Benny and Norm, will be of the work that you've put out there? Maybe Norm, you can go first, and try to just say briefly. - I think there's a value to preserving the record. I'm not optimistic about where things are going to end up.

There was a very nice book written by a woman named Helen Hunt Jackson, at the end of the 19th century, describing what was done to the Native Americans. She called it a century of dishonor, and she described in vivid, poignant detail what was done to the Native Americans. Did it save them?

No. Did it help them? Probably not. Did it preserve their memory? Yes. And I think there's a value to that. You know, there was a famous film by Eisenstein, Sergei Eisenstein. It was either "Battleship Potemkin" or "Mother." I can't remember which one. The last scene was the czar's troops mowing down all the Russian people.

He pans the scene. - Not all the Russian people, just a few. - Well, he pans the massacre. He pans the massacre. - But he could have killed a lot more. (laughing) - And the last words of the movie were, "Proletarians, exclamation point. "Remember, exclamation point." And I've seen it as my life's work to preserve the memory, and to remember.

I didn't expect that anyone would read my book on Gaza. It's very dense. It gives me even a bit of a headache to read at least one of the chapters. - You wrote a book on Gaza. (laughing) - But I thought that the memory deserves to be preserved. - Amen.

- Well, I would just say very briefly, unlike my colleague, I think writing the truth about what happened in history, in various periods of history, if I've done a little bit of that, I'm happy. - Thank you, Norm. Thank you, Benny. Thank you, Stephen. Thank you, Maureen. Thanks for listening to this conversation with Norman Finklestein, Benny Morris, Maureen Rabbani, and Stephen Bunnell.

To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, let me leave you with some words from Lyndon B. Johnson. "Peace is a journey of a thousand miles, "and it must be taken one step at a time." Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.

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